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0.1 Overview and Objectives
Any macroeconomic impact is a result of trade-offs between forces in the economy.
Examples of trade-offs are: Does wage flexibility in crises increase employment and
help mitigate recessions or does it decrease demands and increase the severity of
recessions? Is the higher oil price good or bad for the world economy? These questions
and similar dilemmas could be answered only by considering the specifications of each
economy 1. A good macroeconomic model not only considers the significant forces and
characteristics of an economy, but also is able to draw a clear forecast for the future
of the economy.
By giving special attention to economic policy making, this thesis in 5 chapters
studies, theoretically and empirically, the propagation mechanisms governing business
cycles, in particular the role of financial sector, housing and credit markets. To
do so, DSGE framework remains a core to modeling, estimating, simulating and
analyzing in this thesis. This study concerns different types of agents and focuses
on the implications of various policies on price fluctuations, housing, the behavior
of non-financial firms, households, governments and in turn, their impacts on real
macroeconomic performance. The aim is twofold. First, contributing to the literature
for enhancing our ability to define, measure, and manage activities that pose risks to
the macroeconomy as a whole. Second, defining financial and public policies which
mitigate the volatility of the system and insulate individual well-being. In addition,
models are calibrated to correspond with various examples of advanced and developing
economies. These examples help diagnose the problems and assess the functionality
of the models.
The first three chapters of this thesis focus on advanced economies with the example of
1. These specifications includes defining interconnections between agents and calibrations. In the
language of DSGE, the calibration is delineated by giving value to parameters related to deeper
structural parameters describing household preferences, technological and institutional constraints,
etc.
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the US economy in three periods, respectively: the economic climate before the Great
Recession, the systemic collapse on 2008, and the recovery time after the crisis. The
two last chapters of this thesis answer policy questions about developing economies
with examples of Iran and Morocco. The key questions of each chapter are as follows;
i) The key question of the first chapter is a policy question related to the origin of the
recent crisis: What are macroeconomic consequences, if in the presence of the housing
and credit markets, borrowers default on their obligations to financial intermediary
agents i.e. if banks accumulate Non Performing Loans (NPLs)?
ii) The main question of the second chapter is how the housing and credit markets
can exacerbate disasters on shadow financial institutions in times of recession, in
which situation the financial institution can collapse and how this collapse impacts
on recovery?
iii) The third chapter’s core question is about finding the proper housing and mortgage
fiscal policies. These policies should have lower fiscal multipliers and welfare losses.
This chapter also studies the tax revenue neutral reforms.
iv) The fourth chapter’s key question is how does the financial sector of oil-exporting
developing countries react against oil price fluctuations. The relationship between
macroeconomic aggregates and the financial sector as well as channels through which
the business cycle and the financial cycle in oil economies interacts are the subject of
this study.
v) The last chapter of the thesis answers a policy question about the optimal fiscal
reform in non-oil developing countries with a big informal sector 2.
Purely empirical models quantitatively discover statistical characterizations of the
data. This would be useful only if the model is well designed to account for economic
structures that conduct data processes. On the order hand, stylized theoretical models
2. This research is contributed to the IMF’s Article IV consultation of Morocco
2017. See IMF Country Report No. 18/76 https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/12847/
morocco-selected-issues-paper-imf-country-report-no-18-76-march-2018.pdf
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might provide a rich theoretical structure but they are usually silent in accommodating
observed behavior. A policy maker requires tools which has both strengths: the
conformation to the data and the ability to discover the causal relations behind
the data. To do so, DSGE models follow the complexity of the modern economy
and have become more adaptable with a variety of variables. This “complexity to
accuracy” is imperative from the modern socio-economic perspective: any business
cycle has fallouts by changing GDP, unemployment and growth. So policy makers are
responsible for choosing the best models for insulating well-being of people.
Imposing any complexity to an economic model cannot be preformed only in an ad-
hoc manner 3, without referring to the reality and microfoundations. In this view,
another favorable characteristic of DSGE framework is its attempt to build a macro
model based on microfoundations. This means that micro and macro-economics
cooperate to achieve the results. The attempt for building macro models taking
microfoundations has two periods in the recent economic history. The first attempt
was real business cycle (RBC) theory 4. The second attempt tries to meet micro
and macro-economics by defining market imperfections in different forms, principally
by introducing imperfect competition in goods, labor, asset, financial and credit 5
markets, as well as by nominal or real rigidities. Two good examples of this new
neoclassical approach with Keynesian elements are Smets and Wouters (2003) and
3. For the discussion about why the models only based on microeconomic fundamentals are
not enough for economic analyses, please see Chumacero and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004):”A major
disadvantage of many empirical structural models based only on microeconomic fundamentals –
reflected in a sparse specification that avoids ad hoc variable inclusion – is their poor tracking of
short-run dynamics and unsatisfactory short-term predictive ability. This (and Sims 1980 critique
of large-scale macroeconometric models) has led to the development of non- (and semi-) structural
vector autoregression models (VARs), based on statistically observed dynamic relations among a
small number of key macroeconomic variables. VARs are popularly used for generating impulse
responses to temporary shocks, variance decompositions, and short-term projections, but because they
lack behavioral structure, they are not useful for understanding structural relations, generating long-
term projections, or simulating permanent changes in predetermined variables. Hence, VARs are
empirically useful but not more than complementary tools to structural general equilibrium models
for empirical analysis”.
4. Competitive equilibrium models and their microfoundations has the crucial rule in framing
RBC models. See Dosi et al. (2009). On RBC, also see the seminal work Kydland and Prescott
(1982). The older examples of general equilibrium models are Lucas Jr (1972), Lucas and Lucas
(1987) and Lucas Jr (1978).
5. Theses models allow for borrowing and lending in equilibrium. For example, see Rotemberg
(1987), Benanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
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Laxton and Pesenti (2003).
Both RBC and New Keynesian models are studied in this thesis. Financial sector and
rigidities are as core in these analyses. The findings of the thesis illustrate that DSGE
models which are enriched by financial factors better match the data, therefore they
are more reliable for forecasting and policy making.
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Figure 1 – Changes in household financial assets, liabilities and net financial wealth in
the euro area. Source: ECB
The financial sector- which we can call financial intermediary or bank- is at the center
of the modern economy. For example, the theory of credit rationing is tied to the
banking theory 6 or the existence of central banks without financial sector cannot
be assumed. Figure 1 depicts the decomposition of wealth in the Euro area between
2006-2017. The figure clearly indicates the importance of financial assets and financial
activities, especially in the time of the recent crisis. The 2008 crisis massively changed
6. There is an expansive literature on the connection between credit and the macroeconomy. For
example, Gilchrist et al. (2009),Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), Faust et al. (2013), and Gilchrist and
Zakrajˇsek (2012).
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the modeling of financial sector and frictions in the literature.
Chapter one and three of this thesis adopt the banking model of the seminal work of
Iacoviello (2015). This kind of financial modeling belongs to an expansive literature
which deals with a bank as an agent who performs financial intermediary activities
between savers and borrowers. For a brief list of this literature, one can refer to
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Kollmann et al. (2011) and Meh and Moran
(2010). The banking modeling of chapter one and three differs in two parts. First,
their bank’s balance sheet are different. In chapter one the bank asset side is composed
of two assets: mortgage and government bonds. While in chapter three mortgages
are the only assets of banks. Second, the capital adequacy constraints differs in the
two chapters. In chapter three, the banking system must satisfy banking regulations
every period i.e. the bank equity must exceed a fraction of bank assets in any moment
of the simulation. This constraint is modified in chapter one to allow for a partial
adjustment in bank capital. This partial adjustment gives a degree of freedom to the
banking sector to modestly recapitalize and meet banking regulations. This freedom
is close to the microfoundations of banks’ activities.
Chapter two focuses on shadow banks 7. The model of chapter two improves a very
recent model of shadow banking sector built and developed 8 by the influential work
of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015). In the model, shadow banks issue short-term debt to
finance mortgage and loan demands by households and firms, respectively. As a result,
the bank’s assets are long-term assets while the liabilities are short-term (one-period).
The different maturity time between assets and liabilities makes banks vulnerable to
shocks.
Chapter four focuses on the impact of oil price fluctuations on interconnections of
the financial sector. The model of chapter four sets up a New-Keynesian model that
7. ”Shadow banks are financial entities other than regulated depository institutions (commercial
banks, thrifts, and credit unions) that serve as intermediaries to channel savings into investment.
Securitization vehicles, ABCP vehicles, money market funds, investment banks, mortgage companies,
and a variety of other entities are part of the shadow banking system. Before the crisis, the shadow
banking system had come to play a major role in global finance; with hindsight, we can see that
shadow banking was also the source of some key vulnerabilities”,Bair (2010).
8. See Gertler et al. (2016a) and Gertler et al. (2016b).
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features a heterogenous financial sector with the presence of the central bank. The
financial agents are either a borrowing (deposit) bank or a lending bank. These
two types interact on an inter-bank market. Borrowing banks collect deposit from
households and lend it to the lending banks at the interbank rate. Lending banks,
then, mix up inter-bank loans with their own net worth and liquidity from the
central bank to finance loans to firms and buy government bonds. This kind of
modeling financial sector is standard and vastly used in the literature e.g. Dib (2010),
De Walque et al. (2010), Gerali et al. (2010).
The fifth chapter, in its empirical section, emphasizes that an efficient financial
sector remarkably helps economic development. A well designed banking system
stimulates saving and investments by mobilizing savings and assigns them to
productive enterprises. This removes the deficiency of capital in the economy and
results in a progressive distribution, effective investments, decreasing informality and
consequently, a direct positive impact on growth.
Before the crisis, most efforts had been made to study the dynamics of the main
macroeconomic variables and not the relation between financial and credit markets,
and the real economy. For example, Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) build a model in
which financial sector- i.e. banks- acts as a firm. Banks combine their own net worth
with capital from other sectors to issue loans. So banks are subject to equity and
regulatory constraints. Nevertheless financial frictions are the missing points in such
paper. On the other hand, seminal works such as Bernanke et al. (1999), Bernanke and
Gertler (2000), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) and Iacoviello (2005) introduce financial
frictions and credit transactions in economic models through the market but they
ignored an independent financial sector.
The absence of financial intermediaries causes that credit-supply effects are ignored.
As a result, financial frictions are considered only on the borrowers’ side of credit
markets. The absence of financial mechanisms in pre-crisis models has a rational
reason; there was a public belief at that moment about the financial sector: financial
8
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shocks cannot have a major effects on aggregate economic activity. This opinion was
driven from the economic history and pre-crisis literature in which, the financial sector
does not significantly modify the responding mechanism to the shock 9. In addition,
economists were sure about the stability of financial systems for the reason of deposit
insurance; conventional wisdom had it that deposit insurance makes the financial
system impossible to run 10.
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Figure 2 – Composition of financial systems per GDP (%), Advanced economies (End of
2016). Source: FSB Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2016.
Figure 2 presents the composition of financial systems per GDP at the end of 2016
for Advanced economies 11. The figure depicts that the size of the financial sector
in advanced economies stood at above twice GDP. For example, the total financial
sector for France and Euro area are about 6.29 and 7.06 times of GDP, respectively.
This confirms the crucial role of the financial sector in economic modeling. By
9. For example see Linde´ et al. (2016)
10. See Diamond and Dybvig (2000) and Cooper and Ross (2002). Even at that time there were
some research which indicates different opinion. For instance, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)
show that deposit insurance cannot fully save the financial system from banking crises and somehow
it might increase the probability of a crisis.
11. To keep the figure clear, Luxembourg and Cayman Islands are excluded from the figure. The
volume of banks and OFIs for Cayman Islands are 34171% and 211,844% of GDP, respectively. These
are 1414% and 24674% of GDP for Luxembourg.
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neglecting the financial sector, models miss crucial channels. Ignoring financial sector
as a failure, was revealed and resolved in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In
this tiem, many empirical researches emphasized the role of shifts in credit supply
in amplifying the business cycle and macroeconomic fluctuations 12. As a result,
theoretical papers have included financial intermediaries in economic models. This
links financial factors to macroconomic fluctuations. Here, I mention a non-exhaustive
list of a few influential studies such as Gertler et al. (2010), Curdia and Woodford
(2010), Del Negro et al. (2010), Dib (2010), Angeloni and Faia (2013), Christiano
et al. (2014), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and
Christiano et al. (2016).
Financial frictions are another important subject of this thesis and recent DSGE
models. Critics e.g. Stiglitz (2018) argues that the pre-crisis DSGE models were not
equipped with essential elements of a complex economy such as financial frictions,
liquidity constrained consumers and credit rationing. As a result, the models were
not able to predict the crisis or to provide accurate policy recommendation to resolve
related issues. The critics, then, doubt the ability of the DSGE model to predict and
recommend an efficient policy in the context of other deep downturns. The answer
to this critique is what has been already mentioned in the paragraph above and also
partly mentioned in the critics’ arguments: the absence of a financial sector with
proper financial frictions made pre-crisis DSGE models unable to predict the crisis
which was based on housing bubble and financial issues. Pre-crisis DSGE models did
not fail to predict the 2008 crisis because of their approach, they failed because of the
crucial elements missing from their models. As an example, Christiano et al. (2017)
indicate that the failure of DSGE models to forecast the 2008 crisis was a consequence
of a mistake in modeling the financial sector by missing shadow banking system which
is not subject to deposit insurance 13.
Another important objective of this thesis is to illuminate the fundamental
12. See Adrian and Shin (2010), Ciccarelli et al. (2015) and Gilchrist et al. (2009).
13. The significant role of shadow banking sector in the recent crisis is generally confirmed by the
economics community, for instance see Bernanke (2010), Gertler (2017) and Pozsar (2008).
10
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Figure 3 – Non-financial Assets for the US (top), Liabilities (Below). Source: Balance
Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations, Board of governors of the federal reserve
system
involvement of housing market in supply and demand, housing behavior, housing
wealth effect and finally, the role of housing on triggering business cycles. As discussed
earlier, all chapters of this thesis allow DSGE models for some sort of financial
factors including financial frictions, financial liquidity constraints, capital constraints
and collateral constraints which are attached to housing market. The interest of
macroeconomic models in housing market, as a field out of real estate economics, is
new. The literature on housing starts by Iacoviello (2005), years before 2008 housing
crisis, when economists underestimated housing market contributions in economics
and considered it to have no impact on the real economy. The recent housing turmoil,
which nobody had expected, showed that there are mechanisms in housing market
which are crucial in macroeconomic fluctuations. Figure 3 presents the components
of non-financial assets as well as that of liabilities in the balance sheet of households
and non-profitable organizations of the US. Both charts clearly indicate that housing
has the main share in both sides of the balance sheet. As a result, housing has
become an important key in designing policy decisions and many researches ratify the
11
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association of housing market and the real economy 14.
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Figure 4 – Annual growth rates of consumption, housing price and financial assets for
France (top) and United States (below). The figure shows that consumption growth is
strongly correlated with housing wealth growth. Source: OECD
Housing and financial sector are connected through mortgage market. As a result,
any disruption in mortgage market, as it happened in the US, affects both sectors.
Housing is, in addition, linked to households’ wealth through corrections in house
prices. Any change in households’ wealth directly influences consumption and saving
decisions. This, as a consequence, impact both the financial and real sector. Figure
4 compares the annual growth rate of private consumption, real housing price and
financial wealth in France and the US. The positive correlation between house prices
and consumption is evident in both charts, however the intensity of the correlation is
mostly related to household borrowings against housing wealth to finance consumption
in both countries. New studies on Europe such as Skudelny (2009), January (2009),
Cho (2011) confirm the claim of figure 4 and indicate a positive and significant housing
and financial wealth effect on consumption.
Housing also addresses overall employment by its impact on the construction sector.
14. To shed light on the importance of housin, see de Bandt et al. (2010).
12
General Introduction
0
25
50
75
100
E
U
-2
8
E
ur
o 
ar
ea
 (E
A
-1
9)
R
om
an
ia
C
ro
at
ia
Li
th
ua
ni
a
B
ul
ga
ria
S
lo
va
ki
a
P
ol
an
d
La
tv
ia
H
un
ga
ry
S
lo
ve
ni
a
E
st
on
ia
G
re
ec
e
M
al
ta
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
Ita
ly
C
yp
ru
s
S
pa
in
P
or
tu
ga
l
Ire
la
nd
Fr
an
ce
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Fi
nl
an
d
A
us
tri
a
B
el
gi
um
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
G
er
m
an
y
D
en
m
ar
k
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
S
w
ed
en
FY
R
 o
f M
ac
ed
on
ia
S
er
bi
a
Tu
rk
ey
N
or
w
ay
Ic
el
an
d
S
w
itz
er
la
nd
Tenant — reduced price or free
Tenant — market price
Owner occupied, with mortgage or loan
Owner occupied, no outstanding mortgage or housing
loanFigure 5 – Distribution of population by dwelling type, Euro area 2015. Source: Eurostat
This impacts are more tense in the countries with a higher share of debtors. Figure 5
presents the distribution of population by dwelling type in 2015 for Euro area. The
figure illustrates that over 70% of the population in Western Europe are strongly linked
to the housing and credit market. This linkage is less in less-developed European
country such as those in the east.
0.2 Chapters
0.2.1 Chapter One
Chapter one estimates a DSGE model using Bayesian methods to simulate an economy
which features excessively loose monetary policy, irresponsible mortgage lending
and lax regulation (similar to the situation before the Great Recession). In this
environment, banks granted loans to borrowers who did not have a clear credit history
13
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and sometimes struggled to repay the loans 15. As a result, some borrowers did
not repay their obligations to the financial sector. This default, in general, imposes
reductions in the financial sector’s net worth. Since financial intermediaries are subject
to capital constraints, they cannot absorb the losses by raising more deposit. As a
result, banks are forced to deleverage. Deleveraging impacts the bank balance sheet.
This, accordingly, affects the real sector through credit, housing and deposit channels.
This climate is well explained in Iacoviello (2015).
What is ignored in the literature is the role of treasury bond market and the fact
that before the crisis, mortgages and deposits showed an increasing manner. However
banks were faced by defaults. The banking sector could tolerate the default because
there was a positive spread between the return on loans and that of deposits. As a
result, banks increased their net worth by making profit on their credit activities and,
in turn, reducing their bond holdings. The principal contribution of this chapter to
the literature is giving freedom to the financial sector to choose between borrowers.
To do so, chapter one uses the banking sector and the definition of financial default in
the form of Iacoviello (2015) into a model with government i.e. Alpanda and Zubairy
(2016). In addition, chapter one employs its model in a policy experiment. To do
so, two types of macroprudential policy are proposed. First, introducing the debt-to-
income (DTI) ratio on the the collateral constraint of the borrower which caps credit
growth. Second, controlling liabilities-to-assets ratio (LTA) on the capital constraint
of the banker.
The main finding of this chapter is that the bond market plays an important role in the
portfolio decision of the banking sector: the lack of regulations allows the intermediary
agents to ignore the defaults and increase mortgages by liquidating the sovereign bond
holdings and increasing the liabilities. In addition, this chapter reveals that the house
price expectation and friction in the housing sector, which can be a reason for the
Paradox of Thrift, are the major delay factors in recovery. The model gives prominence
15. ”These risky mortgages were passed on to financial engineers at the big banks, who turned them
into supposedly low-risk securities by putting large numbers of them together in pools. The pooled
mortgages were used to back securities known as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), which were
sliced into tranches by degree of exposure to default.” the Economist (2013).
14
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to the important features of the recent crisis such as the home price downward spiral
and the lengthy recovery period. For the application of macroprudential policy tools,
the main finding is that macroprudential policy tools help the economy safeguard
against adverse shocks but they should be timely, targeted and temporary, otherwise
they can slow down recovery.
0.2.2 Chapter Two
Chapter two studies the impact of housing and credit market on financial stability. Ten
years after the Great Recession, there is still an ongoing discussion about the reason
of the financial collapse. This chapter reflects this view that the financial collapse
was a collaboration among various factors: the mismatch between banks’ assets and
liabilities, the deposit roll over crisis and accelerated shocks through macro-financial
and macro-housing channels. This chapter improves Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)
by adding the housing and credit markets into the basic definition of market-based
financing institutions i.e. shadow financial system. This contribution shifts attentions
to the asset side of bank’s balance sheet as the origin of frictions in normal times. The
model is calibrated using data pertaining to the US to simulate the economy, before,
during and after 2008 collapse when big shadow financial institutions such as Lehman
Brothers failed.
The main finding of the chapter is that the banking sector, housing and credit markets
are at the core of main consequences of the recent crisis such as house price double-dip,
output downward spiral and lengthy recovery period. This chapter reveals different
mechanisms for these features which pass through three channels including household
balance sheets, bank balance sheets and asset liquidity channels.
Furthermore, chapter two studies the supervision of both the bank and borrower
balance sheets by introducing Capital Adequacy Ratio and caps on Loan-To-Value
ratio. The chapter illustrates that the macroprudential policies ensure the stability
by cushioning asset prices in the time of disasters. As a result, macroprudential tools
15
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can exclude the bank-run equilibrium from the economy. Hence, they mitigate the
insolvency risk, boost output and increase investment.
0.2.3 Chapter Three
Chapter three studies the effects on macroeconomic aggregates of permanent changes
in housing taxes and tax deductions through the lens of a multi-agent DSGE model
with financial intermediaries. Specifically, the housing taxes that are examined consist
in the property tax, and the tax deductions are the ones that are attached to the
mortgage interest rate and imputed rental income. The primary contribution to the
literature is adding a well-defined financial intermediation sector and realistic financial
frictions into the models which have ignored the financial sector.
The main result is that borrowing-constrained bankers play an important role for
housing dynamics and for welfare improvements. While in the model without a
financial sector 16 the long-run multipliers are around -2, this chapter illustrates that
the introduction of a banking sector lowers the housing tax multipliers more than
twice: close and below unity, the range from -1.02 to -0.6. On the contrary with
tax deductions, policies that change property tax and banking requirements so that
tax revenues are raised lead to a greater GDP. All policies are welfare-improving for
homeowners, but welfare-diminishing for renters and bankers.
Chapter three also looks at the effects of tax revenue neutral policies for which
the government uses its additional revenues to lower labor income taxes. The
chapter finds that the repeal of mortgage interest deductions is the only policy that
generates significant gains in GDP. In light of the tax plan recently proposed by
the US government 17 that encompasses, among others, changes in mortgage interest
deductibility, these results are particularly interesting for policymakers.
16. See Alpanda and Zubairy (2016).
17. See https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/top-priorities/tax-reform
16
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0.2.4 Chapter Four
The human society gradually gets more and more complex. Building new institutions
and agencies are an answer to these new complexities. Each new institution (does
not matter monetary, financial, fiscal, regulatory etc) individually can impact the
economy. As a result, it is important for policy makers to know and model the modern
economy as it really is. There is a big difference between a theoretical model, the goal
of which is to help better understand the basics of economics, and a model which is
applied to make economic policies for a country 18. Following this view, chapter five
builds a new model to studies the economy of oil-exporting countries.
Chapter four builds a New-Keynesian DSGE model to analyse the macro-financial
linkages through which the exogenous oil price affects quasi-modern oil economies.
These economies have tried to analogize themselves to the modern economies by
creating modern institutions i.g. central bank, commercial banks and chamber of
commerce etc, but not by practicing the rules of open free market. As a result, they
are still highly dependent on oil revenues 19. These economies, apparently, work well
when there is a high oil price. Problems become visible when their economy is hit
by a negative oil shock 20. This shock not only has a simple negative effect on GDP,
but also affects the economy through those so-called modern institutions. The goal
of this chapter is to study the role of modern economic institutions in accelerating
the propagation of commodity shocks to the rest of the economy in an oil-exporting
country 21. These modern institutions composed of: a heterogeneous financial sector
18. However adding new complexities (even if there are microfundation evidences behind it) is
usually considered as vain, but the modern economy and recent financial crisis shows us that the
economic studies (and in social perspective, polciymaking) need complex models to better understand
the new channels and mechanisms which tremendously affect an economy. Even before the crisis 2007,
many economists believed that financial and housing sectors are vain and these sectors do not add
anything to the literature. The time showed them that there is nothing vain in economics. See
Iacoviello (2010).
19. For Saudi Arabia: the share of oil revenues in budget revenues is 87%, in GDP is 42%, and in
export earnings is 90% (IndexMundi 2018). For Venezuela: oil sales accounts for 50% of GDP and
95% of export revenue (The World Bank). For Iran: oil sales accounts for 25% of GDP and 70% of
export revenue (The World Bank).
20. IMF forecasts: ”We are projecting a surge in inflation to 1,000,000 percent by end-2018 to
signal that the situation in Venezuela is similar to that in Germany in 1923 or Zimbabwe in the late
2000’s.” https://blogs.imf.org/2018/07/23/outlook-for-the-americas-a-tougher-recovery/.
21. The analysis of such countries are different than modern economies, not only because of a
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i.e. deposit and lending banks, oil reserve fund (sovereign wealth fun) and central
bank. In this regard, the impact of an interbank market and different monetary
policy on the economy is on interest.
The findings of this chapter are as follows. i) The labor market has a crucial role in
propagating shock in such economies. The shocks force labor supply moves between
oil and non-oil sectors with different productivity. This affects GDP, oil and non-oil
outputs. ii) Because in such economies government transfers depends on oil revenues,
government transfers become an essential channel in propagating oil shocks. iii)
Financial sector has an important role in amplifying oil shocks. The interests rate
changes, i.e. deposit return rate, loan rate and inter-bank, during the shocks affects
other sectors. This deepens the effect of shocks.
0.2.5 Chapter Five
Chapter five builds a dynamic general equilibrium model to assesses the
macroeconomic and welfare effects of structural and fiscal reforms in non-oil
developing countries. This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of tax
reforms in non-oil developing economies by quantifying the potential effects of various
reform scenarios, especially on inequality and growth. The optimal reform aims three
goals at the same time: creating fiscal space by enhancing tax revenues for improving
investment and social spending, boosting GDP by recommending tax incentives to
entrepreneurship, and increasing the progressivity of the tax system to improve
fairness and welfare.
Chapter five shows that a single reform cannot address the 3-dimension goal and the
reform should be comprehensive and in different sectors. Such an approach should
consider the combined impact of various tax measures in several dimensions, including
growth, revenue, and fairness, as well as parallel efforts to improve the targeting
and impact of public social spending. In the absence of comprehensive strategy, the
different economic structure, but also because of huge differences between economic parameters. For
example, while the Central bank discount rate in the western economies are close to 0, in Venezuela
it is 30% and in Iran it is close to 20% (IndexMundi 2018).
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risks are that isolated reforms are not sequenced properly, that they either introduce
inconsistencies or distortions, or that they be perceived as unfair, and in the end
counter-productive from the perspective of improving the quality, efficiency, fairness,
and acceptance of the tax system. The chapter draws the impact of fiscal policies from
a holistic viewpoint; It provides useful guidance on the relationship between taxation
and economic growth, how taxation can help reduce inequality, and the importance
of strengthening social safety key to mitigate the effects of tax reform.
The model of this chapter is calibrated using data pertaining to Morocco (and
applicable to similar developing and emerging market countries). In addition, this
chapter looks at the impact of tax reforms in developing economies on the housing
market i.e. house and rent prices. The results of the simulation illustrate that Morocco
would benefit from a comprehensive tax reform strategy. At the same time, the
targeting of social programs should be strengthened. Such a reform approach would
protect the most vulnerable and help broaden the tax base, remove tax distortions,
and better share the tax burden.
19
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Chapter 1
Macroeconomic Consequences of
Bank’s Assets Reallocation After
Mortgage Defaults

1 Bank’s Assets Reallocation After Mortgage Defaults
easily
Abstract
This paper proposes a DSGE model which uses Bayesian estimations to assess an economy
under the strain of borrower’s default on its obligation to intermediary agents, similar to
the climate of the Great Recession. The paper finds that the treasury bond market plays
an important role in such economy: the default increases the spread between the return
on mortgages and deposits, as a result banks prefer to compensate their losses by making
profit in the mortgage market and in turn, decreasing their treasury bond holdings. These
changes transfer the shock to the real side of the economy through housing, credit, deposit
and government loan channels and thereby instigate a business cycle. The model proposed
in this paper accurately portrays the behaviour of key economic variables before the Great
Recession; in particular housing prices, mortgages, deposits and treasury bond holdings by
banks. Significantly, this model illustrates the home price downward spiral which succeeded
the recession. This paper demonstrates that the specification of credit constraints relying
on house price expectations as well as frictions in housing and capital investments, which
can give rise to the Paradox of Thrift, are the major delay factors in recovery. In addition,
the findings argue that macroprudential policies help mitigate financial risks and reduce
common exposures across markets. Such policies, however, may be inadequate for the post-
crisis restoration of the economy.
JEL classification:E32, E44, E62 .
Keywords : Private default, Financial business cycle, Macroprudential policy, Home-
price downward spiral.
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1.1 Introduction
This paper outlines a DSGE model for the purpose of assessing the impacts of
default on bank loans, in the presence of government, housing and credit markets.
The key questions addressed by the paper are: i) What is the role of housing and
credits in accelerating financial shocks? ii) what is the impact of frictions and
expectations on recovery time? and iii) do macroprudential regulation tools always
provide mechanisms to mitigate the adverse impact of shocks? To answer these
questions, I build a model which incorporates a real sector, financially constrained
intermediaries, government, housing and credit markets. The paper uses Bayesian
methods to estimate and simulate the behaviour of the economy before and after the
Great Recession. The model captures the important features of the recent crisis such
as the home price downward spiral and the lengthy recovery period.
This paper is designed to incorporate the basic features of Iacoviello (2015). The
banking structure, the context of default and the financial shock, as presented in this
model, are closely comparable to Iacoviello (2015). In both models, the household
default causes a wealth transfer from the banking system to borrower households.
While Iacoviello (2015) successfully identifies the origin of the Great Recession 1, his
simulation does not correctly match the data on house prices, mortgages or deposits.
Iacoviello (2015)’ simulation indicates that mortgages and deposits decrease in times
of default, while the data from 2005 to 2008 indicates 2 an upswing in both variables.
This upswing happened due to an increase in the return spread (between return
on assets and liabilities) and the demand in the mortgage market. As a result,
the intermediary agents ignored the defaults and heated the mortgage market by
liquidating the sovereign bond holdings and increasing the liabilities 3.
Iacoviello (2015) neither incorporates unconstrained borrower 4 nor fluctuations in
1. Interestingly, it shows that ”financial shocks account for two-thirds of the decline in private
GDP during the 2007–2009 recession”
2. Source: The World bank 2017 and European Mortgage Federation (EMF) 2014.
3. The process of reducing Sovereign Bond Holdings by bank from 2005 to 2008 is pointed in
Bruegel database of sovereign bond holdings developed in Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012).
4. The unconstrained borrower points at government. Banks participate in general trading
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the total housing supply. Both borrows, entrepreneurs and households, are financially
constrained: their loans are constrained by their assets. When a default happens,
due to the raise in the asset price and the impact of the fixed housing supply, the
entrepreneur’s credit constraint is relaxed. This increases the entrepreneur’s ability
to borrow from the financial sector. As a result, the mortgage supply reduces.
To deal with this problem, I improve on a rich macrofounded general equilibrium
model which has been widely implemented in previous literature. This paper develops
Alpanda and Zubairy (2016)’s model by introducing intermediary agents to the lender-
borrower relationship. The model features lender, borrower and renter households,
elastic housing supply, a financial intermediary sector, house producers and a
government. Government collects taxes, distributes lump-sum transfers and issues
bonds. Both borrower households and government are debtors of the financial sector.
There is no friction in the bond market so the intermediary agents can freely hold or
sell government bonds. On the other hand, there is a friction in the mortgage market
in the form of collateral constraint. The main result of incorporating government, the
bond market and an elastic housing supply is that the model of this paper accurately
simulates the behaviour path of key economic variables especially deposits, mortgages
and housing prices. The existence of both constrained and unconstrained borrowers
provides a freedom for the financial sector to answer mortgage demands by adjusting
its bond holdings. However, this liquidity-risk change 5 exposes the financial sector to
shock 6.
This paper finds the crucial role of house price expectation in lengthy recovery 7. The
collateral constraint in this paper is based on the expectation of house value and not
on the current price. House producers also take the house price and adjustment costs
into account to produce houses. With these features, the model captures the role
operations (open market) to buy and sell securities. The government securities mostly offer risk
free returns and are generally the most liquid instrument a bank holds. Using these liquid assets,
banks are able to immediately react to shocks. See Gennaioli et al. (2014).
5. I used this term because in my model bonds act as a liquid asset which is traded without any
friction and their return is risk-free.While in the mortgage market there is a constraint which should
be satisfied, and borrower households can default.
6. See Angeloni and Wolff (2012).
7. See Case and Shiller (2003) and Case et al. (2003).
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of the price expectation on the credit and investment growth: the mortgage market
and housing investments move in the same direction of the house price expectation.
The paper illustrates that the expectation of the economy for a lower house price
as well as frictions in investments cause a gradual decline in house prices, even after
the default is ended. This home price downward spiral is an economic setback which
delays recovery.
Finally, the paper presents the application of macroprudential tools and their impact
on recovery. These tools are applied to debt-to-income ratio on the borrower side and
liabilities-to-assets ratio on the bank asset side. The paper reveals that by introducing
a cap on debt-to-income ratio to the mortgage market, the economy is safeguarded
against extreme drops but recovers more slowly. In addition, the paper shows that
the application of a countercyclical liabilities-to-assets ratio policy helps reduce house
price volatilities.
There is an expansive body of literature which studies banking sector, intermediary
agents and capital constraints which incorporate banks in the analysis. Gorton
and Metrick (2010), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and Gersbach et al. (2015)
use simple non-stochastic intermediary capital constraints to show the major role
of financial intermediaries. Tchana (2012) presents a banking regulation in an
overlapping-generations model and analyses its effect on welfare. Mimir (2016) studies
the role of financial shocks and credit frictions in a quantitative analysis a` la Gertler
and Karadi (2011) with the addition of a stochastic banking sector. Banks in these two
models either act as zero profit organizations or accumulate net worth every period
and consume all their net worth at the final period of their life. The model of this
paper is more realistic as following Iacoviello (2015), it uses a stochastic representative
banking sector which consumes every period. Households do not have the expertise
required for direct investment and so they rely on bankers to invest under behalf.
In other words, the banking sector facilitates transfers of assets between agents. In
addition, the banking sector in this paper faces a capital adequacy constraint which
is dynamically dependent on banker’s expectations for future assets, defaults and
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liabilities-to-assets ratio set by an authority as a macroprudential policy tool.
Macroprudential policy tools 8 aim to provide a global model for the protection of
banks and households against financial and real shocks. Following the recession,
attention turned to the study of the effects of these tools i.e. Lim et al. (2011) and Igan
and Kang (2011). This paper provides a theoretical background which sustains known
empirical results on the procyclicality on macroprudential policies. By simulating
the behaviour of the economy after the default shock, the paper confirms Claessens
et al. (2013)’s empirical assertion that macroprudential tools are time inconsistent.
The stylized facts, e.g. Gordy and Howells (2006), show that an efficient tool in
boom periods could slow down the recovery of the economy during a recession. This
procyclicality is evidenced in this paper for a cap on borrower credit which is based
on debt-to-income ratio a` la Gelain et al. (2013).
Macroprudential tools are all protecting, but should be carefully selected. Some
policies are designed to mitigate the vulnerabilities and others are better suited
to building up buffers. The liabilities-to-assets ratio pertains to the latter 9. Both
countrcyclical capital buffers and the prudential policies for mitigating vulnerabilities
(especially in the form proposed by the Basel committee) are corroborated by an
expansive body of empirical and theoretical evidence. For instance, Angelini et al.
(2014) and Angelini et al. (2015) build a DSGE model a` la Gerali et al. (2010)
to show the functionality of Basel and countercyclical capital buffers. The impact
of these buffers after the shock on recovery is neglected in the literature . This
paper finds that a countercyclical liabilities-to-assets ratio reduces the volatility of
house prices and protects the economy without slowing it down. The model used
here highlights the supporting role of the macroprudential policy tools in mitigating
8. Macroprudential policy tools are proposed by regulators including the SEC, Federal Reserve,
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Financial Standards Board (FSB), Prudential
Regulatory Authority (PRA) and the European Commission.
9. The liabilities-to-assets ratio is controversial because it has the same context as the capital
requirement ratio (CRR). The required total CRR in Basel I and II was 8%. A mandatory capital
conservation buffer in the form of dynamic macroprudential is presented in Basel III (2010) which
adds 2.5% to the previous CRR. The required total capital increases up to 10.5% Supervision (2011).
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financial system vulnerabilities. These policies address both the cross-sectional and
temporal dimension of systemic risk and may assist monetary policy by counteracting
financial imbalances.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 calibrates
and estimates the parameters used as per the US data. Section 4 simulates the
Great Recession using the estimated parameters and compares the accuracy of the
model with previous literature. Section 5 outlines the effectiveness of different
macroprudential policies and their protective mechanism. Section 6 offers a conclusion
on the findings of this paper.
1.2 Model
The model is composed of four heterogeneous households: lenders (patient), borrowers
(impatient), renters (hand to mouth) and bankers. Lenders are capital owners. Firms
borrow this capital to produce non-housing goods. Lenders are, in addition, active
in the housing market. They accumulate housing which are either for personal use
or for rent to renter households. Lenders issue bank deposits. Bankers are expert
investors and the owners of the banking sector. Bankers create credits for borrowers
in the form of mortgages and trade government securities. Borrowers accumulate
housing and because of their impatience, do not save. Stochastic financial frictions
are applied on impatient households and bankers in the form of collateral and capital
constraints, respectively. The government collects income and housing taxes and
combines them with governmental liabilities to cover its expenditure and lump-sum
transfers to patient, impatient and renter households.
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1.2.1 Household
Superscribes P, I, R,B stand for Patient, Impatient, Renter households and Bankers,
respectively. There is a unit measure of every type of infinitely lived household.
Patient households
The patient households’ problem is
maxEt
∞∑
τ=t0
βτ−t0P {log cPτ + ϕh log hPτ−1 − ϕl
(lPτ )
1+ι
1 + ι
}
s.t.
(1 + τc)c
P
t + p
h
t h
Ph
t + i
k
t + dt ≤ ωPt − τPt − ACPt (1.2.1)
where t presents time. βP < 1 is the discount factor that is greater than the discount
factor of other households. ϕh and ϕl present the relative importance of housing and
labor in the utility function respectively, and ι is the inverse of the Frisch-elasticity of
labor supply. τc is the tax on consumption.
A representative patient household consumes cPt , accumulates housing h
Ph
t at relative
price pht . There are two types of houses: residential houses h
P , and rental houses
hR. lPt is the labor supply of patient households. The patient household is the owner
of capital which is borrowed by firms in order to produce non-housing goods. The
patient housing variation hPht , and capital investments i
k
t respectively are
hPht = [h
P
t − (1− δh)hPt−1] + [hRt − (1− δh)hRt−1] (1.2.2)
ikt = kt − (1− δk)kt−1 (1.2.3)
The depreciation rates on housing and capital are δh and δk, respectively. Deposit dt
is the saving of the patient household in the banking sector. In summary, the patient
household has three saving tools, housing, capital and deposit. Total income ωPt is
composed of wage wPt , rent from renters at price p
R
t , return on deposit and capital
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with interest rate rt and r
k
t respectively and the government transfer Γ
P
t ,
ωPt = w
P
t l
P
t + p
R
t h
R
t−1 + (1 + rt)dt−1 + r
k
t kt−1 + Γ
P
t (1.2.4)
Total tax paid by the patient household τPt is composed of taxing on wage, rent,
property, return on deposit and capital,
τPt = τw[w
P
t l
P
t + p
R
t h
R
t−1 − δhhRt−1 − τppht (hRt−1 + hPt−1)] + τppht (hPt−1 + hRt−1)
+ τdrtdt−1 + τk(rkt − δk)kt−1 (1.2.5)
τw stands for the income tax rate , τp for property tax rate, τd and τk for tax rate on
deposit and capital return, respectively. In addition, to remain consistent with the US
tax code, home owners profit from a tax break 10 on property taxes and depreciation
allowances for housing. The last term in the budget constraint is the adjustment cost
ACP consistent with the literature 11.
The FOC with respect to residential and rental houses respectively are
pht = βPEt[
ϕh
λPt h
p
t
+
λPt+1
λPt
((1− δh − τp(1− τw))pht+1] (1.2.6)
pht = βPEt[
λPt+1
λPt
((1− δh − τp(1− τw)pht+1 + (1− τw)pRt+1 + τwδh] (1.2.7)
where λPt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint at time t. The FOCs
10. https://www.irs.gov/publications/p530/ar02.html
11. Patients’ adjustment cost is ACPt = AC
Pk
t + AC
Pd
t where AC
Pk
t =
ψk
2
(kt−kt−1)2
k
, ACPdt =
ψdh
2
(dt−dt−1)2
d
and it is adopted from Iacoviello (2015).
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with respect to deposit, capital and labor respectively are 12,
1 = βPEt[
λPt+1
λPt
(1 + (1− τd)rt+1)] (1.2.8)
1 = βPEt[
λPt+1
λPt
(1− δk + (1− τk)rkt+1 + τkδk)] (1.2.9)
ϕl(l
P
t )
ι = λPt (1− τw)wPt (1.2.10)
Impatient households
The utility function of the representative impatient household is the same as the
patient one but with a different discount factor. Thus, the problem of impatient
household is
maxEt
∞∑
τ=t0
βτ−t0I {log cIτ + ϕh log hIτ−1 − ϕl
(lIτ )
1+ι
1 + ι
}
s.t.
(1 + τc)c
I
t + p
h
t h
Ih
t + (1 + r
b
t )Mt−1 − ςIt ≤ ωIt +Mt − τ It − ACIt (1.2.11)
in order to have the impatient household as a net borrower and the patient one as a
net saver in equilibrium, it is assumed that βI < βP . Impatient households consume
cIt . h
Ih
t is impatient housing variation
hIht = h
I
t − (1− δh)hIt−1 (1.2.12)
where hIt is impatient houses. Mt is mortgages from the banking sector. ω
I
t is total
impatient income at time t
ωIt = w
I
t l
I
t + Γ
I
t (1.2.13)
where wt represents wage and Γ
I
t is the transfer from the government. ς
I
t is the focal
point of the paper. It stands for a default shock. Since it is positive, it induces wealth
transfers from the bank to the impatient household. It is a redistribution shock.
12. For simplicity in reading, the derivatives of adjustment costs are not written in the equations.
They are, of course, considered in the coding.
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This is consistent with the fact that during The Great Recession most of the damage
incurred by the banking system was due to household defaults 13. Repayments to the
banking system are [(1 + rbt )Mt−1 − ςbt ]. Total tax paid by the borrower is composed
of income and property taxes,
τ It = τw[w
I
t l
I
t − rbtMt−1 − τppht hIt−1] + τppht hIt−1 (1.2.14)
To remain consistent with the current US tax code, there is a tax exemption on the
mortgage return, with the interest rate rb, and on the property tax. ACI is the
adjustment cost on changing houses 14.
Collateral constraint restricts the impatient household mortgage to a fraction of the
expected value of his house,
Mt ≤ ρmMt−1 + (1− ρm)θ[Et( p
h
t+1
1 + rbt+1
hIt )] (1.2.15)
where θ is the loan-to-value ratio in housing and ρm captures the fact that only a
fraction of borrowers change their loan every period. Collateralized houses are valued
by the expectation of their future real value and not their current value. This structure
captures the role of the price expectation in the credit market. This friction is one of
the channels which connects the real and financial side of the economy.
The first order conditions with respect to impatient houses, mortgage 15 and labor
13. See Gabriel et al. (2016).
”The packaging of increasingly risky subprime loans, extended to people with poor credit by banks
and other mortgage lenders, undermined the market, which was deeply interconnected through
complex financial transactions. Increased demand for housing soon spurred a bubble, based on the
widely shared assumption that housing prices would continue to go up. When they instead began to
fall, borrowers began defaulting and lenders began foreclosing on mortgages at higher rates, which
in turn shook the financial markets, mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the complex
securities dependent on those underlying assets”. Source: http://businessresearcher.sagepub.com/
sbr-1863-101611-2765611/20170102/shadow-banking
14. ACIt =
ψm
2
(Mt−Mt−1)2
M
15. To keep the simplicity of reading, the derivations of the adjustment cost is not written in the
equations.
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respectively are
pht −
λmt
λIt
(1− ρm)θEt p
h
t+1
1 + rbt+1
= βIEt[
ϕh
λIth
I
t
+
λIt+1
λIt
((1− δh − τp(1− τw))pht+1)]
(1.2.16)
1− λ
m
t
λIt
= βIEt[
λIt+1
λIt
(1 + (1− τw))rbt+1 −
λmt+1
λIt
ρm] (1.2.17)
ϕl(l
I
t )
ι = λIt (1− τw)wIt (1.2.18)
where λIt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint and λ
m
t is the Lagrange
multiplier of the collateral constraint at time t.
Renter households
Renter households are hand-to-mouth and consume what they earn. The renters’
problem is
maxEt
∞∑
τ=t0
βτ−t0I {log cRτ + ϕh log hRτ−1 − ϕl
(lRτ )
1+ι
1 + ι
}
s.t.
(1 + τc)c
R
t + p
R
t h
R
t−1 ≤ (1− τwr)wRt lRt + ΓRt (1.2.19)
where the discount factor of renters is the same as impatient one. The Renter
consumes cRt and rents rental houses from the patient household. They are are so
poor so that they cannot borrow and lend. The renter provides the labor supply lRt to
the economy and earns wage wRt . Because their income level is low, the government
drives a lower tax on their wages, τwr < τw (based on the US tax codes). Their income
is composed of the wage and government transfer ΓRt . The existence of three types of
households is a convenient approximation to mimic the stylized fact of the presence
of lenders, borrowers and renters without making it an endogenous decision. The first
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order conditions with respect to rental housings is
pRt =
ϕh
λRt h
R
t−1
(1.2.20)
where λRt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint at time t.
Bankers
A representative banker is a type of household which consumes and intermediates
between other agents. The banker issues liabilities dt and buys assets at. The
borrowers are either households (who borrow in the form of mortgages Mt) or
government 16 (the borrowings of which are termed government bonds bgt ). Banker’s
utility function and budget constraint are,
maxEt
∞∑
τ=t0
βτ−t0B log c
B
τ
(1 + τc)c
B
t + (1 + rt)dt−1 + at + AC
B
t = dt + (1 + r
b
t )at−1 − ςIt
at = b
g
t +Mt (1.2.21)
rb is the interest rate on loans. It is the same for impatient households and the
government. The banker receives new deposits and the return on last period loans. ςIt
is the default shock to the banker’s assets. ςIt is the shock which makes the banker’s
asset side smaller and forces the banker to recapitalize (i.e. change banker’s portfolio)
in order to meet its budget constraint. ACB is the adjustment cost of issuing liabilities
and assets 17.
The financial friction on the banking sector is 18
at − dt − EtςIt−1 ≥ ρb(at−1 − dt−1 − Et−1ςIt ) + (1− φ)(1− ρb)(at − EtςIt+1) (1.2.22)
16. See Ogawa and Imai (2014) and https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-30/
banks-amass-2-4-trillion-hoard-of-bonds-as-bofa-leads-stampede.
17. ACBt =
ψa
2
(at−at−1)2
a +
ψdb
2
(dt−dt−1)2
d
18. This type of friction modeling is standard and used in Iacoviello (2015).
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Parameter φ is the Liabilities-to-assets ratio (hence the capital-to-asset ratio is 1−φ).
Basel I, II and III are based on this ratio. Similar to the real regulation patterns,
with this constraint, the bank has the ability to deviate from its liabilities-to-assets
ratio in the short run. In the long run bank should set its leverage ratio to φ. The
constraint is derived from the fact that in every period the banker should be able to
provide a fraction of bank assets. With the first term in the right hand side the bank
has the option of partial adjustment in bank capital beyond one period. The first
order conditions with respect to liabilities,dt, and assets, at, are
1 =
λφt
λBt
+ βBEt
λBt+1
λBt
(1 + rt+1 − ρbλ
φ
t+1
λBt+1
) (1.2.23)
1 = (φ(1− ρb) + ρb) λ
φ
t
λBt
+ βBEt
λBt+1
λBt
(1 + rbt+1 − ρb
λφt+1
λBt+1
) (1.2.24)
where λBt , λ
φ
t are the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint and the collateral
constraint at time t, respectively.
1.2.2 Firms and Housing producers
Patient, impatient and renter households work for the representative firm and receive
wages depending on different labor elasticity, ιP , ιI , ιR. It is assumed that ιP+ιI+ιR =
1. There is a continuum of identical firms of measure one. The firm produces a
homogeneous good using a Cobb-Douglas technology
Y ft = Atk
α
t−1((l
P
t )
ιP (lIt )
ιI (lRt )
ιR)1−α (1.2.25)
and maximizes its profit
maxY ft − wPt lPt − wIt lIt − wRt lRt − rkt kt−1 (1.2.26)
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Since markets are perfectly competitive, the market prices are the usual terms
α
Y ft
kt−1
= rkt (1.2.27)
(1− α)ιiY
f
t
lit
= wit, i = P, I, R (1.2.28)
In the economy, there is a continuum of measure one and perfectly competitive housing
producers which provide housing to households 19. At every period, housing producers
buy undepreciated part of houses from households at a relative price pht , then invest
then iht to produce new houses ht. Hence, they maximize the benefit as
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tP
λPτ
λPt
[phτ (hτ − (1− δh)hτ−1)− ihτ ] (1.2.29)
where ht = h
P
t +h
I
t +h
R
t is total housing. The patient households’ stochastic discount
factor is used to discount future profits 20. The production is subject to an adjustment
cost defined as a fraction of investment. As a result, the housing production follows
the law of motion
[1− ψhp
2
(
iht
iht−1
− 1)2]iht = ht − (1− δh)ht−1 (1.2.30)
The FOC with respect to housing reveals the house price,
pht [1− ψhp(
iht
iht−1
− 1) i
h
t
iht−1
− ψhp
2
(
iht
iht−1
− 1)2] + βPEtpht+1[
λPt+1
λPt
ψhp(
iht+1
iht
− 1)(i
h
t+1
iht
)2] = 1
(1.2.31)
19. Similar to Roi et al. (2007)
20. See Smets and Wouters (2007) and Alpanda and Zubairy (2016).
40
1 Bank’s Assets Reallocation After Mortgage Defaults
1.2.3 Government
The government collects all taxes from all households
Tt = τcCt + τw[w
P
t l
P
t + (p
R
t − δh)hRt−1 − τp(hPt−1 + hRt−1)] + τdrtdt−1 + τp(hPt−1
+ hRt−1) + τk(r
k
t − δk)kt−1 + τw[wIt lIt − rmt−1Mt−1 − τphIt−1] + τphIt−1
+ τwrw
R
t l
R
t (1.2.32)
where Ct = c
P
t + c
I
t + c
R
t + c
B
t is total households’ consumption. In each period, the
government has access to funds from the banker in the form of bonds, bgt and total
tax, Tt, to pay its liabilities to the banker, lump-sum transfers and the government
spending, gt. Hence, the government’s budget constraint is
(1 + rbt )b
g
t−1 + gt + Γt = b
g
t + Tt (1.2.33)
where Γt is total transfers to each household, depending on level parameters specific
to the type of household ϑP , ϑI , ϑR
Γt = Γ
P
t + Γ
I
t + Γ
R
t (1.2.34)
Γit = ϑiY
f
t − ρgbgt−1, i = I, P,R. (1.2.35)
ρg determines the response of transfers to government debt to adjust transfers to
government loans in order to avoid Ponzi game by government 21.
1.2.4 Market clearing
The non-housing good firms produce goods to cover total consumption, total housing
investment, capital investment and government spending. Good market clearing is
Y ft = Ct + i
h
t + i
k
t + gt (1.2.36)
21. Making the adjustment through transfers is standard, for example see Alpanda and Zubairy
(2016) and Alpanda and Zubairy (2017). The evidence could be find in Leeper et al. (2010).
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In this paper total GDP is defined as 22
Yt = Y
f
t + τcCt + p
R
t ht−1 (1.2.37)
An equilibrium defines a set of prices (ph, pR, r, rb, rk) and allocations
(cP , cI , cR, cB, hP , hI , hR, d, k, bg, g,Γ
P ,Γi,ΓR) so that all agents and firms maximize
their objective functions subject to all constraints while all markets clear (markets for
good, housing, labor, deposit, mortgage, capital and government bonds).
1.3 Estimation
1.3.1 Calibration
Table 1.1 – Calibrated parameters
Parameters Symbol Value
Discount factors βP , βI , βB 0.9925, 0.94, 0.945
Housing preference ϕh 0.27
Labor Supply parameter ϕl 0.8
Depreciation rates δh, δk 0.0096, 0.016
Transfer share ϑP , ϑI , ϑR 0.040, 0.036, 0.030
Income taxes τw, τwr 0.32, 0.22
loan-to-value ratio θ 0.90
Liabilities-to-assets ratio φ 0.90
Labor shares in production ιP , ιI , ιR 0.13, 0.67, 0.20
Capital share in production α,A 0.2047, 1.805
Inverse labor supply elasticity ι 1
Inertia in collateral constraint ρm 0.70
Inertia in capital constraint ρb 0.24
Response of transfers to gov. debt ρg 0.003
Taxes τk, τc, τp, τd 0.4, 0.05, 0.14/4, 0.15
deposit and capital adj. for Pat. ψdh, ψk 0.10, 1.73
deposit and loan adj. for Bank ψdb, ψa 0.14, 0.54
Mortgage adj. for Imp. ψm 0.37
Housing investment adj. for Producer ψh 2.48
Parameters of AR(1) ρςI , ρςg 0.9
Table 5.1 presents the value of the parameters which are chosen to get the targets
22. To be is consistent with the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data which is used
for the calibration. NIPA is choosen because it is the only data that includes imputed rental income
from owner-occupied housing. In NIPA data, VAT is included in the relative price of consumption
and housing provides consumption services.
42
1 Bank’s Assets Reallocation After Mortgage Defaults
quarterly in the data and as initial values for the estimation of the model. The
calibration here is closely based on the empirical estimation of Iacoviello (2015). In
order to have binding borrowing constraint in the steady state the impatient discount
factor should be set less than the weighted average of two others. Thus, discount
factors of patient, impatient and banker are set to 0.9925, 0.94, 0.945, respectively.
With this setting the annual interest rate on deposits is 0.3 and the interest rate
on loans is 0.5 according to Iacoviello (2015). Depreciation rates are set to 0.96%
for housing and 1.6% for capital to target 5% housing, 10% non-housing investment
and total investment equal to 15% and capital over GDP equal to 6 according to
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA,Bureau of Economic Analysis) and
the Flow of Funds Accounts (FOF; Federal Reserve Board). With this setting,
government loans over GDP is set to 80% consistent to the average loan of the
US According to OECD 2016 for twenty years and government spending over GDP
equal to 18% as Alpanda and Zubairy (2016). The inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply is set to 1 according to Smets and Wouters (2007). ϑP , ϑI , ϑR are
set to 0.04, 0.036, 0.030, respectively, to target total transfer over GDP, tr/Y = 0.08
according to NIPA and based on their share of total income. τw, τwr are calibrated
to 0.32, 0.22 to get total income tax, T/Y = 0.27 as Zubairy (2014). loan-to-value
ratio and Liabilities-to-assets ratio are both calibrated to 0.9, Inertia in collateral
constraint and Inertia in capital constraint to 0.70 and 0.24 and parameters of AR(1)
shock to 0.9 all according to the estimations of Iacoviello (2015). This calibration also
addresses deposit and mortgage to GDP equal to 65% and 52%, respectively, roughly
consistent with the wold bank data 1980-2015. According to the 2001 Residential
Finance Survey (RFS; Census Bureau), ιP , ιI , ιR are set to 0.13, 0.67, 0.20 respectively
to target hP/h = 0.37, hI/h = 0.43, hR/h = 0.20. Response of transfers to government
debts is calibrated to 0.003 to adjust transfers with government loans. Housing
preference is set to 0.27 to have housing value over GDP equal to 5.44 according
to Iacoviello and Neri (2010). Labor supply parameters calibrated in order to get
total labor supply equal to one. Capital share in production α, is set to 0.2047 based
on the optimal conditions and the relation between rk, k and to insure k/Y = 6. All
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coefficients for adjustment cost are chosen from the estimations of Iacoviello (2015),
except adjustment cost for housing producer that is set as Roi et al. (2007). Capital,
consumption, property and deposit taxes,τk, τc, τp, τd, are set to 0.4, 0.05, 0.14/4, 0.15
respectively based on the US tax codes as Zubairy (2014). Total Consumption
over GDP in this settings is C/Y = 52% and cP/C = 26%, cI/C = 53%, cR/C =
18%, cB/C = 3%.
Table 1.2 – Steady state of the benchmark model annually
Variable symbol Steady State/GDP
Consumption cP , cI , cR, cB 0.13, 0.28, 0.10, 0.01
Housing hP , hI , hR 0.50, 0.58, 0.27
Tax T 0.27
Bankers’ asset a 0.71
Mortgage M 0.51
Government loan bg 0.80
Deposit d 0.65
non-housing output Y f 0.84
wages wP , wI , wR 0.38, 1.2, 0.36
Government Exp. g 0.18
Transfers trP , trI , trR 0.031, 0.027, 0.022
Investments ik, ih 0.10, 0.05
1.3.2 Estimation results
In order to estimate the model, Dynare 23 and Bayesian methods 24 are used. The
model is estimated based on the borrower household default, consistence with the
situation of the Great Recession. The shocks 25 follow autoregressive (AR1) process
ςIt = ρςI ς
I
t−1 + 
I
t (1.3.1)
where I ≈ N(0, σ2ςI ). The optimizer for the mode computation is that introduced by
Sims et al. (1999). There is one shock in the model so for estimating the parameters,
there must only be one data set, otherwise, stochastic singularity arises 26. On the
23. http://www.dynare.org/manual/index 27.html
24. SeeAn and Schorfheide (2007).
25. Note, another shock will be defined to the model in the government default section.
26. See Ruge-Murcia (2007).
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other hand, estimating such a model on only one observable series is a bit of a stretch,
hence I use measurement error technique 27 to estimate the model on 4 observable
series. The applied series are U.S. quarterly data on real consumption, mortgage,
losses from mortgage default and real house prices (all in the form of deviation from
steady state) between 1985Q1 and 2010Q4 28. The 20 first observations are used as a
training sample for the Kalman filter 29.
Number of replications for Metropolis-Hastings algorithm 30 (Markov chain Monte
Carlo, MCMC) is set to 100000. Table 1.3 presents the estimated variables. Other
variables are assumed to be fixed as Table 5.1, due to demeaned data and the fact that
in the estimation procedure, when steady state is being updated for any draw, the non-
estimated parameters are not able to conduct steady-state values in the procedure.
Initial values for estimation are, in addition, set to the ones in the calibration (Table
5.1). Table 1.3 presents the comprehensive results of the estimation 31.
Table 1.3 – Estimation results
Parameter symbol Pri. mean Post. mean 90% HPD interval De. Pri sd Post. sd
St. Dev., default shock σςI 0.0025 0.0015 0.0013 0.0016 I.G 0.025 0.0001
Autocor., default shock ρςI 0.80 0.9037 0.8804 0.9294 Be. 0.100 0.0150
Inertia in collateral cons. ρm 0.70 0.7069 0.6904 0.7238 Be. 0.100 0.0102
Inertia in capital cons. ρb 0.25 0.4221 0.1380 0.7148 Be. 0.100 0.1769
Adj. cost,P Deposit ψdh 0.25 0.2169 0.0567 0.3810 Ga. 0.125 0.1086
Adj. cost,P capital ψk 1.00 1.1750 0.2905 2.0514 Ga. 0.500 0.5782
Adj. cost,B Deposit ψdb 0.25 0.2532 0.0599 0.4523 Ga. 0.125 0.1330
Adj. cost,I Mortgage ψm 0.25 0.1864 0.0449 0.3184 Ga. 0.125 0.0900
Adj. cost,B assets ψa 0.25 0.2528 0.0538 0.4342 Ga. 0.125 0.1275
Adj. cost,HP ψh 1.00 1.2129 0.3883 2.0726 Ga. 0.500 0.5685
P:Patient household, I:Impatient, B:banker, HP:Housing producer, I.G:Inverse Gamma, Be:Beta,
Ga:Gamma, HPD:highest posterior density interval
The 90% Highest Posterior Density interval shows the most probable interval of
parameters. Posterior mean of inertia in collateral constraint is 0.71. This coefficient
presents the fraction of impatient households which change mortgage every period.
27. See Pfeifer (2014)
28. As introduced in Iacoviello (2015)
29. See Kalman et al. (1960).
30. See Metropolis et al. (1953) and Chib and Greenberg (1995)
31. The optimal acceptance rate in a DSGE estimation with Bayesian method should be between
one third and one quarter. The best value for the acceptance rate is approximately 23.4%. See
Roberts et al. (1997). In the present estimation, the acceptance rate is 23.5%.
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Inertia in bankers’ capital constraint is estimated 0.42. This parameters shows how
flexible a banker can be in deviating from the liabilities-to-loans ratio in short term
after the shock. The autocorrolation of the default shock is 0.90, this constitutes a
high persistent shock. It has the standard deviation of 0.0015. Prior and posterior
estimated adjustment costs of deposits and loans for bankers are practically equal.
This shows the observed data are not very informative about these parameters.
Household deposit adjustment cost is estimated at 0.21. The difference between
deposit adjustment cost of households and banks shows that changing deposits for
households is cheaper and easier than for bankers. Capital and producer adjustment
costs are both estimated around 1.2. This confirms the existence of a high inertia and
show that deviating capital and housing from steady state is a costly activity.
1.4 The Great Recession
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Figure 1.1 – Delinquencies on all loans and leases secured by real estate in all commercial
banks (left) and real house price (right). Resource: (left) Federal Reserve bank of st. Louis,
(right) OECD Data 2017
Household defaults, as explained before, were the primary cause of the Great
Recession. This section demonstrates the impact of household default similar to the
the real situation of the Great Recession within the estimated model. During the
Great Recession, intermediary agents lost their assets. The loss was slowly recovered
after the shock. The Great Recession officially happened in 2007-2009 with the
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consequence of bankruptcies and bank runs. The most significant collapse was that
of the Lehman Brothers. This was the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history, with
holding over 613 billion in assets on September 2008. This crisis was the consequence
of distortions in the economy accumulated from late 2000 32. Mortgage underwriting
standards declined gradually during the boom period, particularly from 2004 to 2007
and mortgage fraud by lenders and borrowers increased enormously 33. In 2004, an
important credit risk of non-prime mortgage lending and an epidemic in mortgage
fraud were foreseen by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 34. Figure 1.1 (left) shows
that the rate of default starts to increase from 2005 and it was almost doubled in
2006 35.
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Figure 1.2 – Simulation of the Great Recession, Key variables, Spread is in level.
To simulate the situation of the Great Recession, the unexpected impatient shock is
fed by 0.38% of annual GDP for 12 quarters (3 consecutive years). The maximum
losses are set to equal 2.8% of GDP after three years and a cumulative losses are set
to equal 9% of GDP after 5 years (20 quarters) 36. This emulates the Great Recession
32. See Vos et al. (2011).
33. See Cowen (2008).
34. See Black (2009).
35. See Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) and an interesting discussion in Antoniades (2016).
36. To ensure the comparability of the model, I aim the same target as Iacoviello (2015). This
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starting in 2005 and culminating with the bankruptcy of Lehman in 2008. After the
shock, there is no shock so losses gradually return to zero.
The posterior mean values of estimated parameters in Table 1.3 and the value of non-
estimated parameters in Table 5.1 are inputted to the model to simulate the Great
Recession. Figure 1.2 shows the impact of the described shock on the model’s key
variables.
  
Steady State 
Borrower 
Default 
Borrower 
Housing ↑ 
Housing Price ↑ 
Mortgage ↑ 
Borrowing Interest ↑ 
Deposit ↑ Capital ↓ 
Lender Housing 
↓ 
Housing Price ↓ Output & wage↓ 
Wealth effect 
Deposit Interest ↑ 
Spread ↑ 
Gov. Bond ↓ 
Figure 1.3 – The mechanisms of the model
The negative shock on bank’s assets is a wealth transfer from bankers to impatient
households for 12 periods, corresponding to the 2005-2008 period in the data.
The effect of the transfers in these 12 periods is summarized in Figure 1.3. The
mechanisms are fourfold. First, The transfer increases the housing demand by
impatient households and consequently, the mortgage demand increases. This raises
the return on mortgages. Impatient households can afford a high return due to
the wealth effect. Second, bank which both suffers a loss in its assets and faces a
high mortgage demand increases deposits. The deposit increase helps bank finance
mortgage demands and payoff its liabilities. This effect raises the return on deposits.
The mixed effect of the raise in deposit and mortgage interest rate on the spread 37,
setting is driven in order to meet and target the evidence and estimations found in IMF (2009).
37. Annualized spread is calculated as the annualized difference between the interest rate on
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as seen in figure 1.2, is positive. Before the shock, the spread is about 2%. This
raises to 4.2% by the end of the third year. Third, a higher interest rate on deposits
changes the patient’s portfolio. Patient households relocate their saving from capital
and housing to deposits. The effect on the the housing market is further discussed
below. The drop in capital investment gradually reduces GDP from −0.6% to −3%
in 12 periods. Four, bank reduces its government bond holding in order to answer
mortgage demands 38. This mechanism reduces the size of the government’s budget
balance sheet and decreases the government expenditure. Figure 1.4 presents the data
on government bond holdings of banking sector before 2009 and the simulation of the
model.
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Figure 1.4 – Treasury bonds at all commercial banks per GDP. Index:2005. Sources:
BEA, Board of Governors, FRED
The model imitated 2005-2008 economic behaviour and data. Figure 1.5 compares the
data for deposit and mortgage to GDP alongside annualized spread between lending
and borrowing rate in 2005-2010 with the path simulated by the model of this paper
for the similar variables. The simulation demonstrates the same behaviour as the
data.
After the shock (after period 12), the economy does not go back immidiately to the
steady state. Capital and housing keep on falling for same periods before they recover.
The explanation for this is as follows.
banker’s loans and the interest rate on deposits.
38. Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) illustrate the reduction in Sovereign Bond Holdings by banks
from 2005 to 2008.
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The real housing price between 2005-2014 is presented in figure 1.1 (right). Following
the beginning of the default in 2005, house prices increased. The increase picks in
2006 and then declines until early 2011. Noting the after crisis period, the figure 1.1
(right) evidences the home price downward spiral when, even after the crisis ends (in
2009) and recovery begins, housing price continue to fall. This continuous negative
effect was a major contributing factor to the late recovery after the Great Recession.
The data from FRED shows that it took almost 5 years for the the US economy to
return to the 2007 level of output per capita. Normally for an economy like that of
the US, it takes less time to return to the pre-recession peak 39.
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Figure 1.5 – Deposit and Mortgage to GDP, Annual Spread (lending-borrowing rate).
Index:2005. Resource: The World Bank and European Mortgage Federation (EMF) 2015
Figure 1.6 presents the simulation of housing factors. The figure at the top left
indicates that the home price downward spiral is captured by the model. The
mechanisms effective in the behaviour house price are as follows. First, the wealth
transfer has a positive impact on the impatient-house demand. This increase in
housing demand is the reason of the initial house price increase, right after the shock.
The increase in housing demand supports an increase in mortgages prevision. Note
39. For more details, see Christiano (2016).
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that the amount of the current mortgage is contingent on the previous mortgage and
the expectation of the future house value (equ 1.2.15), the latter of which is increasing.
This clearly shows the crucial role of the expectation in mortgage fluctuations. Second,
as discussed before, patient households prioritize deposits and decrease their housing
investment. This, in turn, decreases the demand and consequently the housing price.
Some period after the shock, this effect dominates the first mechanism. As a result, the
house price decreases. Impatient households benefit from the impact on the housing
price and expand their consumption and housing. When the shock comes to an end,
so too do these expansions. Lastly, the rent price increases because lenders ask for a
higher return rate on rental houses 40, so rental housing demands decreases.
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Figure 1.6 – Simulation of the Great Recession, Housing factors, (%) change from SS
In contrast, the drop in housing prices does not end at the same time as the shock. As
recovery begins, house prices continue to fall. The explanation is as follows. At the end
of the shock, the economy is still below the steady state and there is a large marginal
utility of housing. So the immediate increase in the house price is not consistent with
the all other returns on saving tools being equal. As a result, the house prices continue
to decrease. For impatient households, the housing is large. So the return on housing
40. Because of the arbitrary condition. As seen before, the rate on deposits increases so the return
on rental houses also increases.
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is small. This is not a problem because impatient households make no arbitrage with
deposits. For patient households, the rate on deposits remains above the steady state
for a long time. So the return on housing for patient households remains above the
steady state as long as the effect of the shock on housing has not disappeared.
The lower investment in housing and capital which makes the crisis so long-lasting is
similar to the context of the Paradox of Thrift 41. Investment frictions make saving
more desirable than investing. Hence, personal savings role as a net drag on the
economy during a recession.
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Figure 1.7 – Simulation of the Great Recession for two models Iacoviello (2015) and the
model of this paper , (%) change from SS
Figure 1.7 compares the path of the key variables in the present model and in Iacoviello
(2015)’s model. The economy was hit by the same shock in both models. The GDP
response is almost the same. However, contrary to the data shown in figure 1.1, after
the unset of the shock, key variables such as house price, mortgage and deposit decline
in Iacoviello (2015)’s model. In addition, his model does not capture the downward
41. See Huo and R´ıos-Rull (2013) and Christiano (2016).
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spiral in the housing price.
1.5 Macroprudential regulation
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, macroprudential policy tools have been
proposed to ensure financial stability. In this section, two types of macroprudential
policy are proposed; One on the the collateral constraint of the borrower and the
other on the capital constraint of the banker. The debt-to-income (DTI) ratio caps
credit growth for borrowers. Liabilities-to-assets ratio (LTA) restricts the liabilities
of financial institutions to a fraction of their assets. In order to apply the DTI to the
model, Equ 1.2.15 is changed to
Mt ≤ ρmMt−1 + [θm(wIt lIt ) + (1− θm)(1− ρm)θ(Et(
pht+1
1 + rbt+1
hIt ))] (1.5.1)
where θm is the weight assigned by the banker to the borrower’s wage income.
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Figure 1.8 – The impact of applying debt-to-income (DTI) into the model.
Figure 1.8 presents the impulse response to a negative 1% shock to the banker’s asset
without a DTI and with DTI=0.10. The DTI ratio limits the borrower’s debt to 10%
of disposable income and 90% of the expected house value. Increasing the DTI by 10%
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reduces the shock’s negative impact on GDP by 0.1%. As explained in the previous
section, GDP declines due to the higher demand of deposits by banks in response
to the higher demand of mortgages. The DTI restricts mortgages. As a result, the
patient household’s portfolio change is moderated.
On the other hand, the DTI’s effect on mortgages makes it difficult for the economy
to recover. With such policy on the collateral constraint, the economy suffers less but
recovers more slowly. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, GDP, capital and wages decline
after the shock. The DTI restricts borrowers to their income so their accessibility to
credits drops. Without the DTI, borrowers can raise more credit with lower income
and buy more houses. This action ignites the economy and helps recovery. However,
the strict regulation of a prudent debt-to-income ratio can regulate the housing boom
and moderate the crisis. Secondly, a higher DTI and consequently a lower amount
of mortgages result in less deposit issuance and credits. This reduces the amount
of government loans and consequently government spending. The economy therefore
slows down.
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Figure 1.9 – IRFs to households defaults, different liabilities-to assets ratio
A higher liabilities-to-assets ratio (LTA) φ, influences the economy as follows. The
rise gives the banker the ability to further increase deposits. Mortgages is regulated by
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the household collateral constraint which binds the mortgage to the expectation of the
house value. The mortgage, therefore, is not affected immediately. By raising more
deposits, bankers can pay off the liabilities with new deposits and reduce the negative
impact of a sudden shock. This is why the banker is no longer forced to sharply reduce
government loans in the higher LTA. This helps the economy to recover more quickly.
The impact of a 1% increase to the LTA is depicted in figures 1.9.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I use a DSGE model to study the impact of defaults on the asset side of
the bank balance sheet. The model features four types of heterogeneous households:
lenders, borrowers, renters and bankers. In addition, the model incorporates
government, firms and house producers as well as a tax system closed to the real
tax code in the US. The key elements of the model are stochastic financial frictions:
first, collateral constraints for borrower households based on the expected house value
and second, capital constraints on intermediary agents. This paper examines the
impact of a credit crunch on financial intermediaries similar to that of 2005-2008 on
the aggregate key variables. The lack of regulations allows the intermediary agents
to heat the housing market by liquidating the sovereign bond holdings, increasing
the liabilities and financing more mortgages. The findings of this paper reveal that
the role played by expectations and friction in housing and capital investments, which
give rise to the Paradox of Thrift, are the major delay factors in recovery. In addition,
the role of macroprudential policy tools in protecting financial stability is assessed.
A few essential points must be made regarding the role of intermediaries in financial
shocks. These would be interesting departure points for future studies. In this
model, banks are not able to run, though this is not the case in a real economy.
In 2007, financial companies which could not meet their obligations were forced to
run. This trend began with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers who had over 600
billion dollars in assets. The run was a result of having high volumes of subprime
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and other lower-rated mortgage which were not sufficiently secured 42. Other reasons
outlined in literature are illiquid aspects of bank’s assets and variations in the maturity
time for the projects. As a result, banks are incapable of responding to all requests
simultaneously. Different orientations such as those used by Uhlig (2010), Calvo
(2012) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) would make an interesting addition to the
model. One could also study the impact of other shocks on the model such as
technological shocks.
The presented DSGE model has the ability to explore the impacts of other scenarios
of default e.g. government default 43. The Government default may occur specifically
in response to a government spending shock. One scenario could be government
default in order to provide more transfers to households. This situation could happen
in an exceptional social-political situation wherein governments might need political
supports. This is the case of some third world countries which defaulted on their
loans to increase public spending 44. This model conducts the shocks in an exogenous
manner but It would be favorable to examine the interaction of primitive economic
elements.
42. Alan and Bialeck (2015)
43. See Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Ramey (2011). A famous example of this situation is 1998
Russian crisis in which the low productivity, a high fixed exchange rat, a chronic fiscal deficit and
declines in demand and price of crude oil (following the Asian financial crisis) impacted Russian
foreign exchange reserves and consequently leads the government to an internal default and as well
the economy to collapse. The IMF sources, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/IRProcessWeb/
data/rus/eng/currus.htm/#I. The shock in the model is not directly comparable with the Russian
crisis, but it has the potential to be extended to meet the parameters of the Russian default.
44. See Dinc¸ (2005).
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Chapter 2
Shadow Bank run, Housing and
Credit Market: The Story of a
Recession

2 Shadow Bank run, Housing and Credit Market
Abstract
This paper proposes a DSGE model with bank runs which improves Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2015) to assess the impact of housing and credit markets in financial instability and shadow
banking activities. This paper illustrates that a negative TFP shock is amplified by macro-
financial and macro-housing channels through household’s balance sheet, bank’s balance
sheet and liquidity channels. If the shock makes the shadow banking system insolvent, two
equilibria, no-run and run equilibrium, coexist. In this view, run is a sunspot coordination
failure; if households receive a negative signal from fundamentals and stop rolling over
deposits to the financial sector, banks are not able to fund their losses by new deposits. So
they are forced to liquidate their assets at an endogenous fire sale price. The main finding
of this paper is that the model with housing comprehensively details the consequences of
economic crises, namely home price double-dip, the output downward spiral and lengthy
recovery period. In addition, the paper indicates that macroprudential policy tools in the
form of capital adequacy buffers and loan-to-value ratios can be helpful for eliminating
bank-run equilibrium. They safeguard the economy against extreme busts and help mitigate
systemic risks by insulating asset prices.
JEL classification: E23, E32, E44, G21, G33 .
Keywords : Shadow banking, Bank run, Recession, Sunspot equilibrium, Double-dip.
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2.1 Introduction
This paper outlines a DSGE model of financial instability for the purpose of assessing
the impacts of housing on financial accelerator mechanisms and shadow financial
institutions. The key questions addressed by this paper are: i) What is the role of
the housing and credit markets in exacerbating financial distresses? ii) What are
the significant channels through which shocks are amplified and propagated into the
economy? and iii) does regulating shadow financial institutions provide mechanisms
to mitigate the procyclicality and the amplitude of fluctuations? To answer these
questions, this paper incorporates shadow financial intermediary agents, lender and
borrower households, housing and credit markets, goods and capital producers. The
model of this paper is calibrated using data pertaining to the US economy.
This paper is designed to improve Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) (hereafter, GK). GK’s
model focuses on the liability side of bank’s balance sheet and successfully identifies
the sunspot phenomenon 1 of shadow bank runs. However, housing, mortgages and
financial malfunctions, in the asset side of bank’s balance sheet, were at the core
of the recent recession 2. This paper contributes to the literature by focusing on
financial frictions between bankers and borrowers. This includes the role of housing
frictions, house prices and the credit market. GK’s model incorporates three agents:
lender households, shadow banks and firms. These agents are connected through two
types of goods: capital and non-durable goods. This paper improves GK’s model
by introducing a third asset, housing, and a fourth agent, borrower households, to
the basic features of GK’s shadow banking system 3. In this manner, the financial
agents’ assets are composed of capital lent to the productive sectors, and credits
demanded by households. Although simple models help to conceptualize the problem,
they jeopardize the results by underestimating the impact of shocks and overlooking
1. See Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Benhabib and Farmer (1999) and Farmer (2015) and self-
fulfilling debt crisis literature: Cole and Kehoe (1996), Jeanne and Masson (2000) and Cole and
Kehoe (2000).
2. The asset side of bank’s balance sheet is also the primary source of frictions in normal times,
when marcoprudential in under control. See Christiano (2017).
3. Market-based financing as some authorities prefer to call it.
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influential channels.
The main finding of this paper is that by introducing housing and credit market into
the literature the model is able to capture the important features of crises such as the
home price double-dip, output downward spiral 4, and lengthy recovery period. The
explanation of these features are in following paragraphs.
This paper finds that the house price double-dip is an event which occur by banking
recovery activities. Recession literature e.g. Giri et al. (2016), Koo (2014) and Marelli
and Signorelli (2017) clarifies the concept of the economic double-dip, however the
double-dip in house prices remains unexplored. The US data 5 shows the double-
dip in the house price in 2010, two years after the crisis. This paper indicates that
financial intermediary agents are primary in forming the house price double dip. The
mechanism of double dip is as follows. The first shoot occurs during the crisis mainly
due to a fall in mortgages and then a fall in borrowers housing demand. After the
crisis, house prices are low so the demand by lender households is high. This increases
the price i.e. the price start to recover. The higher house price relaxes collateral
constraints and consequently, increases mortgage demands. Banks are in the recovery
period so they need more deposits to answer the mortgage demands and accumulate
more net worth. The high deposit demand by banks reduces lenders’ housing demand
and reduces the house prices one more time after the crisis.
This paper illustrates that the major factors in causing the shocks in output to persist
(i.e. output downward spiral after the crisis) are financial frictions as well as frictions
in capital investments. The mechanisms involved in this persistence are as follows.
Two channels amplify a TFP shock into the economy: i) household balance sheets: a
negative TFP shock shrinks the lender and borrower’s wealth (firstly from a reduction
in wage and the capital return, secondly from housing value). The contraction in the
lender’s wealth reduces deposit rollovers. This exacerbates banks’ financing-ability
and leads banks to distresses. In addition, the sagged borrower’s wealth reduces the
4. The continues decrease in output even after the shock. See Eichengreen (2004).
5. See the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index 2011, Harding (2011) and https://www.economist.
com/blogs/dailychart/2010/12/house prices
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borrower’s house demands, tightens collateral constraints and consequently reduces
banks’ assets. All theses affect capital investments and output. ii) bank balance
sheets: a negative TFP shock affects the economy through both sides of bank’s balance
sheet and the asset liquidity. In the liability side, high leveraged banks cannot absorb
more leverage due to financial constraints. This limits the ability of the bank to pay
off its liabilities by new deposits. As a result, banks are forced to deleverage. In the
asset side, by facing the deterioration of asset value, banks are obliged to decrease
capital investment as well as credit. The cut back in investments causes a vicious
circle in capital and output. This ignites an output downward spiral. The cut back in
credit effects the borrower’s house demand and has an adverse effect on house prices.
This channel reinforces the the borrower balance sheet’s impact which is explained
above.
Finally, by comparing two equilibria i.e. no-bank run and bank run equilibrium,
this paper finds that the financial collapse (or i.e. bank run) puts a major delay on
recovery. The reasons are threefold. First, the financial collapse always comes with
an asset fire sale. In other words, at the period of the run, banks liquidate all their
assets. As a result, the excess capital supply remarkably reduces capital prices. The
low asset prices, in addition, have impact on household wealth. All these effects put
a delay on recovery. Second, the financial collapse negatively impacts the credit and
housing markets. When the financial collapse occurs, the financial sector closes its
door for one period. As a result, there is no credit market. This extremely impacts the
housing market and delays recovery. Third, the financial collapse increases the cost of
production. When the financial sector is shut down, households hold all capital. As
they should pay management cost for holding capital, the production is more costly.
This, in turn, affects output and recovery.
Considering the significance of the shadow banking system and its run-like behavior 6
during the recent recession, this paper models the financial agents in the form of
market-based financing institutions. These shadow financial institutions do not adhere
6. See Christiano et al. (2017) and Adrian and Liang (2016).
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to formal banking regulations. There is only an incentive compatibility constraint
which limits the bank’s ability to raise liabilities. This constraint is created by
the rationality of lenders. This agency problem markedly differentiates between
traditional and shadow banking systems. The traditional banks are supposed to the
regulatory constraints which are suggested in international regulatory frameworks
by committees such as the Basel. These regulations are extensively studied in
the literature e.g. Elenev et al. (2017), Rampini and Viswanathan (2017),He and
Krishnamurthy (2013), Iacoviello (2015) , Brunnermeier et al. (2012) and Perri and
Quadrini (2014). The financial sector adopted by this paper is standard and widely
investigated in the literature, in particular, Gertler et al. (2010), Gertler and Karadi
(2011), Gertler et al. (2012), Occhino and Pescatori (2014), Quadrini (2017) and
Gertler et al. (2016a). The banking sector modeled here correspond best to the
shadow banking sector which was at the core of the instability of the 2008 financial
crisis. To do so, following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), the other types of financial
intermediaries are excluded from this modeling because the nature and the possibility
of their run is extremely different with the shadow banking sector. For instance,
commercial banks, due to tight regulations and bank reserves at the central bank, are
not supposed to the same type of run as that of shadow banks.
This paper finds that a proper marcoprudential policy tool is able to remove bank-
run equilibrium. to do so, this paper assesses the supervision of both the bank and
borrower balance sheets by introducing Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) a` la Ghilardi
and Peiris (2016) and caps on the Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratio a` la Claessens et al.
(2013) on financial stability. The share of shadow banking in the U.S. mortgage market
as a whole increased to 38% in 2015, compared to 14% in 2007 7. The debate on how to
regulate these entities remains a controversial issue 8. The impact of macroprudential
7. See Buchak et al. (2017).
8. To see the fragility of the shadow banking system before, during and after crisis please
see https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120612a.htm at the conference on
Challenges in Global Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. In addition, Collier (2017)
describes the importance of shadow banking and the potential for systemic collapse in the current
world economy especially in the biggest economies like the US and China.
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policy tools in mitigating systemic distortions is wildly explored 9. These policy tools
control either bank balance sheets, borrower balance sheets or the liquidity of the
banking sector 10.
This paper finds that the CAR increases the financial stability by insulating the
bank’s asset price. The CAR control carries out a countercyclical capital buffer. In
this policy, shadow banks are obliged to withhold a certain ratio of their net worth
over productive assets. This protects the economy by ensuring that the shadow banks
have enough cushion to absorb temporary losses and pay off their obligations. This
mitigates, as well, the insolvency risk. This helps banks facing a shock to modestly
recapitalize without defaulting or causing panic 11. Furthermore, the cap on the LTV
reduces mortgage issuance and gives more leverage to banks for investing in capital. In
this regard, the cap on the LTV performs the same role as CARs. This is empirically
confirmed in the literature e.g. Moreno (2011) and Cerutti et al. (2015).
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 calibrates
the parameters used as per the US data. Section 4 simulates the recession with
and without a bank run. Section 5 outlines the effectiveness of countercyclical
macroprudential policies and their protective mechanisms. Section 6 offers a
conclusion on the findings of this paper.
2.2 Model
The model incorporates households, the financial and the production sector. There
is a continuum of measure unity of each type. Households are either lenders or
borrowers. The lender households consume, accumulate housing and capital. They,
9. To have a comprehensive overview in theoretical and empirical researches on macroprudential
policy tools, see Galati and Moessner (2017).
10. See Laeven et al. (2016), Brown et al. (2016) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).
11. Panics are one reason of bank runs. They act as an extrinsic random variable i.e. a sunspot
which can firstly, make a bank run equilibrium feasible and secondly, shift the economy from the
no-bank run equilibrium to the bank run equilibriumSee Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Chen and
Hasan (2008).
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also, raise deposits in the financial sector. 12. The borrowers consumes and accumulate
housing by getting credits from the financial sector. Credits are subject to a collateral
constraint. The financial sector is in the form of shadow banking. The financial sector
issues credits and has its own capital. Finally, the firms use productive assets borrowed
from the lender households and the bankers to produce non-durable goods.
2.2.1 Lender Households
The lender’s problem 13 is
Max Et
∞∑
τ=t0
βτ−t0P {(1− ϕc) log(CPτ − ϕcCPτ−1) + ϕh log hPτ + ϕl log(1− lPt )}
s.t.
CPt +Dt + p
h
t (h
P
t − hPt−1) + pkt (Kht − (1− δk)Kht−1) + f(Kht ) + (1− σ)Nn ≤
wPt l
P
t + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 + r
k
tK
h
t−1 (2.2.1)
where t presents time. βP < 1 is the discount factor , C
P
t is consumption, h
P
t is
the housing asset of the lender household and lPt is the labor supply. ϕh and ϕl are
the coefficients which represent the relative importance of housing and leisure in the
utility function, respectively.
Every period, the lender engages in the following activities: consuming non-durable
goods, depositing safe assets Dt to the banking sector, buying and selling housing at
the house price pht , investing in capital at the price p
k
t and working at the firms with
wage wP . r is the interest rate on the deposit and rk is the one-period return on
capital. Kht is capital held by the lender. The household bears a convex managing
cost f(Kht ) =
αk
2
(Kht )
2, αk > 0.
Nn is the donation of the household to perform new banks in the case of bank failure.
12. Cross sectional and over time analysis indicates the homogeneity of banks’ liability structures:
banks are almost financed by deposits. See Hanson et al. (2015). Shadow financial institutions are
engaged with short-term debts and securitization.
13. This type of utility function is known in literature. See Iacoviello (2015).
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The probability of a failure is 1 − σ, i.i.d. This case will be explained in the bank
section.
The Lagrange multiplier of lenders is the result of the first order condition with respect
to consumption,
λPt =
1− ϕc
CPt − ϕcCPt−1
(2.2.2)
The FOC with respect to the lenders’ housing asset, deposit and capital, respectively,
are
pht =
ϕh
λPt h
P
t
+ βPEt
λPt+1
λPt
pht+1 (2.2.3)
1 = βPEt
λPt+1
λPt
(1 + rt) (2.2.4)
pkt + f
′(Kht ) = βPEt
λPt+1
λPt
[pkt+1(1− δk) + rkt+1] (2.2.5)
2.2.2 Borrower Households
The borrower’s problem is
Max Et
∞∑
τ=t0
βτ−t0I {(1− ϕc) log(CIτ − ϕcCIτ−1) + ϕh log hIτ + ϕl log(1− lIt )}
s.t.
CIt + p
h
t (h
I
t − hIt−1) + (1 + rbt )Mt−1 ≤ wIt lIt +Mt
Mt ≤ θmpht hIt (2.2.6)
In order to make borrowing and lending possible for the agents, the borrower’s
discount factor is assumed to be less than that of the lender, βI < βP . At time
t, the borrower consumes CIt , buys and sells housing assets h
I
t at the price p
h
t , receives
mortgages Mt and pay the mortgage interest rate r
b
t . The borrower works for the
firms at the wage, wIt and provides labor supply l
I
t . The borrower household does not
accumulate physical capital nor hold any equity.
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The collateral constraint restricts the mortgage to the fraction, θm, of the housing-
asset value. θm is the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. It is set by the regulatory as a
macroprudential policy tool. The collateral constraint is one of the channels by which
the financial sector is connected to the real economy. For instance, stricter regulation
i.e. a smaller LTV lowers the consumption to income ratio 14.
The macroprudential constraint highlights the role of the house price in the
borrower’s portfolio decision. Higher house prices decrease house demands and affect
consumption. On the other hand, the high house price relaxes the collateral constraint
and increases available credit. This credit increase opens a new mechanism which
increases spending capacity of constrained households 15. In addition, higher house
prices have a wealth effect on home owners which, again, increases the consumption
capacity 16. These contrary mechanisms impact the borrower at the same time, so the
final effect is ambiguous prior to a calibration.
λIt and λ
m
t are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the budget and collateral
constraint, respectively. The FOC with respect to consumption is
λIt =
1− ϕc
CIt − ϕcCIt−1
(2.2.7)
the FOCs with respect to borrower’s housing asset, mortgage and labor, respectively,
are
(1− λ
m
t
λIt
θm)p
h
t =
ϕh
λIth
I
t
+ βIEt
λIt+1
λIt
pht+1 (2.2.8)
1− λ
m
t
λIt
= βIEt
λIt+1
λIt
(1 + rbt+1) (2.2.9)
ϕl
1− lIt
= λItw
I
t (2.2.10)
14. See Jappelli and Pagano (1994) and Chen et al. (2010).
15. See Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995) and Cheng and Fung (2008). The housing wealth acts
as buffer stock. Buffer stock is a supply of inputs held as a reserve to safeguard against unforeseen
shortages or demands. See Carroll et al. (1992).
16. See Christelis et al. (2015) and Cooper and Dynan (2016).
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2.2.3 Shadow Bankers
The bankers are responsible of shadow banking financial institutions 17. The banker’s
problem is
Max Vt = Et
∞∑
τ=t0+1
βτ−t0B (1− σ)στ−t0−1cbτ
s.t
Pro' σ
nt = nlt = (rkt + (1− δk)pkt )kbt−1 + (1 + rbt )mt−1 − (1 + rt−1)dt−1cbt = 0
Pro' 1− σ
nt = nncbt = nlt
pkt k
b
t +mt = dt + nt
θb(p
k
t k
b
t +mt) ≤ Vt where 0 < θb < 1 (2.2.11)
where Vt is the bank’s value function, βB is the bankers’ discount factor, c
b
t is the
banker consumption and nt is the total net worth of the shadow banker. There are
two possibilities at the beginning of each period. First, the bank is still alive (with
the probability σ). In this case, the banker pays off its liabilities and manages its
net worth, nt = n
l
t. Then the banker combines its net worth with new deposits dt
to operate new investments pkt k
b
t +mt. Second, the banker fails and should leave the
market (with the probability 1− σ). In this case, the banker pays the liabilities and
consumes all its net worth. Then, a new banker enters into the financial sector by
receiving the start-up fund nn, from lender households 18. Thus, the banking utility
function is defined as the present discounted value of banker’s consumption. In both
cases the bank balance sheet equates the liabilities to the assets.
The significant contrast between shadow and traditional banks arises from regulations.
17. The banking model here extends Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)’s banking model to a bank
granting mortgages.
18. This structure guarantees the existence of the steady state. Otherwise bankers accumulate
their net worth every period, so the net worth is increasing and the aggregate net worth is not
stationary. For more details on proof, see Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler et al. (2016a).
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The last equation in problem 2.2.11 indicates an incentive compatibility constraint
posed by the rationality of lenders restricts the liabilities of shadow banking sector.
This constraint can be described by a simple agency problem.
Every period, the banker decides between operating normally or scamming. If the
bank operates normally, it holds its assets and pays back the liabilities at the end of
the period. If the bank chooses to scam, it sells the fraction, θb, of its assets in the
open market, then leaves the economy. The banker is not able to sell the whole asset
due to the asset illiquidity. In addition, this large financial transaction cannot be done
without attracting attention. The capital constraint restricts the banker’s ability to
issue liabilities so that the banker’s utility of the normal case is greater than the utility
of the scamming case. One can see θb as the index of banker trustworthiness. The
higher the value of θb, the greater the trust in the shadow banking system.
The value function is the expected present value of the next-period net worth. It is
more informative to show this maximization recursively as a Bellman equation
Vt = EtβB[(1− σ)nlt+1 + σVt+1] (2.2.12)
Equ. 2.2.12 drives the banker’s Tobin’s Q. It is the banker’s value function over its
net worth. Using the tobin’s Q, the banker’s problem can be rewritten as
Max υt = EtβB[(1− σ) + σvt+1]n
l
t+1
nt
θb(φ
d
t + 1) ≤ vt (2.2.13)
where vt =
Vt
nt
is Tobin’s Q and φdt =
dt
nt
is the leverage ratio.
There is an arbitrage between the return on the mortgage and capital for the banker
which drives the relation between the prices,
Et(1 + r
b
t+1) = Et(
rkt+1 + (1− δk)pkt+1
pkt
) (2.2.14)
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Considering the balance sheet and the arbitrage condition 2.2.14, the evaluation of
net worth is
nlt+1
nt
=
(rkt+1 + (1− δk)pkt+1)kbt + (1 + rbt+1)mt − (1 + rt)dt
nt
(2.2.15)
= st+1φ
d
t + (1 + r
b
t+1) (2.2.16)
where st = r
b
t−rt−1 is the spread between lending and borrowing rates. The first term
of equ. 2.2.16 is the marginal profit gained by raising the deposit by one unit and
the second term is the pure benefit from one unit of the net worth. From equations
2.2.4,2.2.5 and 2.2.14, the spread is a function of the lender management cost and the
asset price
βPEt
λPt+1
λPt
st+1 =
f ′(Kht )
pkt
(2.2.17)
Assuming the capital constraint is binding, the Bellman equation 2.2.13 leads to
θb(φ
d
t + 1) = βBEt[(1− σ) + σθb(φdt+1 + 1)](st+1φdt + (1 + rbt+1)) (2.2.18)
Equ. 2.2.18 describes the dynamic of the leverage ratio. The equation equates the
minimum value of the marginal bank’s value to the discounted marginal benefit of
future operations. st+1φ
d
t + (1 + r
b
t+1) is the growth rate of the net worth.
Equ. 2.2.18 demonstrates the main difference between shadow financial institutions
and regular banks. The leverage ratio of the regular banks is subject to regulations.
The regular banks should set their activities in order to meet the regulations. The
shadow financial institutions are not subject to the banking regulations. Their
leverage ratio is set endogenously by the market. The equation 2.2.18 illustrates
that the leverage ratio of a bank does not depend on its net worth or other individual
characteristic. This property helps write the model in the aggregate form.
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2.2.4 Firms
A perfectly competitive non-housing goods market is characterized by constant returns
to scale. The identical firms of measure one are producing a homogeneous final good
according to the Cobb-Douglas technology. The profit maximization determines factor
prices. All households except bankers work for the firm with labor elasticity, ιP , ιI . It
is assumed that ιP + ιI = 1. The firm rents the capital from patient households and
bankers in order to produce goods
Yt = ZtK
αf
t−1((l
P
t )
ιP (lIt )
ιI )1−αf (2.2.19)
Πft = Yt − wPt lPt − wIt lIt − rktKt−1 (2.2.20)
Y is output, , K = Kh + Kb is total capital in the economy, Z is total factor
productivity and αf is the output elasticity of capital. Π
f stands for the firms’ profit.
Factor markets are competitive. Factor prices are the result of the first order condition
with respect to capital and labor, respectively
αf
Yt
Kt−1
= rkt (2.2.21)
(1− α)ιiYt
lit
= wit, i = P, I (2.2.22)
Total factor productivity Z has a stochastic nature. In the next sections, an adverse
shock on this variable reduces productivity and starts a business cycle.
2.2.5 Capital Producers
In the economy there are perfectly competitive capital producers who produce capital
subject to an adjustment cost. The capital investment by producers is ik. The law of
motion of capital is
[1− ψk
2
(
ikt
ikt−1
− 1)2]ikt = Kt − (1− δk)Kt−1 (2.2.23)
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Capital producers buy the undepreciated part of the last-period capital from
households and bankers to produce new capital. This capital is offered at price pk to
capital holders. Consequently, a producer maximizes 19 his gains as
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tP
λPτ
λPt
[pkτ (Kτ − (1− δk)Kτ−1)− ikτ ] (2.2.24)
the first order condition for capital production reveals the capital price,
pkt [1− ψk(
ikt
ikt−1
− 1) i
k
t
ikt−1
− ψk
2
(
ikt
ikt−1
− 1)2] + βPEtpkt+1[
λPt+1
λPt
ψk(
ikt+1
ikt
− 1)(i
k
t+1
ikt
)2] = 1
(2.2.25)
2.2.6 Market clearing
The leverage ratio of the bankers does not depend on individual bank specifics. So at
time t, all the bankers behave in the same way. By using this feature, it is possible to
describe the economy in the aggregate form. The capital letters state the aggregate
variables. In the aggregate, the asset-to-net worth ratio φ is defined by
At ≡ pktKbt +Mt = Dt +Nt (2.2.26)
φt ≡ At/Nt = φdt + 1 (2.2.27)
where A is the total financial-sector asset. The aggregate net worth N is defined by
N lt = (1 + r
b
t )At−1 − (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 (2.2.28)
Nn = $Y (2.2.29)
Nt = σN
l
t + (1− σ)Nn (2.2.30)
where N l is the aggregate net worth of the banking system at the beginning of period
t and (1−σ)Nn is the aggregate household donation towards establishing new banks.
To simplify the calibration and to fix the leverage ratio steady state to the target,
19. See Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
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it is supposed that the aggregate start up fund is equal to the small fraction, $, of
the output steady state.The aggregate bankers’ consumption and the market clearing
equations are
CBt = (1− σ)N lt (2.2.31)
Ht = h
P
t + h
I
t = 1 (2.2.32)
Kt = K
b
t +K
h
t (2.2.33)
Yt = Ct + f(K
h
t ) + i
k
t (2.2.34)
where Ht is total housing which is normalized to one and Ct = C
P
t +C
I
t +C
B
t is total
consumption. Output is equal to total consumption, capital holding fees and capital
investment.
A set of prices and allocations define an equilibrium so that households and banks
maximize their utility functions subject to all constraints and all markets clears
(markets for good, housing, labor, deposit, mortgage and capital).
2.3 Calibration
Table 2.1 – Calibrated parameters (quarterly)
Parameters Symbol Value
Discount factors βP , βI , βB 0.9901, 0.9877, 0.9876
Consumption preference ϕc 0.50
Housing preference ϕh 0.08
Leisure parameter ϕl 2.18
Capital depreciation rate δk 0.035
Probability of survive σ 0.96
loan-to-value ratio θm 0.80
Truth index to bankers θb 0.27
Coef. of start-up funds $ 0.05
Coef. of capital cost function αk 0.0014
Elasticity of capital αf 0.37
Elasticity of labor ιP , ιI 0.51, 0.49
Factor productivity SS Z 0.88
AR parameter of the shock ρz 0.95
Capital investment adj. for Producer ψk 2
Policy parameters ρΩ, % 0.5, 3.5
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Table 5.1 presents the value of the parameters which are chosen from the US data to
calculate the quarterly targets. In adherence to standard practices and maintain the
comparability, a subset of parameters are taken from Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015).
In the case of absence, parameters are calibrated from the very standard related
literature or they are conventional and are calibrated to match the long-run averages
observed in the data. The calibration here is closely based on US data from 1985-2015.
This information is sourced from the World Bank, the OECD, the Federal Reserve
Bank, the Financial Flow Accounts and the 2011 American Housing Survey (Census
Bureau).
In order to have a binding borrowing constraint in the steady state, the impatient
discount factor should be set less than the weighted average of the two others.
According to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), this setting of discount factors results
in an annualized average real interest rate on deposits of 0.04 and an interest rate on
loans of 0.05. The housing preference and loan-to-value ratio are calibrated to jointly
match two long-run proportions: the total housing value over GDP equal to 1.3 on
an annualized basis according to the Federal Reserve and the ratio of mortgage debt
owed by households relative to their real estate holdings equal to 0.30 according to the
2011 American Housing Survey. The coefficient of leisure time in the utility function
is calibrated to insure that the labor supply of households are approximately 30%.
Consumption preference is set to 0.5 according to Iacoviello (2015). By the preference
settings, the share of patient consumption on total consumption is cP/C = 56%,
impatient cI/C = 41% and banker cB/C = 3%. This is corroborated by the OECD
data. In addition, consistent with the Financial Flow Accounts data and Roi et al.
(2007), the ratio of quarterly consumption to housing is around 0.1. The coefficient of
capital cost by lenders is set to 0.0014 in order to target the share of household capital
over total capital which is equal to 30% based on Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015). The
trustworthiness index to bankers, the coefficient of start-up funds to new bankers,
and probability of survival are calibrated to jointly match the target of the asset-
to-net worth ratio which equals 8.4 (and consequently the leverage ratio equals 7.4)
according to the OECD data 1995-2015, and capital over GDP equal to 1.5 on an
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annualized basis according to the Federal Reserve Economic Data. The coefficient
for adjustment cost for capital producers is set as per Justiniano et al. (2015). The
capital depreciation rate is set to 3.5% according to Iacoviello (2015). Considering
the target of capital, the interest rates and market clearings, elasticity of capital in
Cobb–Douglas production function and total factor productivity are set to 0.37 and
0.88, respectively. The policy parameters come from Ghilardi and Peiris (2016).
2.4 Run and Recession
In this paper, the recession has a real origin. The shock to TFP exacerbates
the deterioration of financial and real market conditions 20 by financial accelerator
mechanisms which will be explained later in this section.
If the net worth of the shadow bank is positive, the economy has only one equilibrium.
If the banking net worth gets negative, two equilibria coexist: bank run or no-bank
run equilibrium. When the net worth is negative, paying off liabilities requires rolling
over deposits by lenders. The decision of lender households between “still rolling
over” or “stopping rolling over” deposits into the financial sector determines what
equilibrium is chosen.
Rolling over deposits helps banking system pay off the liabilities by new deposits and
accumulate net worth. This is the equilibrium without bank run. In the equilibrium
with bank run, stopping rolling over forces the banking system to sell all its assets at
the fire sale price to pay off the liabilities. In this case the run occurs because the
value of the bank’s assets at the fire sale price is less than the liabilities. The fire sale
price might be well below the assets’ intrinsic value. The price cutback depends on
various elements such as the nature of the shock, bank’s financial stance etc.
The equilibrium is selected by macroeconomic fundamentals and sunspots. By
definition a sunspot is a non-payoff relevant signal that generates coordination on
a particular equilibrium among many. While two equilibria coexist, at the same time,
20. See Bernanke et al. (1999) and Gertler et al. (2016b).
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it is the sunspot which forms the bank run or no-bank run equilibrium 21.
The depositor recovery rate X depicts the sufficient condition for the existence of a
bank-run equilibrium,
Xt =
(rkt + (1− δk)pk∗t )Kbt−1 + (1 + rbt )Mt−1
(1 + rt−1)Dt−1
< 1 (2.4.1)
where pk∗ is the fire sale price. Expression 2.4.1 is equivalent to a negative net worth.
As a result, the return on deposits is outlined by,
The deposit interest rate =
 (1 + rt−1) No-bank run equilibriumXt(1 + rt−1) Bank run equilibrium (2.4.2)
The timing of the model is as follows: the economy starts at the steady state at t = 0.
At t = 1 an adverse technological shock hits the economy. This affects production,
and consequently wages and the borrowing return rate. Total factor productivity Z
follows AR(1) process, a white noise process with zero mean and constant variance.
If the shock satisfies Xt < 1, a bank run equilibrium exists. The bank run may occur
in any period before Xt becomes greater than one. At any time t, to determine if a
run occurs, as in GK’s model, a sunspot can appear with a given probability: if the
sunspot appears, then the run occurs and the economy follows then the ”bank run”
equilibrium; if the sunspot does not appear, then there is no run at t and the economy
keeps following the ”no bank run” equilibrium.
Figure 2.1 (left) presents the path for the depositor recovery rate Xt after the 5%
adverse technological shock 22. The run can happen when the depositor recovery rate
is less than one.
21. Agents can coordinate based on the observation of the signal. Sunspots are extrinsic random
variables which influence expectations. The extrinsic uncertainty caused by market psychology,
self-fulfilling prophecies and panics etc can alter equilibrium outcomes.
22. The shock should be big-enough to make banks insolvent. Here I chose 5% adverse shock as
well as Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) to keep the comparability of the model with the model without
housing. In addition, the same methodology as Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) is used to solve and
simulate the model. Starting from the end of the simulation and working backwards, the program
compute the path of the economy after a run happens back to steady state.
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Figure 2.1 – Bank run may happen in periods in which the depositor recovery rate (left)
is less than one.
The asset fire sale price, using equ. 2.2.5, is
pk∗t = Et
[ ∞∑
i=1
βiP
λPt+i
λPt
(1− δk)i−1[rkt+i − (1− δk)αkKht+i]
]
− αkKht (2.4.3)
The asset fire sale price is the discounted sum of the returns minus the managing
cost and taking into account the depreciation rate. Figure 2.1 (right) presents the
fire sale price after the 5% adverse technological shock. This price is the capital price
at the period of the run. So figure 2.1 (right) is only meaningful for the periods in
which bank run is possible i.e. the depositor recovery rate is less than one. The later
the run, the higher the fire sale price. Equ. 2.4.3 indicates three important points;
first, the price depends on the household’s capital holdings. The higher the volume of
household’s capital, the higher the marginal management cost and the lower the fire
sale price. Second, it takes time until household’s and bank’s capital return to the
steady state. The longer this process, the lower the fire sale price. Third, the price
depends on the size of the shock: the more severe the adverse shock, the lower total
factor productivity and the lower the expected yield. This means a lower return on
capital and consequently, a lower fire sale price.
Figure 2.2 and 2.3 (dashed lines) present the paths of the aggregate variables after
the 5% adverse technological shock for no-bank-run equilibrium.
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Figure 2.2 – % change from the SS for the key variables, 5% technological shock at t=1,
bank run at t=3
The explanation of the economy after the shock and before the bank run is as follows
(the summary of mechanisms is depicted in figure 2.4). After the shock, banks suffer
losses, so their net worth declines. This leads to a reduction in investment and capital
prices. The drop in the capital price feeds back into lower net worth and leads to an
increase in bank leverage. The reason why banks are allowed to take on more leverage
is the credit spread. This financial amplification (same as in GK’s model) rests on
the countercyclical behavior of credit spreads. Figure 2.2 shows that after a negative
realization of TFP, both the leverage ratio and spread increase.
82
2 Shadow Bank run, Housing and Credit Market
0 20 40
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
Borrower’s housing asset
%
∆ 
fro
m
 s
s
0 20 40
−2
0
2
4
6
Lender’s housing asset
%
∆ 
fro
m
 s
s
0 20 40
−15
−10
−5
0
House Price
%
∆ 
fro
m
 s
s
0 20 40
−100
−80
−60
−40
−20
0
Net worth
Quarters
%
∆ 
fro
m
 s
s
0 20 40
−100
−80
−60
−40
−20
0
Deposit
Quarters
%
∆ 
fro
m
 s
s
0 20 40
−100
−80
−60
−40
−20
0
Mortgage
Quarters
%
∆ 
fro
m
 s
s
 
 
Bank run
No−Bank run
Figure 2.3 – % change from the SS for the household and financial variables, 5%
technological shock at t=1, bank run at t=3
In addition to credit spreads, before the bank run, the adverse real shock propagates
into the economy of this model through two channels: i) The household balance
sheet channel: The adverse shock reduces output as well as wages and the return on
capital. This reduces the household wealth. As a result, lender households decrease
their deposit and capital. In addition, borrower households reduce their housing and
mortgage demand. So the house price drops. It is why lenders increase their housing.
The low-price housing asset tightens the collateral constraint and therefore, again,
adversely effects mortgages.
ii) the bank balance sheet channel: the shock affects both asset and liability sides.
1- the asset side: the TFP shocks reduces the marginal productivity of capital. As
a result, net worth drops. In this situation, the bank has to reduce issuing credits.
There is a reduction in resources available for borrowing, so there is less capital for
production and less available resources for mortgages. The former caused a vicious
circle between capital and output. In addition, the reduction in mortgages causes the
borrowers’ house demand to decline. This, consequently, decreases the house price. 2-
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the liability side: due to financial constraints, banks cannot pay off their liabilities by
taking up more leverage. As a result, they are forced to deleverage. By deleveraging,
banks sell their assets to pay off liabilities. This reduces bank’s capital.
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Figure 2.4 – Mechanism of the model, after the shock before the bank run.
The bank run equilibrium is as follows. The bank run is unexpected. Hence, the
behavior of the economy before the run is the same as the no-bank run equilibrium.
If the sunspot determines the bank run equilibrium at t∗, banks are forced to liquidate
all their assets at t∗. During the period of the systemic bank run, the intermediary
sector becomes inactive. Households continue their activities without bankers. It
is assumed that only one bank run occurs and there are no other bank runs after
the first one. This circumstance leads to the zero balance sheet for banks at t∗:
Nt∗ = At∗ = Mt∗ = K
b
t∗ = Dt∗ = 0.
During the period of the run, lender households collect capital and invest directly.
The lender’s budget constraint becomes:
CPt∗ + p
h
t∗(h
P
t∗ − hPt∗−1) + pkt∗Kht∗ + f(Kht∗) ≤ wPt∗lPt∗ + (1 + rbt∗)(At∗−1 + pkt∗−1Kht∗−1)
(2.4.4)
where Kt∗ = K
h
t∗ indicates the total capital. At this period, borrowers do not have
access to credit so they smoothen their consumption using their assets and income.
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The borrower’s budget constraint is:
CIt∗ + p
h
t∗(h
I
t∗ − hIt∗−1) + (1 + rbt∗)Mt∗−1 ≤ wIt∗lIt∗ (2.4.5)
At the period after the run, t∗+ 1, the banking sector is revitalized. It uses the start-
up fund provided by lender households to rebuild itself over time. In other words,
the economy continues with the pre-run structure while all banks are newborn using
start-up funds.
Figure 2.2 and 2.3 (solid lines) present the paths of the aggregate variables after the
5% adverse technological shock for bank run equilibrium. Here, it is assumed that
the bank run occurs unexpectedly at t∗ = 3 (the second period after the shock). No
further bank runs occur after the first bank run.
The following is the interpretation of the time of bank run. When there is the run,
households get all capital in the economy at the fire sale price. To do so, households
reduce their housing. This, again, reduces housing prices. Note that there is no
deposit for one period at t∗, because banks get inactive. Borrowers benefit the low
house price and the excess supply of housing to increase their housing 23. The summary
of mechanisms at the bank run is depicted in figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5 – Mechanism of the model at the bank run.
After the run, the TFP shock monotonically retrieves to the steady state. This is not
the case for the other variables in the model e.g. capital, housing and output. Due to
23. It is also the effect of the normalization of total housing supply to one, equ. 2.2.32.
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the quick price increase after the bottom point (at the run), there is a short period
of a high capital return. This leads to an overshooting in capital investment. This
investment boom leads capital to go above the no-run case and make a peak for GDP.
In addition, banks try to get back a part of their previous capital but given that the
bank net worth remains depleted, the financial frictions slow down this recovery.
Figure 2.3 indicates an interesting point about the behavior of the house price: the
home price double-dip. The figure shows that the home price has sagged to another
low after rebounding from the shock. The US data shows the double-dip in the
house price in 2010, two years after the crisis. Two mechanisms take the home price
double-dip into account. Lender’s and bank’s portfolio decision. The first drop in
housing prices occurs during the run (explained in the previous paragraphs and figure
2.5). After the run, the banking system restarts its activities and retrieves capital.
This gets lenders the opportunity to increase deposits and housing. As a result, the
housing price increases. This relaxes collateral constraints and increases the mortgage
demand. Bank is in the recovery period, so needs to issue more loans and accumulates
more net worth. To do so, bank needs more deposit. The bank’s deposit demand is
constrained, so bank can raise the desired amount of deposit with the low interest
rate. As a result, lenders issue more deposit and reduces their housing. For this
process to be the optimal decision of lenders, the return on the housing must be low.
This low return is made by housing price decreased. So the housing price reduces
one more time after the crisis. Lastly, the price goes back monotonically to its steady
state value.
The ways in which financial collapses contribute slow recovery can be determined by
comparing the run and no run equilibrium paths in figure 2.3. The output’s path of
the run equilibrium is always below that of the no run equilibrium. This means that
the financial collapse poses damage on recovery. This damage is mostly made in three
ways. First, the financial collapse severely reduces asset prices through the process of
asset fire sale. Second, the financial collapse exacerbates housing and credit markets.
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Third, the financial collapse increase the production cost.
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Figure 2.6 – Aggragate changes for a 5% real shock in the model without housing and
credit markets
Figure 2.6 presents the response of aggregate variables of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)
(the model which excludes the housing and credit markets) for the same size of TFP
shock. There are four major differences between the results of this paper and GK.
First, in this model, the economy exits faster from the bank runs-possible area than
in the case of GK’s economy. The period in which run can occur in GK’s model
is twice that of this paper. This is due to the absence of the credit market in the
simple model. The borrowers’ need to raise credit creates revenue for the banking
sector which increases the bank’s profitability. Second, GK’s model is not able to
capture the output downward spiral. This is due to its fixed total supply of capital
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and the fact that capital cannot depreciate. In addition, in GK’s model there is no
rigidity in the form of capital adjustment costs. The adjustment cost makes the shock
persistence. Third, this paper simulates a lower asset fire sale price than GK’s model.
Indeed, housing reduces the asset fire sale price. This is because of the expansion in
the lender household choices for saving. The availability of cheap houses increases
lenders’ housing demands. As a result, the household does not forced to only buy
capital, but he can changes its portfolio depending on the trad-off between return and
costs. Fourth, the output downfall in this model is more severe than GK’s model. The
reason for this is a contraction in borrower consumption which is due to tightening in
the collateral constraint.
2.5 Macroprudential Policy
This paper studies macroprudential policy on the bank balance sheet by introducing
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and on the borrower balance sheet by the cap on the
Loan-To-Value (LTV). Banks are obliged to pay a penalty if their CAR deviates from
the regulatory target 24. As a result, the bank aggregate net worth 2.2.30 changes to
Nt = σN
l
t + (1− σ)Nnt − %(
Nt
pktK
b
t
− Ωt)2 (2.5.1)
Ωt = (1− ρΩ)Ω + ρΩΩt−1 + (1− ρΩ)(Yt − Yt−1
Yt−1
) (2.5.2)
where Ωt is the macroprudential CAR target. This value considers only bank’s capital
asset and not other assets such as mortgages. This is in line with existing regulations.
% is the policy parameter, Ω is the steady state value of N
pkKb
25 and 0 < ρΩ < 1 is the
parameter of the process. The growth value added to the CAR target corresponds to
a countercyclical policy. It gives the flexibility to the policy to increase the target in
booms and decrease it in recessions. This is in accordance with the current applied
macroprudential policies recommended by Basel III.
24. This modeling is standard and applied by Ghilardi and Peiris (2016).
25. Ω is such that the steady state of the model is not modified by different value of %.
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Figure 2.7 – Impact of introducing the CAR
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 present the impact of the 5% adverse real shock in the presence
and absence of the macroprudential policies. Introducing the CAR target and cutting
down the LTV by 1% insulates the banks’ capital assets against extreme drops. These
policies increase the resilience of the financial sector and have three impacts on the
economy: i) increasing asset fire sale prices, ii) regulating credits and iii) reducing
the volatility of the real economy.
The CAR regulating policy imply that banks recover faster. This happens because
the capital fire sale price is higher in this case than that of no-regulation case. The
CAR insulates the capital fire sale price because it obliges the banking sector to
always keep a certain amount of capital. From equation 2.4.3, the lower the bank’s
capital holding, the lower the capital fire sale price. Hence, the drop of net worth
(equivalently, X) at the shock is smaller. This is of course in the price of limiting
mortgages and dampening the housing market.
The LTV has the same impact as the CAR. By reducing the LTV, banks issue less
mortgage, and keep more capital. This has the same as the CAR on the capital
fire sale price. All these effects mitigate fluctuations in the real economy. This may
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impede boom-bust business cycles.
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Figure 2.8 – Impact of cutting down the LTV
The main result of this section is that given a TFP shock, there is a proper value
of policy parameters (θm and %) which eliminate the bank run equilibrium. In other
words, the depositor recover rate does not get less than one after the shock. As a
result, the economy passes only in the no-bank run equilibrium path. The value of
these parameters are critical for 2 reasons. First, the higher the value, the lower the
mortgage supply and the lower the borrowers’ housing demand. Second, the proper
value is highly depends on the size of the expected shock. If the shock is not close
to the expectation, the proper value is not any more a good value. As a result, a
policy maker, before setting a value, should pay attention to the trade-off between
protecting the financial sector and the impacts on the housing and credit markets.
Then the parameters should be set carefully based on the economic situation and
economic targets.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper improves the DSGE model of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) to study the
impact of the housing and credit markets on the stability of the economy. The
model is made representative of the real economy through the introduction of two
types of heterogeneous households: lender and borrower. In addition, the model
incorporates the financial sector in the form of shadow banking system, goods and
capital producers. The key elements of the model are stochastic financial frictions
in the form of collateral constraint for the borrowers and incentive compatibility
constraint for the banking sector. This paper indicates how direct linkages and
associated financial channels lead to the transmission of shocks from one sector to
another, and how this can be intensified by feedback loops. In addition, an assessment
is made of the amendatory role of macroprudential policy tools, in particular the CAR
and LTV, in safeguarding financial stability.
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3 Housing Taxation and Financial Intermediation
Abstract
Through the lens of a multi-agent dynamic general equilibrium model, we examine the effects
of four permanent changes in housing taxes and deductions on macroeconomic aggregates
and welfare. We find that these changes have very small effects on economic activity in
the short-run. The short-run tax multipliers that we find over a horizon of 20 quarters
range from −0.02 to −0.13, while the long-run tax multipliers found range from −1.43 to
−0.81. The presence of borrowing-constrained bankers dampen the negative consequences
of housing taxation on output—especially in the short run. The reduction in the deduction
of mortgage interest payments delivers the lowest long-run multiplier. We also implement
revenue-neutral tax reforms and find that the repeal of mortgage deductibility is the only
policy that generates gains in output.
JEL classification: E62, G28, H24, R38.
Keywords : Housing taxation, banking, dynamic general equilibrium.
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3.1 Introduction
The importance of housing finance has grown substantially in the past decades in
the United States. In 1970, mortgage debt corresponded to 26% of GDP; less than
four decades later, in 2007, this ratio rose to 71%. Its weight on the commercial
banks’ balance sheets has also grown substantially. Specifically, mortgage lending as
a fraction of total bank lending was 70% in 2007, up from 55% in 1970. 1 Throughout
the same period, housing value as a proportion of GDP has almost doubled—moving
up from 0.9 in 1970 to 1.7 in 2007. This build-up in mortgage debt and housing value
is partially due to the favorable treatment of housing in the US tax code. In fact,
mortgage interest payments are deductible from taxable income, and imputed rents
on owner-occupied housing are exempted. Furthermore, owners of rental housing
have access to a deduction for depreciation allowance. Making changes to the housing
fiscal policies leads to greater tax revenues for the government, but at the expense
of output losses. What are the effects of such changes in the short and long-run on
aggregate variables and welfare? Alternatively, how would these variables react if the
government decides to implement tax revenue neutral reforms?
In this paper, we pay special attention to the role of financial intermediaries in the
transmission of permanent housing policy changes. Recent work that examine the
role of banking on business cycles find that the presence of intermediaries amplify
and propagate shocks 2. Contrary to this strand of the literature, our results suggest
that the presence of banks can dampen the effects of permanent housing tax policy
changes.
Our model is closely based on Alpanda and Zubairy (2016). They incorporate to
their framework the multi-agents structure and household borrowing constraints that
are featured in iacoviello2005house work. 3 In addition to patient, impatient, and
1. See Jorda` et al. (2016) for the evolution of bank loans over a long horizon for 17 advanced
countries.
2. See e.g. Angeloni and Faia (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Gertler and Karadi
(2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Meh and Moran (2010).
3. Another paper that uses the structure of Iacoviello (2005) to examine housing tax policy
is Ortega et al. (2011). However, they focus on the Spanish housing market, and their policy
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renter households that are present in their framework, we introduce bankers to the
economy in a similar fashion to Iacoviello (2015). The policy changes that we examine
only affect the intensive margin of housing, since households cannot switch types. 4
Specifically, the housing tax policies that we examine are (i) the deduction of mortgage
interest payments Imt for impatient households, (ii) the deduction of imputed rents
Irt, (iii) the property tax τpt, and (iv) the depreciation allowance δ˜ht. Note that
the policy change (i) is of particular interest, since the tax plan proposed by the
Trump administration in November 2017 encompasses a repeal of mortgage interest
deductibility for the portion of mortgages that exceed $ 500,000—down from one
million dollars.
Housing tax policies are ranked according to the values of their long-run multipliers,
which correspond to the ratio of the present value loss in output over the present
value of tax revenues that are raised. We find long-run multipliers that range from
-1.43 to -0.81. The size of these multipliers are not due to short-run transitions, since
the multipliers that we find at a horizon of 20 quarters are much smaller—they range
from -0.02 to -0.13. We also find that the new channels of propagation that arise with
the introduction of a banking sector do not affect the ranking of long-run multipliers;
however, as will be shown below, the presence of this sector dampens the adverse
effects of changes in housing tax policies. Specifically, the less favorable policies are
for impatient households, the more they are effective at limiting output losses. In fact,
the distortion created by the deduction of interest mortgage payments is determinant.
When this distortion is directly partially eliminated, i.e. in the case of policy (i), the
output loss that ensues is the smallest (the long-run multiplier is -0.81). As for the
mechanism, it works as follows. Since impatient households decrease their demand for
housing, its price falls, which leads patient and renter households to consume more
housing services.
instruments differ. Specifically, they examine the role of subsidies on house purchases and rentals.
4. As discussed by Alpanda and Zubairy (2016, pp. 508-510), this assumption is consistent with
empirical evidence. Instituting partial taxation of imputed rents could even lead to an overestimation
of output loss, as some impatient households would become renters. However, these changes are not
large enough to modify the ranking of housing tax policies.
101
3.1 Introduction
On the opposite side of the spectrum, the reduction of the depreciation allowances
for rental income—i.e. policy (iv)— directly affects renters since the rental price
of housing increases. There is a shift from rental to owner-occupied housing that
takes place, which is beneficial for impatient households. This leads to an increase
in mortgage payments for the latter that does not benefit the government, since
these payments are fully deductible. Hence, depreciation allowances need to be
further decreased in order for tax revenues to accrue. This reallocation of housing
is detrimental in terms of output losses (the long-run multiplier is -1.43).
Even though the presence of banking does not modify the ranking of housing tax
policies, it deflates the effects of these policies on output losses. 5 The causes of these
smaller multipliers differ from one policy change to another. For the deduction of
mortgage interest payments—policy (i)—the difference in multipliers is related to the
interest rate spread incurred by the introduction of banking. In fact, the interest rate
at which impatient households borrow is greater than the one that patient households
receive on their deposits, as well as the equilibrium rate in a framework without
banking. Therefore, the government does not need to reduce the deductibility of
mortgages as much to increase its tax revenues, which results in smaller effects on
housing. These effects are important to explain the dynamics of GDP, which includes
a fraction of housing stock. Thus, smaller effects on housing implies smaller effects
on output, and ultimately a smaller long-run multiplier.
For policies (ii) and (iii)—i.e. reduction in deduction of imputed rents and increases in
property taxes—the lower output losses relative to the losses generated by the model
without banking are also accounted by the smaller response of housing. Specifically,
it is the housing stock held by impatient households that falls less. One important
property of this fraction of housing is that it is used as collateral. Since they benefit
from the spread between the deposit rate and the lending rate, bankers have some
incentives to lend as much as possible. Following these policy changes, they absorb
5. The multipliers that we find are much smaller than the ones put forward by Alpanda and
Zubairy (2016), for whom they range from -2.21 to -1.52. However, as we report in Ghiaie and
Rouillard (2018), there is a coding error in their model that greatly affects the dynamics of business
investment, and thereby the multipliers that they obtain.
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some of the negative consequences by consuming less. In contrast, in the model
without banking, the agents that lend are the patient households. Since they are
able to redirect their lending into capital investment or rental housing, loans fall by
a greater margin. Hence, the type of agents that lends matters for the response of
housing and GDP.
As noted above, the reversal of depreciation allowances for rental housing—
policy (iv)—is beneficial for impatient households who increase their housing loans
and consumption services. By lending more, bankers increase their profits and
consumption. Hence, by facilitating financial intermediation, this policy change has
less detrimental effects in our baseline model than for the model without banking.
Finally, we implement three revenue-neutral tax experiments: the repeal of mortgage
deductibility, the taxation of imputed rents at the same rate as labor income, and the
repeal of the depreciation allowance for rental income. For each of these experiments,
we lower the labor income taxes, so that the net present value of taxes is nil. Since
lower taxes incentivize agents to work more hours, the rise in non-housing output is
not large enough to overturn the effects of the fall in housing stock in the long-run.
In fact, out of the three reforms, the repeal of mortgage deductibility generates the
smallest losses in output in the long-run, which makes it the most appealing policy.
However, in the short-run, we find increases in the present value of GDP for all
experiments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we review the related
literature. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 present the model and its calibration, respectively.
Section 3.5 discusses the effects of permanent housing tax policy changes on the main
aggregate variables and on welfare. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Related literature
Our paper is related to the literature that examines the effects of changes in housing
tax policy through the lens of theoretical models. 6 Gervais (2002) embeds the
decisions of households to own or rent in a general equilibrium life-cycle model. His
baseline model features the same properties of the US tax code for the housing sector,
and financial institutions are embedded to simplify the exposition. These institutions
are a veil, since they are zero-profit and unconstrained. In contrast, in our model, they
play an active role in dampening the effects of policy changes. Gervais (2002) conducts
two separate experiments: he introduces taxation for imputed rents, and a repeal of
mortgage interest deductions. Both these experiments are tax revenue neutral, as
the income tax rate is lowered simultaneously. By comparing steady state outcomes,
he finds that both these changes are welfare-improving, since it allows households to
better smooth their consumption. They result in significant shifts of resources from
housing (-8.56%) to business capital (+6.4%) when imputed rents are taxed, whereas
housing is unchanged and business capital increases (+4%) when mortgage interest
deductions are repealed. Homeownership declines significantly following these housing
tax policy changes.
In a similar type of framework, Chambers et al. (2009) examine the same two policy
changes with special attention given to the supply of rental property and to the
progressivity of the US tax system. They corroborate a crowding-out effect, as the
stock of housing falls and capital increases, in response to the elimination of some
asymmetries in housing taxation. Floetotto et al. (2016) emphasize the importance
of considering transitional dynamics prior to undertaking housing tax policy changes.
In fact, because in the short-run the fall in house prices overshoots its level in the
terminal steady state, they find that taxing imputed rents is welfare-improving in
the long-run for the economy, but not in the short-run. Similarly, for the repeal of
mortgage interest deduction, the positive effects on welfare are greater in the long-
run than in the short-run. There are also important distributional effects that result
6. For empirical contributions to the literature, see Glaeser and Shapiro (2003), Poterba (1992),
Poterba and Sinai (2008), Rosen (1979).
104
3 Housing Taxation and Financial Intermediation
from changes in these policies. Sommer and Sullivan (2013) underline the interaction
between the progressivity of income taxation and the consequences of the repeal of
mortgage interest deduction. In contrast, Floetotto et al. (2016) consider only a flat
income tax. The decline in house prices in response to this tax policy change is welfare-
improving for 58% of households and contributes to an increase in homeownership.
Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) simulate a model with shocks that reproduce the
house price and foreclosure dynamics of the recent financial crisis. From their
counterfactual experiment, they find that the rise in foreclosures would have been
10 percentage points lower—and the crisis much smaller—without a preferential tax
treatment of mortgage interest payments. Alpanda and Zubairy (2017) compare the
effectiveness of various policies that are aimed at reducing household indebtedness,
since a high level of debt poses threats to financial stability. They find that a reduction
in mortgage interest deduction—via its effects on home equity loans—is more effective
and less costly than an increase in property taxes and a tightening of monetary policy.
From the simulation of a housing search model that features geographical mobility
and labor market frictions, Head and Lloyd-Ellis (2012) find that the elimination of
mortgage interest deductibility leads to falls in house prices and in unemployment.
BieSta:2018 New Keynesian model also features housing search frictions. They find
that labor tax reductions financed by a rise in property taxes generates the highest
level of welfare.
As we have mentioned above, we show that the banks’ balance sheet channel is
important in explaining the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates following changes
in housing tax policy. In our model, the banking sector is not a veil, in contrast
to Gervais (2002), for example. Financial intermediation in the household mortgage
market is present in other work; however, they focus on different objectives than our
paper. 7 Iacoviello (2015) examines how the inclusion of a banking sector to a DSGE
model amplifies and propagates financial shocks. Elenev et al. (2016) study the role of
mortgage default insurance that is provided by the government on the amount of risk
7. For a review of the literature on the role of banking in dynamic general equilibrium models,
see Galati and Moessner (2013).
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exposure by the banks. Contrary to their work, we do not consider home foreclosures.
Finally, Landvoigt (2016) puts forward the role of mortgage loans’ securitization to
explain the US housing boom in the 2000s.
3.3 Model
In this section, we present the optimization problems of the agents, the firms, and the
capital and housing producers. We also show and discuss the tax instruments that
the government possesses in the economy. We refer the reader to the Appendix for a
complete derivation of the first order conditions.
All agents consume non-durable goods. Patient, impatient, and renter households
also derive utility from housing services and leisure. Actions that are specific to each
type of agents are as follows. Patient households rent a fraction of their housing
stock to renters, accumulate housing and capital stocks, and earn interest on deposits
made to bankers and on their holdings of government bonds. Impatient households
finance their consumption and housing investment by contracting mortgage loans from
bankers. Their loans are constrained by the value of their housing stock which is their
collateral asset. We assume that renters are hand-to-mouth, so that their consumption
of non-durable goods and houses corresponds to their after-tax labor income. Bankers
act as a transmission belt between impatient and patient households. They are able
to issue mortgages from the deposits made by patient households. However, they face
a capital adequacy constraint so that deposits cannot exceed a fraction of mortgages
issued. Finally, the government collects taxes from various sources, borrows from
patient households, makes transfer payments to agents, and makes expenses.
3.3.1 Patient households
Patient households are savers, since they have a greater discount factor than other
agents (βP > βi where i = I, R,B). They maximize the following discounted sum of
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period-utilities:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtP{log cPt + ϕh log hPt−1 − ϕl
(lPt )
1+ι
1 + ι
} (3.3.1)
where cPt corresponds to their consumption of non-durable goods, h
P
t−1 to their housing
stock chosen in period t− 1, and lPt to their labor supply. The parameters ϕh and ϕl
corresponds to the weights allocated to housing and leisure, and ι to the inverse of
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Their budget constraint is as follows:
(1 + τc)c
P
t + p
h
t [h
P
t − (1− δh)hPt−1] + pht [hRt − (1− δh)hRt−1]
+ pkt [kt − (1− δk)kt−1] + dt + bgt ≤ wPt lPt + pRt hRt−1
+ (1 + rdt−1)(dt−1 + b
g
t−1) + r
k
t kt−1 + Γ
P
t − τy[wPt lPt
+ (pRt − δ˜ht)(hRt−1 + IrthPt−1)− τptpht (hPt−1 + hRt−1)]
− τdrdt−1(dt−1 + bgt−1)− τk(rkt − δk)kt−1 − τptpht (hPt−1 + hRt−1)− ACPt (3.3.2)
where hRt is the rental housing stock, kt is the capital stock that they rent to firms
at rate rkt . It depreciates at rate δk. The relative prices of housing and capital are p
h
t
and pkt , respectively. Note that there are adjustment costs AC
P
t for choosing levels
of housing that deviate from their steady states. 8 Every period, patient households
also choose the amount of deposits that they make to bankers dt, and the quantity
of lending that they make to the government bgt . Interest accrue at rate r
d
t−1. Patient
households are paid wages wPt for the hours that they work for firms. Their rental
income corresponds to pRt h
R
t−1 where p
R
t is the rental price. There is a depreciation
allowance for housing δ˜ht, which may differ from the depreciation rate of housing δh.
The government has many instruments to tax patient households: τc is the
consumption tax rate, τy is the tax on labor and rental income, τd is the tax on
interest income, τk is the tax on capital income, and τpt is the property tax rate on
8. We assume that these costs are quadratic: ACPt =
ψa
2h
P p
h
t (h
P
t − hPt−1)2 + ψa2hR p
h
t (h
R
t − hRt−1)2.
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housing. 0 < Irt < 1 is another policy instrument that is inversely proportional to the
deduction of imputed rental income. Finally, the government transfers ΓPt to these
households.
In order to examine the effects of tax policy changes, we present the first order
conditions with respect to owner-occupied and rental housing. For the sake of
simplification, we set the parameter that governs housing adjustment costs ψh to
zero when presenting the first order conditions. The first order condition with respect
to owner-occupied housing is
λPt p
h
t = βPEt[
ϕh
hpt
+ λPt+1
[
(1− δh − τpt+1(1− τy))pht+1 − Irt+1τy(pRt+1 − δ˜ht+1)
]
(3.3.3)
where λPt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. In equilibrium, it is
equal to the marginal utility of consumption. The left-hand side of equation (3.3.3)
corresponds to the cost in terms of consumption that the patient households incur
to purchase an additional unit of owner-occupied housing stock, while the right-hand
side presents the benefits of that additional unit. Patient households derive utility
from consuming housing services, and they also make capital gains that are taxed.
One can see that the government distorts the decisions of investing in owner-occupied
housing via its tax policy instruments. The government also distorts incentives for
patient households to own rental housing. Specifically, the first order condition with
respect to rental houses is
λPt p
h
t = βPEt[λ
P
t+1(1− δh − τpt+1(1− τy)pht+1 + (1− τy)pRt+1 + τy δ˜ht+1)]. (3.3.4)
In a similar fashion to owner-occupied housing, the left-hand side shows the marginal
costs of increasing rental houses, and the right-hand side the marginal benefits.
Changes in tax policies can also affect the decisions of investing in rental housing.
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3.3.2 Impatient households
As stated in the previous section, impatient households have a lower discount factor
than patient households, and are also called borrowers. This is the only difference
with regards to the function that they maximize. However, their budget constraint is
different:
(1 + τc)c
I
t + p
h
t (h
I
t − (1− δh)hIt−1) + (1 + rbt−1)Mt−1 ≤ wIt lIt +Mt
+ ΓIt − τy[wIt lIt − Imtrbt−1Mt−1 + Irt(pRt − δ˜ht)hIt−1 − τptpht hIt−1]
− τptpht hIt−1 −
ψa
2h
I
pht (h
I
t − hIt−1)2. (3.3.5)
Every period, they choose their consumption levels cIt , their housing stock h
I
t , their
labor lIt , and their mortgage loans Mt. They face quadratic adjustment costs for
changing their housing stock. They are paid at wage wIt , and they must repay their
mortgage loan contracted the previous period in addition to the interest rate rbt−1
due on these loans. They also receive transfers ΓIt from the government. Impatient
households face four tax policy instruments. Three of them are similar to the ones
faced by patient households. The fourth one is the deductibility of mortgage interest
payments 0 ≤ Imt ≤ 1, where Imt = 1 indicates that these payments are fully
deductible. Their mortgage loans are constrained by their housing value as follows:
Mt ≤ ρmMt−1 + (1− ρm)θpht hIt (3.3.6)
where θ corresponds to a loan-to-value, and ρm to the persistence in mortgage
borrowing. Hence, if the value of their housing stock increases, impatient households
are able to borrow more.
Setting housing investment adjustment cost to zero, the first order condition with
respect to housing is
λItp
h
t = (1−ρm)θλmt pht +βIEt[
ϕh
hIt
+λIt ((1−δh−τpt+1(1−τy))pht+1−Irt+1τy(pRt+1− δ˜ht+1)]
(3.3.7)
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where λIt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint that is equal to the
marginal utility of consumption in equilibrium. λmt is the Lagrange multiplier of the
borrowing constraint. The marginal costs and benefits of increasing housing resemble
those of the patient owner-occupied housing. The only difference is the additional
benefit that allows impatient households to borrow more when they invest in housing.
The first order condition with respect to mortgage loans is as follows:
λIt = λ
M
t + βIEt[λ
I
t+1(1 + (1− Imt+1τy)rbt − λmt+1ρm)]. (3.3.8)
In a similar fashion to other first order conditions, the left-hand side consists of
the marginal gain from borrowing, while the right-hand side shows the marginal
costs. There are costs related to the tightening of the borrowing constraint and the
repayment of the mortgage loan in the following period. Through the deduction of
mortgage interest Imt, the government can affect the effective interest rate at which
impatient households repay their mortgage loans.
3.3.3 Renters
The renters’ period-utility function is identical to those of patient and impatient
households. We assume that they have a lower discount factor than the patient
households. Their budget constraint is as follows:
(1 + τc)c
R
t + p
R
t h
R
t−1 ≤ (1− τR)wRt lRt + ΓRt . (3.3.9)
They consume non-durable goods cRt , rent houses h
R
t−1 from patient households at
price pRt , work l
R
t , and receive transfers from the government Γ
R
t . They earn w
R
t
for their labor. Note that their labor income is taxed at a different rate (τR) than
patient and impatient households. Since they are not able to borrow or invest, they
are considered as hand-to-mouth agents. Finally, the housing tax policy changes do
not affect these agents directly, but indirectly through the changes in rental housing
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prices. The first order condition with respect to rental housing is as follows:
pRt =
ϕh
λRt h
R
t−1
(3.3.10)
where λRt is equal to the marginal utility of consumption of renters.
3.3.4 Bankers
Bankers are the financial intermediaries in the economy. We assume that they are
the only agents that have the technology to redirect funds between agents. Their
assets are composed of mortgages contracted to impatient households and liabilities
of deposits from patient households. They maximize the following problem:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtB log c
B
t
subject to:
(1 + τc)c
B
t + (1 + r
d
t−1)dt−1 +Mt = dt + (1 + r
b
t−1)Mt−1 (3.3.11)
where βB < βP . Since, in equilibrium the interest rate on mortgages r
b
t is greater than
the interest rate on deposits rdt , they are able to make profits that they consume, i.e.
cBt . In a similar fashion to Iacoviello (2015), bankers face a quadratic loan adjustment
cost. Moreover, their issuance of liabilities is constrained by their asset holdings:
dt ≤ φMt (3.3.12)
where 0 < φ < 1 is a policy parameter typically set by regulatory agencies. 9
9. See Appendix B of Iacoviello (2015) for the derivation of this constraint.
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The first order conditions with respect to deposits and mortgage loans are as follows:
λBt = λ
φ
t + βBEtλ
B
t+1(1 + r
d
t ) (3.3.13)
λBt = λ
φ
t φ+ βBEtλ
B
t+1(1 + r
b
t ) (3.3.14)
where λBt and λ
φ
t are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint and on the
capital adequacy constraint, respectively. An additional unit of deposits implies more
consumption in the present period; however, there are costs to do so. Specifically, the
borrowing constraint is tightened, and bankers need to repay the principal of deposits
and the interest rdt accrued the following period. As for the first order condition
with respect to mortgage loans, the left-hand side of equation (3.3.14) represents the
marginal costs of increasing mortgage loans, whereas the right-hand side shows the
marginal benefits. Bankers gain from the repayment of the loans and the interest
rbt thereon. An additional benefit of greater mortgage loans is that it relaxes the
borrowing constraint.
3.3.5 Non-durable good producers
In a perfectly competitive environment, identical firms produce homogeneous non-
durable goods. Their production functions feature constant returns to scale in capital
and labor:
Y ft = k
α
t−1
(
(lPt )
ιP (lIt )
ιI (lRt )
ιR
)1−α
(3.3.15)
where Y ft is the production of non-durable goods, α is the capital-elasticity of output,
and ιP , ιI , and ιR correspond to the labor shares of the households that work. These
parameters are calibrated so that their sum is equal to one (ιP + ιI + ιR = 1). Every
period, firms maximize their profits:
Πft = Y
f
t − wPt lPt − wIt lIt − wRt lRt − rkt kt−1 (3.3.16)
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Non-durable good producers sell their production, and incur labor, and capital costs.
From this profit maximization, wages and borrowing rates of capital are equal to their
marginal products.
3.3.6 Capital and housing producers
We assume that capital and housing producers also operate in a perfectly competitive
environment. Patient and impatient households sell to them the undepreciated part
of the installed capital and housing at prices pkt and p
h
t , respectively. In the same
period–once production is completed–these agents buy the new stocks of capital and
housing at the same prices that they sold the undepreciated parts. The producers
purchase capital and housing investment (ikt and i
h
t ) from the non-durable goods firms
at a unitary price. Hence, their maximization problem is as follows:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtP
λPt
λP0
[
∑
x=k,h
pxt (xt − (1− δx)xt−1)− ixt ]
subject to:
kt = (1− δk)kt−1 + [1− ψk
2
(
ikt
ikt−1
− 1)2]ikt , (3.3.17)
ht = (1− δh)ht−1 + [1− ψh
2
(
iht
iht−1
− 1)2]iht . (3.3.18)
where ht = h
P
t + h
I
t + h
R
t . We assume that capital and housing producers use
the patient households’ stochastic discount factor to discount future profits. Their
profit maximization is subject to the laws of motion of capital and housing that are
characterized by quadratic investment adjustment costs.
3.3.7 Government
The government collects taxes on consumption, income revenue, deposits, government
bonds, capital, and housing properties. Total taxes taxt correspond to the following
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sum:
taxt = τcCt + τy[w
P
t l
P
t + (p
R
t − δ˜ht)(hRt−1 + IrhPt−1)− τpt(hPt−1 + hRt−1)]
+ τdr
d
t−1(dt−1 + b
g
t−1) + τpt(h
P
t−1 + h
R
t−1) + τk(r
k
t − δk)kt−1
+ τy[w
I
t l
I
t − Imtrbt−1Mt−1 + Ir(pRt − δ˜h)hIt−1 − τpthIt−1] + τpthIt−1 + τRwRt lRt
(3.3.19)
where Ct = c
P
t +c
I
t +c
R
t +c
B
t is the sum of consumption of all agents. The government’s
budget constraint is as follows:
bgt + taxt = (1 + r
d
t−1)b
g
t−1 + g + Γ
P
t + Γ
I
t + Γ
R
t . (3.3.20)
Every period, from taxes that they collect and the new borrowing that they contract
from patient households, they make transfer payments (ΓPt , Γ
I
t , and Γ
R
t ) to three types
of agents. We assume that government expenditures g are fixed. Transfer payments
are attributed according to the following rule:
Γit = ϑiY
f
t − ρbbgt−1, i = P, I, R. (3.3.21)
where ϑi are parameters specific to the type of households, and ρb denotes the response
of transfer payments to government debt. This coefficient is necessary to ensure the
stability of the model following policy changes.
3.3.8 Market clearing
In equilibrium, all non-durable goods are sold to the agents, the capital and housing
producers, and the government, so that the market clearing condition is:
Y ft = Ct + i
h
t + i
k
t + g (3.3.22)
where Ct =
∑
i=P,I,R,B c
i
t. However, the production of non-durable goods is not
consistent with the measure of GDP that is published by the Bureau of Economic
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Analysis in the NIPA. Consumption needs to be adjusted to take into account the
effects of consumption taxes, and the consumption services provided by housing.
Therefore, NIPA-consistent GDP, Yt, corresponds to
Yt = (1 + τc)Ct + p
Rht−1 + iht + i
k
t + g. (3.3.23)
3.4 Calibration
Table 3.1 – Endogenously calibrated parameters
Symbol Value Steady state targets
Discount factors
Patient households βP 0.9937 r¯
d=0.03 (annualized)
Impatient households and renters βI , βR 0.9852 250 basis points spread on r¯
d (annualized)
Bankers βB 0.9375 r¯
b=0.05 (annualized)
Weights in the utility function
Housing ϕh 0.217 h¯/GDP = 6
Labor ϕl 0.56 l¯
P = 1
Factor shares in production
Capital share α 0.21 k¯/GDP = 5.2
Patient hhs labor share ιP 0.2 h¯
P /h¯ = 0.37
Impatient hhs labor share ιI 0.56 h¯
I/h¯ = 0.43
Renters labor share ιR 0.24 h¯
R/h¯ = 0.2
Depreciation rates
Housing δh 0.0096 i¯
h/GDP = 0.05
Capital δk 0.02 i¯
k/GDP = 0.12
Transfer shares
Patient hhs ϑP 0.038 Total transfers:
Impatient hhs ϑI 0.035
(∑
i=P,I,R Γ¯
i
)
/GDP = 0.074
Renters ϑR 0.015
Labor income tax rates
Patient and impatient hhs τy 0.3 Average labor income tax rate:
Renters τR 0.2
τy(w¯
P l¯P + w¯I l¯I) + τRw¯
R l¯R∑
i=P,I,R w¯
i l¯i
= 0.27
The calibration of parameters is done at a quarterly frequency and is split into two
parts. First, we show in Table 3.1 the calibrated values of parameters that are chosen
by jointly matching steady state targets, i.e. endogenously calibrated parameters.
Second, Table 3.2 presents the remaining set of parameters that are invariable to the
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Table 3.2 – Exogenously calibrated parameters
Symbol Value
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply ι 1
Loan-to-value ratio θ 0.70
Persistence of mortgage ρm 0.85
Liabilities to assets ratio for bankers φ 0.9
Investment adjustment costs ψk, ψh 8, 30
Responses of transfers to government debt ρb 0.005
Tax rates τk, τc, τp, τd 0.4, 0.05, 0.0035, 0.15
Tax deductions Im, Ir 1, 0
steady state, i.e. exogenously calibrated parameters. Most steady state targets and
exogenously calibrated parameters take the same values than the ones reported by
Alpanda and Zubairy (2016).
Discount factors slightly differ from their calibrated values, since we follow Iacoviello
(2015) for these parameters. Specifically, we set βP and βB to match annualized
steady-state deposit and lending rates of 3 and 5 percent, respectively. As for
the transfer shares, they are chosen to match the relative shares of labor and
capital income of each agent. We pick the labor income tax rates to reproduce the
progressivity of the tax code. In the exogenously calibrated parameters category,
we also follow Iacoviello (2015) and set φ = 0.9, so that the liabilities-to-assets
ratio in the bankers’ capital adequacy constraint is consistent with historical data
on banks’ balance sheets. To avoid repetition of the discussion of the remaining
steady state targets and exogenously calibrated parameters, we refer the reader to
alpanda2016housing calibration section. The addition of a banking sector does not
greatly alter these parameters.
3.5 Results
In this section, we present the effects of changing housing tax policies. First, the size
of the changes are set so that all of them generate a present value of tax revenues
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that corresponds to 50%. 10 The following four policies are considered: we (i) reduce
the mortgage interest deductions Imt, (ii) institute partial taxation of imputed rents
Irt, (iii) increase the property tax rate τpt, and (iv) reduce the depreciation allowances
δ˜ht. Second, we present revenue neutral experiments that eliminate the distortions
created by policies (i), (ii), and (iv). The additional tax revenues are used to lower
the labor income tax rates of the households. For all these experiments, we discuss
the mechanisms that generate the results, and pay particular attention to the role of
banking.
3.5.1 Equivalent revenue generating experiments
Table 3.3 – Fiscal policy values
Initial New
Symbol Baseline Model without banking
Reduction of mortgage interest deductions Imt 1 0.85 0.72
Instituting partial taxation of imputed rents Irt 0 0.067 0.066
Property tax increase τpt 0.014 0.015 0.015
Reduction of depreciation allowance δ˜ht 0.0096 0.0065 0.0066
Table 3.4 – Short and long-run tax multipliers
Baseline Model without banking
Symbol Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Reduction of mortgage interest deductions Imt -0.13 -0.81 -0.22 -0.96
Instituting partial taxation of imputed rents Irt -0.12 -1.14 -0.22 -1.26
Property tax increase τpt -0.1 -1.2 -0.2 -1.3
Reduction of depreciation allowance δ˜ht -0.02 -1.43 -0.12 -1.45
The tax policy changes that we implement are permanent. We assume that the
economy is at its initial steady state in period 0. In period 1, the government surprises
all the agents with new housing tax policies that last permanently. Agents have perfect
information and foresight. We compute the transition of all variables from periods 0
to 1,000—as we consider that the economy attains its new steady state at this long
horizon. Table 3.3 presents the changes in housing tax policies that are implemented
10. We use the discount factor of patient households to measure the present value of changes in
tax revenues: PVtax =
1
tax0
∑T=20,∞
t=0 β
t
P (taxt − tax0). T = 20 when we compute the short-run
multipliers, and T =∞ the long-run multipliers.
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for the baseline model and the model without banking 11, so that the present value
of tax revenues increases by 50%. Table 3.4 presents the corresponding short and
long-run tax multipliers generated by both models. Specifically, these multipliers are
measured as follows: (PVY ·Y0)/(PVtax · tax0) where PVY =
∑T=20,∞
t=0 β
t
P (Yt−Y0)/Y0,
Y0, and tax0 are the present value of changes in GDP, and the initial steady state
values of GDP, and tax revenues, respectively. Over a horizon of 20 quarters, the
multipliers that we obtain are very small, and even more so for the baseline model.
Therefore, we can assert that changing housing tax policies is not very detrimental for
economic activity in the short-run. This is not the case in the long-run, as multipliers
are larger. We find that the order of desirability of policies is the same for the baseline
model and the model without banking; however, the presence of banking contributes
to lowering the multipliers. We discuss its role in the following sections.
Table 3.5 – Percent changes in the steady state
Y Y f C ik ih M p
R
Reduction of mortgage interest deductions −0.11 −0.05 −0.01 −0.05 −0.63 −1.47 0
Instituting partial taxation of imputed rents −0.15 −0.05 0 −0.05 −0.85 −0.89 0
Property tax increase −0.15 −0.06 0.002 −0.05 −0.9 −0.67 1.13
Reduction of depreciation allowance −0.17 −0.06 0.01 −0.06 −1.07 0.09 5.4
Table 3.6 – Welfare effects of housing tax policies
Savers Borrowers Renters Bankers
Reduction of mortgage interest deductions 0.10 −0.29 0.28 −0.64
Instituting partial taxation of imputed rents −0.21 −0.11 0.33 −0.38
Property tax increase −0.17 −0.05 0.11 −0.29
Reduction of depreciation allowance −0.02 0.13 −0.7 0.05
We present the transitional dynamics of key variables to permanent policy changes for
the first 100 quarters in Figure 3.1, while Table 3.5 shows the changes in the steady
states of key variables. Finally, Table 3.6 displays the effects on welfare for all agents.
Specifically, the amplitude of these effects is given by Λi, where i = P, I, R,B which is
11. This model consists in the baseline model stripped out of its banking sector, which implies that
patient households lend directly to impatient households. The calibration that we use is the same
for both models.
118
3 Housing Taxation and Financial Intermediation
0 50 100
−0.1
−0.05
0
GDP (Y)                    
0 50 100
0
0.05
0.1
Consumption (C)            
0 50 100
0
0.2
0.4
Capital Investment (ik)   
0 50 100
−2
−1
0
Housing Investment (ih)   
0 50 100
−1
−0.5
0
Mortgage (M)               
0 50 100
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
Housing Stock (h)          
0 50 100
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Capital Stock (k)          
0 50 100
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
Total Labor (l)            
0 50 100
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Non−housing Output (Yf)   
0 50 100
0
0.2
0.4
Total Tax Revenue (Tax)    
0 50 100
−1
0
1
Patient Housing (hP)      
0 50 100
−1
−0.5
0
Impatient Housing (hI)    
0 50 100
−4
−2
0
Rental Housing (hR)       
0 50 100
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
Housing Price (ph)        
0 50 100
0
0.2
0.4
Patient Consumption (cP)  
0 50 100
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
Impatient Consumption (cI)
0 50 100
0
0.1
0.2
Renter Consumption (cR)   
0 50 100
−1
−0.5
0
Banker Consumption (cB)   
 
 
I
m
I
r τp δh
Figure 3.1 – Responses to four housing tax policy changes (Imt, Irt, τpt, and δ˜ht) imeasured
in percent deviation from their initial steady states
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a measure in annual consumption units that is calculated from the following equation:
∞∑
t=0
βtiU((1 + Λi)c
i
0, h
i
0, l
i
0) =
∞∑
t=0
βtiU(c
i
t, h
i
t, l
i
t) (3.5.1)
where ci0, h
i
0, l
i
0 are consumption, housing, and labor in the initial steady state.
12 A
positive value of Λi implies that agents are better off following the policy change.
All signs of the welfare changes are similar to Alpanda and Zubairy (2016), with the
exception of the increase in property taxes for borrowers. The heterogeneity of these
effects are important to appreciate the output losses. In fact, policy changes that lead
to negative outcomes for the welfare of impatient households are inversely related with
the size of the long-run multipliers for the economy.
Reducing the mortgage interest deduction
The reduction of the deduction of mortgage payments implies that the marginal cost of
holding an additional unit of mortgage increases. Hence, this policy change directly
targets the impatient households’ mortgage decision, and, consequently, is the one
that decreases their housing stock and welfare the most. As demand for housing
from borrowers decreases, the equilibrium housing price falls in the short-run. As
a consequence of lower prices, housing is reallocated to savers and renters, whose
welfare increases. As for bankers, less mortgage implies less gains from financial
intermediation, and thus lower consumption and welfare.
In the first ten quarters or so, non-housing output falls, partly as a result of lower
capital investment. In fact, savers cut back their investment in order to smooth
out their consumption. In the long-run, however, GDP is dragged down mainly by
diminishing levels of housing stock. It appears that this policy change is the least
distortionary on the housing market as the fall in total housing in the long-run is
the smallest out of the four policy changes. Considering that output losses are the
smallest, this makes it the most efficient one in accruing tax revenues.
12. Since we assume that bankers do not derive utility from housing services and do not work,
housing and labor are set equal to zero.
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Since bankers take advantage of financial intermediation, a wedge between the
mortgage and deposit rates arises. In the steady state, the annualized mortgage rate
is 5%, whereas the deposit rate is 3%. With a higher borrowing rate, the deduction
from mortgage payments is even more important. Therefore, instead of reducing
the mortgage deduction to 0.72 (as is the case for the model without banking), the
government cuts it down almost halfway to 0.85. As a consequence, housing does not
fall as much, and accounts for the smaller short and long-run multipliers.
Taxing imputed rental income
The second best policy change in terms of minimizing output losses is to institute
partial taxation of imputed rents. This affects both the impatient and patient
households who need to pay taxes on the consumption that they derive from housing
services. Consequently, their housing demand and welfare fall. Savers substitute away
from owner-occupied housing by investing in capital and by supplying more rental
housing. This causes prices to fall, thereby making it beneficial for renters. This
shift of housing towards renters also contributes to dampening the negative effects
of a housing stock reduction on GDP. As for bankers, they lose out from this policy
change as less housing demand from borrowers implies fewer originations of mortgages,
and thus less revenues from financial intermediation.
The short and long-run multipliers attached to this policy change are also lower than
the ones obtained from the model without banking. The smaller response of borrowers’
housing accounts for the gap between the multipliers. Since housing enters GDP
in two ways—through housing investment and consumption of housing services—the
response of this variable is key. In fact, the lending process matters in its dynamics. In
the baseline model, there is no substitute to lending for bankers. They have incentives
to keep its value high, because it directly affects their consumption. In some ways,
they absorb the losses incurred by additional taxation. In contrast, per the model
without banking, lending is conducted by savers. Since they also invest in physical
capital, more substitution between the types of investment takes place, which implies
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that lending and housing fall by a greater margin.
Increasing the property tax rate
Contrary to other policies, property taxes affect owner-occupied and rental housing.
When the government increases them, all agents reduce their housing stock. While
impatient and patient households are hit directly, renters are impacted indirectly
through a hike in rents. However, welfare does not fall for all these agents, as they
substitute for more consumption. Specifically for borrowers and renters, the effects on
consumption dominate those of declining housing consumption, and thus their change
in welfare is positive. In contrast, the effects on patient households are negative. As
for bankers, similar to the two previous policy changes, they suffer from less financial
intermediation. Finally, since all agents reduce their demand for housing, its total
stock further decreases, which accounts for a slightly lower long-run multiplier than
for taxing imputed rental income.
In comparison to the multipliers generated by the model without banking, the baseline
model generates short and long-run multipliers that are smaller. The mechanism at
play is the same as for the previous tax policy change: more substitution towards
capital investment arises—especially in the short-run—when patient households lend
directly to impatient households.
Reducing the depreciation allowance
Another distortion introduced by the tax system in the US lies in the depreciation
allowance of rental income that savers can deduct. In our experiment, this allowance
was reduced to almost half—it drops from 0.0096 to 0.0065. Such a large policy change
is necessary because it only affects rental housing, which is a small fraction of total
housing. Since incentives to rent out housing shrink, its supply is reduced, leading to
higher rental prices.
Consequently, renters are the big losers, while borrowers take advantage of a lower
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housing price that ensue from a decrease in total housing. In the short-run, they reduce
their consumption, since the value of their collateral falls as a result of lower house
prices. However, in the long-run, the quantity effects dominate those of the price,
and therefore the value of their collateral and consumption soar. Patient households’
decisions also fluctuate throughout time. A lower house price makes them consume
more non-durable goods and housing services in the short-run. However, once house
prices revert to the steady state level, their total consumption falls so much that it
leaves their welfare unchanged. They also invest more in non-durable goods than in
reaction to the other policy changes, which implies that the multiplier is the lowest.
As for bankers, their consumption evolves according to the dynamics of mortgages.
Overall, the discounted sum of their period utilities rises.
The long-run multipliers attached to this tax policy change generated by the baseline
model and the model are almost the same for the baseline model and the model
without banking. However, the short-run multiplier generated by the baseline model
(-0.02) is smaller. This result is also the consequence of a larger decrease in housing
stock for the model without banking. Specifically, rental housing diminishes more for
them, since savers reallocate their funds towards more lending. In our case, savers do
not lend as much through deposits, since the presence of bankers creates a friction.
In fact, by consuming a fraction of mortgages they compress lending, and thereby
dampen the fall in housing, which leads to a greater multiplier than the model without
banking.
3.5.2 Revenue neutral experiments
In the previous section, all policy changes deliver lower levels of GDP. Can these results
be offset if the government uses its additional revenues to lower labor income taxes?
To answer this question, we conduct three experiments that eliminate the asymmetric
tax treatment of housing. Specifically, we consider (i) the repeal of mortgage interest
deductions, (ii) the taxation of imputed rents at the same rate as labor income, and
(iii) the repeal of depreciation allowance for rental income. The first two experiments
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are similar to the ones that Chambers et al. (2009), Gervais (2002), and Sommer and
Sullivan (2013) examine. In Table 3.7, we report the new labor income tax rates of
patient and impatient households τy, and of renters τR. Since the experiments are
revenue neutral, multipliers are nonexistent. Therefore, we present the present values
of GDP and non-housing output. To obtain a better understanding of these present
values, we display the transitional dynamics of key variables in Figure 3.2.
Table 3.7 – Effects of revenue neutral experiments
New tax values Present value
short-run long-run
Symbol τy τR Y Y
f Y Y f
Repeal of mortgage interest deductions Imt 0.288 0.192 0.033 0.042 -0.005 0.522
Taxing fully imputed rents Irt 0.277 0.185 0.063 0.083 -0.553 0.879
Repeal of depreciation allowance δ˜ht 0.294 0.196 0.021 0.028 -0.226 0.2
For all three experiments, the responses of most variables are amplified compared
to the equivalent revenue generating experiments, since the housing tax changes are
much larger. The amplification is particularly more sizable for policy change (ii),
because it directly affects patient and impatient households, whereas policy changes
(i) and (iii) target only one type of household. The mechanisms at play are similar
to the ones described in the previous section, except for the dynamics of labor. In
fact, as a result of lower labor income tax rates, hours worked increase. This explains
the positive responses of non-housing output and GDP in the short-run. In fact,
the changes in the present value of both these aggregate variables are positive at a
horizon of 20 quarters. However, since total housing falls gradually, the present values
of GDP decrease in the long-run. This fall in housing is not compensated by the higher
levels of non-housing output. Based on long-run present values of GDP, the repeal of
mortgage interest deductions stands out as the superior policy change.
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Figure 3.2 – Responses to three revenue neutral experiments (Imt, Irt, and δ˜ht) measured
in percent deviation from their initial steady states
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3.6 Conclusion
In the United States, housing receives a preferential tax treatment. We examine
the effects of four policy changes that target this sector and increase the government’s
revenues. We employ a multi-agent general equilibrium model to simulate these policy
changes. A fixed share of households are renters, and others are homeowners—either
borrowers or savers. An important feature of our framework is the presence of financial
intermediation, which is not a veil, since bankers face a capital adequacy constraint.
One key finding is that the economy substitutes residential investment for capital
investment in response to the four experiments. The transitional effects on GDP
are very small in the short-run for all the experiments. In the long-run, we find
multipliers that are close and below unity for some of them. Banking plays a role in
lowering these multipliers. The tax policy change that delivers the smallest long-run
multiplier is the reduction of the deduction of mortgage payments. Furthermore, the
welfare outcomes diverge significantly according to the types of households. We also
consider the implementation of three revenue neutral experiments. We find substantial
decreasing levels of housing, and only long-run output gains for the repeal of mortgage
deductibility.
An extension to our work would be to embed the financing of the production of non-
durable goods and housing. Firms would borrow from bankers and offer capital and
land as collateral. Interesting dynamics may emerge, as bankers would redirect their
funds towards firms in the event of a policy change. A financial accelerator mechanism,
similar to the one put forward by Liu et al. (2013) would arise as the value of firms’
land and capital are likely to increase.
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4 Business Cycle in Oil-Exporting Countries
Abstract
The structural model in this paper proposes a micro-founded framework that incorporates
an active banking sector with an oil-producing sector. The primary goal of adding a banking
sector is to examine the role of an interbank market on shocks, introduce a national
development fund and study its link to the banking sector and the government. The
government and the national development fund directly play key roles in the propagation
of the oil shock. In contrast, the banking sector and the labor market, through perfect
substitution between the oil and non-oil sectors, have major indirect impacts in spreading
shocks.
JEL classification: E44, E50, E58, G01, G21, G33 .
Keywords: Oil-Exporting countries, Banking, Oil-Reserve Fund DSGE.
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In November 2014 the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
failed to reach an agreement on production curbs, despite a perceived global oil glut,
sending prices skidding. However, about two years later OPEC reversed its path
and reached a deal among all 14 member countries 1 on its first production cuts in
eight years, sending crude oil prices soaring. Although OPEC is defying skeptics by
going deeper than the pledged cuts, and extending them long enough to deplete oil
inventories, U.S. production growth and other surging rivals like Brazil and Canada
may leave little headroom for the cartel’s expansion after its production curbs expire
this year. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), new U.S. supply will
cover more than half of the world’s oil demand growth in the medium term, partly
thanks to the shale oil boom. With a slightly weaker global demand projection and the
American surge, a supply cut is expected from the cartel to avoid another prolonged
surplus.
This should be a concern for the majority of oil-exporting countries—and particularly
for OPEC members. For Gulf countries, hydrocarbon exports represent about 70
percent of total exports (Fingure 4.1). Oil revenues account for 80 percent of total
fiscal revenues, on average, and about 20 percent of GDP (Figure 4.2). In addition,
fiscal breakeven prices fall below the projection prices for oil, in the medium-term for
most countries (Figure 4.3). In many of oil-exporting countries, the financial sector
has grown fairly large, and macro-financial linkages can exacerbate oil price shocks
(Figure 4.4). The high volatility of oil prices could build systemic financial sector
vulnerabilities, which in turn could adversely affect the real economy.
This study examines the relationship between macroeconomic aggregates, the financial
sector, and the channels through which the business cycle and the financial cycle in oil
economies interact. Unlike the growing body of literature assessing the effectiveness
of policies and their underpinning theoretical models after the global crisis, the
1. Currently OPEC has 15 member countries after Equatorial Guinea became a member in 2017.
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nexus between financial and oil price shocks has not been as fully explored. Most
research in business cycle abstracts either from the role of commodities altogether or
underestimates the role of the financial sector in commodity-exporting economies in
accelerating the propagation of commodity shocks. Consequently, practitioners are
left with limited knowledge on the macro-financial linkages for these economies.
Oil price fluctuations have a major impact on the public finances of developing, oil-
exporting countries. The budget structure, the inability to smooth spending due
to a lack of pertinent financial instruments, and limited access to credit markets
combined with political and institutional constraints force governments to conduct
procyclical fiscal policies (see for example Murphy et al. (2010) and Erbil (2011)),
when facing an oil shock. Moreover, in most oil-dependent countries government
investment expenditure and current spending drive non-oil GDP growth (Figures 4.5
and 4.6). As a result, oil price fluctuation determines the business cycle in the absence
of a well-diversified economy.
The structural model in this paper proposes a micro-founded framework that
incorporates an active banking sector, including an interbank market, into a DSGE
model with an oil-producing sector. Although there is an oil revenue windfall, the
economy is modeled as an autarky and it abstracts from exchange rate regimes. In
addition to other traditional sectors in the real economy, the model includes a national
oil fund collecting a share of oil revenue and a fiscal regime that depends on this fund
in addition to oil revenues. This setting allows us to analyze the role of fiscal policy
in transmission of the oil price volatility to the economy, as discussed in Tazhibayeva
et al. (2008), Arezki and Ismail (2013) and Pieschaco´n (2012). The fiscal policy
is guided by the public policy objective to increase capital expenditure, household
incomes by transfers, and subsidies to firms as a means of sharing the oil revenue
as suggested in Chemingui and Roe (2008). The result is a highly procyclical fiscal
regime in line with previous studies (Tazhibayeva et al. (2008), Murphy et al. (2010)).
The national development fund acts as a saving fund but also as a stabilization fund
to hedge against the liquidity risk in the banking system. To capture government
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involvement in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we assumed that the government
provides productive capital to intermediate goods producers.
Although the government fiscal regime remains a major player in the transmission
of shocks, banks in this model are key agents in spreading shocks across sectors of
the economy. Banks give commercial loans to firms that produce goods, purchase
government bonds, and finance their operation partly by borrowing through the
interbank market from deposit collector banks and partly by the national development
fund, which acts as a stabilizer. The endogenous interbank rate depends on the supply
of deposits, which in turn is reliant upon government transfer to households. Also,
banks are key in determining government bond rates and interest rates on loans to
good-producing firms, thereby linking the real business cycle to the financial cycle.
Oil price shocks can affect the financial sector through multiple channels. First, with
lower revenues, the government must adjust its capital expenditure. The government
usually holds a large stake in SOEs and entities in a variety of sectors, and many of
these SOEs remain dependent on the government’s financial support through subsidies
and transfers. Therefore, lower oil revenues and government spending reflects in
the economic activities of SOEs, which in turn contract out big projects to private
sector companies. As government investment falls, many of these subcontracts to
private firms will halt, and many investment projects will fail. Therefore, banks’
nonperforming loans (NPLs) can increase not only as a result of direct exposure to
SOEs but also because of the private sector’s failing projects. Higher NPLs diminish
the credit availability in an economy, particularly to the private sector where access
to finance is often a challenge in oil-exporting countries.
Second, governments remain the main employer in developing, oil-exporting countries.
As oil revenues drop, efforts to contain the public wage bill increase, resulting
in declines in household disposable income, consumption, and, importantly, bank
deposits. Higher households’ financial fragility and the possibility of falling into
arrears raises nonperforming loans, making credit less available to borrowers who
are dependent on bank financing. This development also affects banks’ ability to
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make new loans. Moreover, deposit volatility makes liquidity management difficult
and costlier for banks, requiring them to borrow from the central bank (in absence
of a developed interbank market) at a premium rate (see Choudhary and Limodio
(2017)). Accordingly, because of the liquidity risk, the cost of supplying longer-term
lending heightens.
Third, with a lower non-oil GDP growth rate due to an oil shock, the stock markets and
housing market would stagnate. Because banks are highly exposed to these markets,
higher credit risks emerge, which eventually feeds back into the real economy and
leads to a lower credit to economy (Arouri et al. (2010), Fayyad and Daly (2011)).
Other channels, such as lower international reserves accumulation and capital outflow,
remain important in the long run.
For the sake of simplicity, not all of the aforementioned channels are modelled as
just described. Nevertheless, several results prevail. First, the government role’s in
the propagation of shocks remains crucial. A positive oil shock boosts fiscal revenues
and enlarges the fiscal space, which lets the government expand the social transfer to
households and increase public capital expenditure. Wealthier households consume
more, but their behavior on labor allocation also changes. Additionally, higher public
investment raises non-oil output, which should result in a higher fiscal multiplier.
Second, due to complementarities between the oil and non-oil sectors in the model,
the labor market becomes an important driver of shocks’ diffusion. Because of fixed
labor supply in the economy, this channel becomes important essentially for the oil-
sector technology shock and the oil price shock. However, this hypothesis dampens
the shock impacts on consumption and GDP and prevents the wage and prices from
acting as automatic stabilizers to avoid large swings of production factors between
sectors.
Finally, while banks do not have important roles in spreading the shocks, they have
a critical role in amplifying them. This is because the oil sector is not directly
exposed to the banking sector, the non-oil companies are not credit constrained, and
the model abstracts from any credit default. However, the heterogenous banking
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system, including deposit and lending banks, differentiate various market interest
rates between households, government, non-oil firms, the national development fund,
and the central bank.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 spells out a stylized but
large-scale small open economy DSGE model of an oil-exporter with eight type of
agents including explicit macro-financial links and demonstrate some of the channels
that were discussed above. In section 4.3, discusses the calibration of structural and
policy parameters of the model based on Iran’s economy and the impact of an oil price
shock on macroeconomic aggregates and financial sector variables. Also, we study the
impact of monetary shock under an inflation- targeting regime. Finally, we offer some
concluding remarks.
4.2 Model
In this section, we develop a DSGE model for a perfectly competitive small open
economy consisting of a real private sector, a financial sector, a central bank, and
a government. The real sector includes households, non-financial good producers,
capital producers, intermediate good producers, and an oil sector. Additionally,
a portion of oil export proceeds is saved in a national development fund, which
intervenes in the financial market by providing funds to the lending bank. The
representative household consumes the final good sold by retailers and supplies labor
to intermediate good producers. The household also deposits her savings in the
deposit bank and is the ultimate beneficiary of both financial and non-financial firms.
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive and use private and
public capital to produce goods. Retailers buy goods from final goods producers
and mark up prices via monopolistic competition with nominal price rigidities a` la
Christiano et al. (2005), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2009) and Smets
and Wouters (2007).The oil sector uses capital and labor to extract oil to sell abroad
at international prices.
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The financial sector consists of a deposit bank and a lending bank forming an interbank
market. The deposit banks offer a one-period financial instrument to households,
namely de- posits, and lend to the lending banks at the interbank rate. The deposit
contract is subject to a quadratic adjustment cost of deposit rates a` la Gerali et al.
(2010a) due to monopolistic power of deposit banks. Lending banks provide one-
period loan contracts to goods producers and the government. In addition to the
interbank market funding, lending banks use resources from the national development
fund at the central bank policy rate. The government issues one-period bonds, collects
taxes, and uses a fraction of oil revenues and the national development fund resources.
The national development fund also receives a share of oil revenues and finances
parts of government expenditure and the banking sector’s needs. The central bank is
independent from the government and follows an inflation targeting policy by using
the Taylor rule.
4.2.1 Households
Households maximize their life-time utility function driven from consumption and
leisure time. The representative household’s intertemporal preference is
max
Ct,Nt,Dt
Et
{ ∞∑
s=t
βs−tU (Cs, Ns)
}
(4.2.1)
with 0 < β < 1. Ct and Nt denote consumption and the number of hours worked. We
assume the single period utility function as:
U (Ct, Nt) =
C1−σt
1− σ − χN
N1+φt
1 + φ
(4.2.2)
with χN , φ > 0. σ denotes households risk aversion and φ represents the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The disutility for work is weighted by χN . In each
period, the household consumes C, raises a short debt D from banks and pay taxes T .
Households supply labor N to the intermediate goods and oil producers, receive wages
W and the previous period deposits return RD, transfer Γ from the government, and
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net payouts P, from the ownership of both financial and non-financial firms. Therefore,
households budget constraint is
Ct +Dt+1 + Tt ≤ WtNt + R
D
t Dt
Πt+1
+ Γt + P (4.2.3)
The first order conditions in respect to consumption, deposit and labor are,
λtP
H
t = C
−σ
t (4.2.4)
Nφt
C−σt
=
Wt
χN
(4.2.5)
1
RDt+1
= βEt
(
1
Πt+1
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(4.2.6)
where λ is the Lagrangian and Πt is inflation. Households hold government debt
indirectly through the financial sector 2.
4.2.2 The Final Good Producer
In a perfectly competitive market, a final good is produced by using intermediate
goods. Taking as given all intermediate goods prices PH(i) and the final good price
PH , the final good producer’s maximizes profit subject to its production function:
max
Yt(i)
PHt Y
H
t −
∫ 1
0
PHt (i)Y
n
t (i)di
s.t
Y Ht =
(∫ 1
0
Y nt (i)
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
(4.2.7)
where θ is the elasticity of substitution. By solving the problem, the input demand
functions are
Y nt (i) =
(
PHt (i)
PHt
)−θ
Y Ht ∀i (4.2.8)
2. Gertler and Karadi (2011) show that holding government debt directly or indirectly does not
matter in such models.
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where Y H is the aggregate demand. The zero profit condition conducts
PHt =
(∫ 1
0
PHt (i)
1−θdi
) 1
1−θ
(4.2.9)
4.2.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
A continuum of intermediate goods producers use the Cobb-Douglas production
technology to produce intermediate goods that are sold to final producers. These
firms face a two-stage problem. In the first stage, an intermediate good producer
maximizes her profit subject to her supply curve, taking wage, W , and capital rent,
Rk, as given,
max
Kt,Nt
Πnt = P
H
t Y
n
t + (1− δk)P kt Kt − (1− u)RktP kt−1Kt −WtNnt
s.t
Y nt = At (Kt)
γn (KGt−1)
γG (Nnt )
1−γn (4.2.10)
where KG is the stock of public capital 3 raised by the government at the end of t− 1
with γn, γG > 0. Every period, the intermediary good producer raises loan L in order
to finance its required capital. The producer acquires capital Kt+1 from the capital
producer at price P kt in order to produce in the subsequent period,
Lt = P
k
t Kt+1 (4.2.11)
The producer will sell the undepreciated part of capital to capital producers on the
open market at the proper price. The firm chooses labor and capital in a perfectly
competitive factor market:
Rkt =
γnP
H
t Y
n
t + (1− δk)P kt Kt
Lt−1
(4.2.12)
Wt =
(1− γn)PHt Y nt
Nnt
(4.2.13)
3. Leeper et al. (2010) and Berg et al. (2013) use the same structure.
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To find the real marginal cost, mc, we set the level of labor and capital to produce one
unit of good, At (Kt)
γn (KGt−1)
γG (Nnt )
1−γn = 1. This equation, by using factor prices
4.2.12 and 4.2.13, implies
Nnt =
1
At
(
γn
1− γn
Wt
Rt
)−γn
(4.2.14)
mct = (
1
1− γn )
1−γn(
1
γn
)γn
W 1−γnt R
γn
t
At(KGt−1)γG
(4.2.15)
where Rt = R
k
tP
k
t−1 − (1− δk)P kt .
In the second stage, the intermediate good producer maximizes its discounted real
profits. Following Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2009), a fraction 1− αp
of producers might change their prices in each period to P ∗t . Other producers can
only index their prices by past inflation. With the indexation parameter χ ∈ [0, 1] 4,
the price index, using Calvo pricing model, evolves as follow:
PHt =
[
αp
(
Πχt−1P
H
t−1
)1−θ
+ (1− αp) (P ∗t )1−θ
] 1
1−θ
(4.2.16)
The dynamic pricing problem of the firm is to maximize the sum of discounted real
profit subject to its supply curve:
max
PHt
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βαp)
τ λt+τ
λt
[(
τ∏
s=1
Πχt+s−1
PHt (i)
PHt+τ
−mct+τ
)
Y nt+τ (i)
]
s.t
Y nt+τ (i) =
(
τ∏
s=1
Πχt+s−1
PHt (i)
PHt+τ
)−θ
Y Ht+τ (4.2.17)
where Πt =
PHt
PHt−1
is inflation. Since we have utility seperatable in consumption and
the security market is complete, the stochastic discount factor (SDF) is similar across
households. Also because firms are owned by households, the same SDF applies for the
4. where χ = 0 is no indexation and χ = 1 is total indexation
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valuation of future profits of these firms. The solution P ∗t after simplication implies
X1t = λtmctY
H
t + βαpEt(
Πχt
Πt+1
)−θX1t+1 (4.2.18)
X2t = λtΠ
∗
tY
H
t + βαpEt(
Πχt
Πt+1
)1−θ(
Π∗t
Π∗t+1
)X2t+1 (4.2.19)
where Π∗t =
P ∗t
PHt
and θX1t = (θ − 1)X2t .
4.2.4 Capital Producers
Competitive capital producing firms build new capital by using undepreciated part of
capital from intermediate goods producers and new investment. The new capital is
sold at price P kt at time t. The capital accumulation dynamic is
Kt = (1− δk)Kt−1 + Φ
(
it
it−1
)
it (4.2.20)
Φ
(
it
it−1
)
= 1− ξ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
it
it−1
(4.2.21)
where Φ(.) is the non-linear investment adjustment cost function following Christiano
et al. (2010). parameter ξ measures the concavity of the technological constrains. The
capital producer maximizes it profit
max
is
ΠKt = Et
∞∑
s=t
Ms,t
[
P ksKs − (1− δk)P ksKs−1 − is
]
(4.2.22)
subject to the dynamic of capital accumulation, equation 4.2.20 where Ms,t is the
stochastic discount factor. P kt is the Tobin’s Q which determines the relative cost of
investment in units of consumption. The price of depreciated capital and the new
capital is assumed to be the same. The maximization problem implies
P kt
[
it
it−1
Φ
′
(
it
it−1
)
+ Φ
(
it
it−1
)]
+ Et
[
Mt+1,t
(
P kt+1
(
it+1
it
)2
Φ
′
(
it+1
it
))]
= 1
(4.2.23)
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The realized profit in each period is:
ΠKt+1 = P
k
t Kt − (1− δk)P kt Kt−1 − it (4.2.24)
In the steady-state, the capital producer’s profit is zero, whereas during the transition
process around the steady-state, the adjustmnet cost cannot be set to its optimal level
and the capital producers can realize a loss or profit because at time t, investment, it
is pre-determined.
4.2.5 Oil Sector
The government owns the oil sector, which follows a Cobb-Douglas production
function, using capital and labor to extract oil. The oil production Y o, is sold in
the international open market at price P o without any friction. In each period, the
government spends a fixed fraction αo of the oil revenue as the new investment in the
sector, partially to replace depreciated capital too.
Kot = (1− δo)Kot−1 + αoP ot Y ot (4.2.25)
As a result, the oil sector maximizes its profit by choosing its required labor,
max Θt = (1− αo)P ot Y ot −W ot N ot
s.t
Y ot = A
o
t (K
o
t−1)
γo(N ot )
1−γo (4.2.26)
the first order condition implies,
N ot = (1− αo) (1− γo)
P ot Y
o
t
Wt
(4.2.27)
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The oil sector is zero profit firm so it returns its profit to the government. We assume
that the oil price follows an AR(1) process,
P ot = ρoP
o
t−1 + (1− ρo)P o + ot (4.2.28)
where ot ∼ i.i.d (0, σ2o)
4.2.6 Financial sector
Deposit Banks
All net creditor financial intermediaries in the interbank market are referred to as
deposit banks, which are price setters (that is monopolistically competitive). Each
deposit bank i ∈ (0, 1) issues risk free deposit facilities for households and returns
deposit interest RDt (i) in the next period. These banks transfer the collected deposits
to lending banks in the interbank market at the interbank rate RIBt . Given that
deposits are imperfect substitution, and banks are monopolistically competitive, a
deposit bank i faces a Dixit-Stiglitz loan demand curve 5.
Dt(i) =
(
RDt (i)
RDt
)ε
Dt (4.2.29)
where the demand is increasing in the relative deposit interest rate and ε > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution between different types of deposits. Dt(i) is deposit supplied
to bank i at the offered interest rate RDt (i). Dt and R
D
t are the aggregate deposit and
deposit rate taken as given by bank i. For setting the interest rates, deposit banks
face a quadratic adjustment cost a` la Rotemberg (1982) when maximizing its profit,
ΠDt = max
RDt (i)
Et
∞∑
s=t
Ms,t
{(
RIBt −RDt (i)
)
Dt(i)− κD
2
(
RDt (i)
RDt−1(i)
− 1
)2
Dt
}
(4.2.30)
5. As in Gerali et al. (2010b) and Dib (2010).
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The first order condition is simplified to
1 + ε
ε
RDt = R
IB
t −
κD
ε
(
RDt
RDt−1
− 1
)
RDt
RDt−1
+ Et
Mt+1,t
ε
(
RDt+1
RDt
− 1
)
RDt+1
RDt
(4.2.31)
where symmetric equilibrium implies RDt (i) = R
D
t for all i ∈ (0, 1). Equation 4.2.31
shows that the interbank rate includes the risk-free deposit rate, deposit bank’s
markup and adjustment costs. This spread between free-risk rate and the inter-bank
rate varies over the business cycle.
Lending Banks
In contrast, all net debtor financial intermediaries in the interbank market are referred
to as lending banks. In addition to deposit resources, the lending bank has access to
the central bank’s loan BCBt at rate R
CB
t . B
CB
t can be elucidated as quantitative
monetary easing. Each bank adds this bundle to its last-period profit, $, in order to
finance lending to firms, Lt, and buying government bonds, Bt. Raising any loan is
subject to a quadratic adjustment cost. So, a lending bank’s balance sheet (which is
the same for all lending banks and therefore we look at the aggregate) can be written
as:
Bt+1 + Lt = Dt+1 +B
CB
t +$t (4.2.32)
The bank maximizes its profit every period by
max
Lps ,Ls,BCBs ,Bs
ΠLt = Et
[ ∞∑
s=t+1
Ms,t$s
]
s.t
$t = R
k
tLt−1 +R
B
t Bt −RIBt Dt −RCBt−1BCBt−1
− ηD
2
(
Dt −D
)2 − ηB
2
(
Bt −B
)2 − ηL
2
(
Lt−1 − L
)2
(4.2.33)
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where ηB, ηD, ηL > 0. The first order conditions imply,
RIBt =
RCBt−1
1 + ηD
(
Dt −D
) (4.2.34)
RBt =
RCBt−1
1− ηB
(
Bt −B
) (4.2.35)
Rkt =
RCBt−1
1− ηL
(
Lt−1 − L
) (4.2.36)
To close the model, we assume that lending banks have unlimited access to oil reserve
fund resources at the policy rate RCBt after exhausting other resources. Therefore,
in addition to the deposit rate in (4.2.31), all other rates in the financial system are
pinned down by the policy rate in equations (4.2.34) to (4.2.36). Each of these rates
can be a markup or a markdown to the policy rate depending on the resources on
asset and liability sides. For instance, if there is an excess liquidity in the banking
system due to high levels of deposits, the interbank rate falls below the policy rate.
Conversely, in a liquidity shortage, the interbank rate is higher than the central bank
rate.
4.2.7 Government
The government collects taxes, Tt , raises government domestic bonds, Bt, and has
access to a fraction ν of the oil revenue Θt, a fraction ρg of the oil reserve fund Ft,
and its return on international investment of the oil fund at interest rate R∗t
6. On the
other side, the government spends Gt, remunarates bond holdings at R
B, distributes
transfers Γt.The government budget constraint is
Tt +Bt+1 + νΘt + (ρg +R
∗)Ft−1 = Gt +RBt Bt + Γt (4.2.37)
6. The best way to introduce R∗t is by using the interest rate parity equation. However, for
simplicity, we assume that the international interest rate is a markdown of the domestic policy rate.
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The government has the following rules for transfer and public spending:
Tt = τd(R
D
t − 1)Dt + τcCt + τwWtNt + τkP (4.2.38)
Γt = ρΓνΘt (4.2.39)
Gct = G
c
(4.2.40)
Gpt = K
G
t − (1− σG)KGt−1 = Gp (4.2.41)
Gt = G
c
t +G
p
t (4.2.42)
τd, τc, τw, τk are tax rates on return on deposits, consumption, wage and profits,
respectively. The government sets the transfer according to the oil revenue by
parameter ρΓ. G
c
t is government current expenditure and G
p
t is government investment
in building public capital. Gt is the total government expenditure.
4.2.8 Central Bank and Oil Reserve Fund
The central bank is a nonprofit institution. Every period, the central bank sets the
policy rate by the Taylor rule as follows:
rCBt = ρcbr
CB
t−1 + (1− ρcb)(rCB + ρpi(Πt − Π) + ρy(Yt − Y )) (4.2.43)
where Y is GDP and 1+rCBt = R
CB
t . We assume that the central bank uses resources
in the oil reserve fund to intervene in financial markets. The oil reserve fund dynamic
evolves such that:
Ft = (1− ρg)Ft−1 + (1− ν)Θt +RCBt−1BCBt−1 −BCBt (4.2.44)
which is a result of the oil reserve fund operation with the lending banks, receiving
a share of oil revenues and a depreciation of the stock which can be due to many
reasons.
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4.2.9 Market clearing
By adding all budget constraints, market clearing conditions are:
GDPt +R
∗
tFt−1 = Ct + Φ
(
it
it−1
)
it + α
oP ot Y
o
t +Gt + (Ft − Ft−1) (4.2.45)
Nt = N
o
t +N
n
t (4.2.46)
P = ΠKt + Π
R
t + Π
D
t + Π
L
t (4.2.47)
where GDPt = Y
H
t +P
o
t Y
o
t . In equation 4.2.45, total output plus the return on foreign
investments are equal to consumption, capital investments, government expenditure
and net deposits in the oil reserve funds.
4.3 Results
Table 4.1 – Calibrated parameters (quarterly)
Parameters Symbol Value source
Discount factors β 0.9595 RD = 0.18(annually)
Consumption elasticity σ 1.5 Bhattacharjee et al. (2007)
Relative utility weight of labor χN 0.52 N = 1
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply φ 2.17 Motevaseli et al. (2011)
Elasticity of private capital γn 0.30 K/GDP = 2
Elasticity of public capital γG 0.1 Berg et al. (2013)
Elasticity of private capital in oil γo 0.80 K
o/GDP = 0.30
Coef. of intermediate producer θ, χ, αp 9, 0.241, 0.50 30% Mark up,Daliri and Mehrgan (2015)
Depreciation rates δk, δo, δg 0.05, 0.007, 0.1 Motevaseli et al. (2011)
Capital Pro. adj. cost ξ 2 Daliri and Mehrgan (2015)
Coef. of deposit bank ε, κD 237, 1.5 R
IB = 0.20(annually)
Taxes τc, τd, τw, τk 0.09, 0, 0.04, 0.15 Average tax rates
Central bank ρcb, ρpi, ρy 0.10, 1.5, 0.125 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Oil AR processes ρo 0.80 Guerra-Salas (2014)
Other AR processes ρA, ρAo , ρξ 0.80, 0.90, 0.90
Gov. share of oil revenue ν 0.70
Gov usage of oil fund ρg 0.05
Share of Transfer in Oil Rev. ρΓ 0.33
Share of investment in oil revenue αo 0.01
Adj. costs of lending bank ηD, ηB , ηL 2, 0.2, 2
The model is calibrated to the quarterly data for Iran’s economy from 1985-2015.
Table 5.1 presents the value of the parameters, which are chosen from Iran’s data
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based on the quarterly targets. In summary, a subset of parameters is taken from
the literature or is calibrated to match the long-run averages observed in the data in
table 4.2. The source of data is from the World Bank, the Central Bank of Iran and
the budget law.
Table 4.2 – Steady state of the benchmark model(quarter)
Variable symbol Steady State/GDP
Consumption C 0.64
Transfer Γ 0.05
Private capital K 2
Oil capital Ko 0.36
Public capital KG 0.48
Non-oil output PHY H 0.75
Oil revenue P oY o 0.25
Gov. expenditure Gc, Gp, G 0.25, 0.046, 0.30
Investment X 0.10
Gov. loans B 0.40
Tax T 0.09
Total government’s budget 0.78
Current expenditure/investment Gc/Gp 5.5
This section discusses the main results of the paper. First, we look at the technology
shocks on non-oil firms and on the oil sector and compare the impulse response
functions to these shocks with well-established results in papers such as Christiano
et al. (2010) and Smets and Wouters (2003). Then, upon the model’s success in
reproducing similar response for main fundamentals of the economy, we look into the
oil price shock on P o. Following Pieschaco´n (2012), we assume that the oil price and
technology shocks are stationary and follow an AR(1) process as in (4.2.28):
P ot = (1− ρo)P o + ρoP ot−1 + ot
log(At) = ρilog(At−1) + at
where i ≈ N(0, σ2i ) i = P o, A.
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4.3.1 Technology Shocks
Figure 4.7 and 4.8 show the impulse responses for the aggregate variables coming from
the same set of models illustrated previously for a one-standard-deviation shock to
the TFP level. A positive technology shock increases non-oil output, leading to an
improvement in wages and the labor employed in the economy. With perfect labor
mobility across sectors, and assuming no change in the oil price, the higher wage
demand decreases the labor supply in the oil industry, leading to a decline in oil
production and revenues. For this purpose, labor initially increases but then declines
as the income effect from the oil sector starts to dominate the substitution effect
from the non-oil sector. Due to higher wages and labor, transfers diminish for a few
periods as the government receives lower oil revenues and households get wealthier.
Following the productivity shock, the marginal cost falls on impact leading to a decline
in inflation. The monetary policy follows the inflation path and with a decline in the
central bank policy rate all market rates fall. The decline in rates reduces the net
worth of the banking system accompanied by deposit and government bond supply.
The only exception among the market rates is the return on capital which according
to equation (4.2.12) follows the productivity shock. Moreover, a positive technology
shock decreases firm’s capital stock building and equivalently the loan demand.
Figure 4.7 compares the benchmark model with other scenarios including no price
stickiness (αp = 0) and higher cost of capital replacement in the oil sector (αo = 0.1).
In 4.8, the benchmark model is compared with models without Rotemberg adjustment
cost in the deposit branch (κD = 0), no market power for deposit banks (εD =∞) and
finally with near perfect pass-through of rates through lending banks (ηD, ηB, ηL ' 0).
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Higher cost of capital replacement in the oil sector only slightly dampens the
technology shock impact on the economy. However, the absence of price stickiness
affects the monetary policy behavior following an increase in inflation, since retailers
can adjust their prices instantly. The absence of sticky rates and imperfectly
competitive financial intermediation alter the picture only marginally. Nonetheless
a quasi-perfect pass-through of rates through lending banks amplify the contribution
to the expansion following a technology shock. The usual drop in inflation induces
a policy rate cut, but without interest rate adjustment costs for lending banks, rates
fall and converge to the steady state slowly against other scenarios in which the policy
rate overshoots after five quarters. Nevertheless, an important difference is that the
deposit rate and the interbank rate are still determined by deposit branches with
monopolistic power.
A 1 percent technological shock on the oil industry has generally the same directional
impact on the economy, but its impact remains more unattenuated. This shock
increases oil revenues, and improves transfers as the government’s receipt from oil
enlarges and household consumption expands. The overall labor drops marginally
in spite of higher hiring by the oil industry because households become wealthier
and choose to work less. Nevertheless, labor in the oil sector constitutes only a
small share of total labor, and modest variations in labor or wages cannot have an
important impact on the real and financial sector. As a result, the government oil
revenue remains the principal channel through which technological advances in the
oil industry propagate into the economy. With higher revenues, government issues
less bonds and carries out more public investment, which builds up public capital
stock. On the impact, this would reduce the marginal cost and inflation, inducing the
monetary policy reaction of reducing the policy rate.
4.3.2 Oil Price Shock
Figure 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the impulse responses for the aggregate variables after
a one-standard- deviation shock to the oil price. A positive oil price shock boosts oil
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revenue, affecting the economy through different channels. First, due to the enhanced
oil revenues, investment in the oil industry strengthens and boosts the capital stock
in the sector, which further amplifies oil production and total output. Second, the
rising oil revenue induces an increase in labor. This is interpreted for the non-oil
sector as a labor supply shock, which inflates wages. To compensate for the loss, the
non-oil sector responds by revising its prices upward. At the same time, the monetary
policy reacts to the positive output gap and higher prices by increasing the policy rate
momentarily. Nevertheless, the detrimental impact of higher oil prices on the non-
oil sector pushes total labor below its steady state value, resulting in falling wages
and prices, reversing the very short-term impact of higher oil prices. This shows the
importance of structure within an economy and how the oil and non-oil sectors are
linked. This development happened in our model, because the two sectors compete
over labor. This effect could be strengthened, if the capital in the oil sector were
of the same material as in the non-oil sector. Inversely, higher oil prices can have a
positive impact on the non-oil sector, if for instance, government subsidies to firms
were important, or government would use more of non-oil sector products in its public
investment program.
As prices start to fall and the central bank cuts the policy rate, other rates start
to decline. Following the drop in rates, deposit and bond supply plummet, partly
because households move to smooth their consumption and the government receives
higher revenues from oil. Naturally, with rising oil revenues, the government finances
its expenses directly from oil revenues, leading to a shift from a modern state to an
economy with reduced dependence on bonds and even taxes.
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Also, due to lower wages and a richer government, households choose to work less and
receive more state transfers and therefore total consumptions grow. In the medium-
term, non-oil firms will substitute lower labor with the capital accumulation by taking
advantage of lower market rates for borrowing. For this reason, capital stock rises after
the fall in interest rates and labor. The oil fund originally overshoots thanks to higher
oil revenues, but because of lower deposits in the system and higher loan demand
coming from non-oil firms, the oil fund must inject resources to the banking system.
Eventually, resources go below the steady state. The oil fund resource injection is
complemented by the central bank’s lending to banks. Indeed, due to higher deposits
at the beginning and lower bond supply, banks do not use the central bank’s lending
facilities. As soon as non-oil firms start to invest and their loan demand increases,
central bank lending goes back to the steady state. Indeed, the central bank’s rate,
following the Taylor rule, rises at first based on output and inflation gaps. However,
due to rigidities in adjusting the interbank rate, the increase in the interbank rate
is smaller than that of the central bank. As a result, the lending branch has more
incentive to borrow in the interbank market rather than directly from the central
bank.
In this setup, the wage is determined only by non-oil firms. Although higher oil price
makes it more efficient to reallocate resources from non-oil to the oil sector, this wage
rigidity prevents a perfect substitution in the general equilibrium. The transmission
mechanism could be reinforced if wage dispersion existed in the model and the wage
was determined in a competitive labor market or even in monopolistic model a` la
Calvo for instance.
In addition to the benchmark model, figure 4.9 shows the oil shock under two
alternative scenarios with no Calvo pricing and higher oil re-investment. The two
models behave similarly to the benchmark model; however, they illustrate the role of
each component in the propagation of shocks. With αp = 0 and no price stickiness,
retailers can adjust the prices instantly, which dampens the impact of the shock on
almost all variables. Since prices adjust immediately, the mechanism that happens
with the full model at the beginning of the shock disappears. As in the benchmark
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model, with positive oil price shock the oil industry absorbs more labor. The non-oil
sector responds to the shock by increasing salaries and prices. However, this time
retailers respond to the monetary policy reaction of a rate increase immediately, and,
therefore, prices fall on impact. The non-oil sector’s output falls as a result of losing
labor and the inability to increase prices. With a shrinking labor force and cheaper
capital acquirement, non-oil firms start accumulating capital. Households choose
to work less, since the salaries have not increased and because transfers increase
due to higher oil price. Nonetheless, consumption and transfers are weaker than in
the benchmark model and the government initially issues higher bonds to support
transfers and public investment.
The case of higher investment in the oil sector is more interesting. The response
is very similar to the benchmark model; however, GDP and consumption expand
more, and convergence to the steady state is slower. The reason is that as the oil
output upsurges with the sector’s investment intensification, production and labor
demand also increase. The impact on the non-oil sector is as detrimental as in the
benchmark, with a more protracted effect. The oil sector is greedier on labor, and
the non-oil output declines faster while trying to compensate for labor losses with
higher investment. This process is facilitated by suppressed market rates. Because
of the prolonged impact on non-oil firms, the monetary reaction remains protracted,
and rates remain low for a longer period.
4.3.3 Application
Once the model has been calibrated and its propagation mechanisms studied, we can
use it to analyze the role of the financial sector and banks, raised in the introduction.
We are not looking at the shocks originating within the banking sector, although they
can be interesting, but are simply studying the role of banks in propagating an oil
shock to the rest of the economy. In this model, agents are not a credit constraint,
leading to the absence of a conventional financial accelerator mechanism. The goal
of the model, therefore, is not to replicate a financial accelerator model, because
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by construction it amplifies the impact of shocks. The goal of adding a financial
sector was to 1) introduce an oil reserve fund and link it to the banking sector and
the government; 2) to see the impact of an interbank market on shocks; and 3) to
introduce different rates in the economy and later on intervention and exchange rate
stability mandate for the central bank.
Figure 4.10 demonstrates the response function to the oil shock with different financial
system component changes. We look at the responses with changes on the deposit
branch where the deposit rate adjustment cost has been removed, κD = 0, and the
case with no monopolization power for deposit branches, i.e. εD = inf. Then we
analyze the impact of instantaneous rate changes at lending branches by removing all
adjustment costs, i.e. ηB,D,L = 0.
The monopolization of the deposit branch or the deposit rate adjustment cost appear
to have a mild impact on the model. In contrast, the response functions related
to lending branches with no adjustment costs have a significant impact. Indeed,
with instantaneous rate adjustments, non-oil firms replace the labor with capital.
Therefore, the overall demand for labor falls at the beginning and investment soars.
This process occurs at the same time as the central bank rate cut because this time
firms do not see the necessity of increasing their price levels for paying higher salaries.
Instead, the overall price index falls, and the central bank responds by cutting the
policy rate, which in turn boosts investment. However, after two quarters, the non-oil
output increases to the point that firms require hiring and therefore labor overshoots.
Since labor declines right after the shock, consumption declines, but it increases as
transfer and labor start to rise and the overall level remains higher than the benchmark
and other scenarios. Government bond supplies also decline on account of lower bond
rates and higher government revenues from oil. The major difference in this scenario
is the positive spillover from the oil to the non-oil sector, because of the firms’ labor-
choosing behavior, falling prices, and the monetary policy reaction. As a result, the
cumulative impact on GDP stands higher than in other scenarios. Nevertheless, this
result remains very sensitive to the parameters’ calibration. With different parameters
for the households’ utility function for labor and leisure and modified Taylor rule, the
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results could be different and potentially closer to the benchmark model.
4.4 Concluding remarks
This paper studies an oil economy in a New-Keynesian framework with a
heterogeneous banking sector. The main purpose is to analyze how different
components of an oil economy from the oil sector, public financing from oil resources,
and national development fund interact together and with a banking sector in
propagating shocks in the economy.
Several results are provided. First, because of complementarities between the oil and
non-oil sectors, the labor market becomes an important source of shocks spillover in
this economy. This is seen especially in the oil sector technology shock and oil price
shock. The main reason here is the fixed labor supply. In an economy with slack
capacity of labor, the results can be different somewhat and a positive technology
shock or oil price shock would have larger impact on GDP and consumption.
Therefore, policies aimed at stabilizing wages and prices prevents these variables to
play their role of automatic stabilizers to avoid large swings of production factors
between sectors. The detrimental effect on the non-oil sector also results in a pro-
cyclical behavior of the monetary policy to support price stability and stimulate the
non-oil sector. Nevertheless, this setup can compensate for the lack of an exchange rate
in the model to capture a similar Dutch disease kind of phenomena in oil economies.
Second, the government’s role in propagating shocks is essential. When the oil
revenues in- crease due to higher oil prices or a positive technological shock,
the government magnifies the transfer to households and increases public capital
expenditure. Higher transfer indeed improves consumption, but it also affects the
households’ decision of labor allocation. On the other hand, since public capital is
used in the non-oil output, total output should increase proportionally, which would
result in a higher fiscal multiplier.
Third, although banks do not play a key role in the propagation of oil shocks in
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this model, they have a critical role in amplifying them. Because the oil sector is not
directly exposed to the banking sector, and non-oil firms are neither credit constrained
nor is a default allowed in the model, banks are not essentially driving the responses
to the oil sector shocks. Instead banks in this model can differentiate between
market rates. Various frictions in the banking sector affects the impulse response
functions. But the deposit bank monopolistic power or deposit rate adjustment cost
have insignificant impact compared to adjustment costs in lending banks. This is due
to the fact, that lending banks are linked to the government, non-oil firms, national
development fund and the central bank.
This model provides plausible explanations in a stylized manner that can help improve
our understanding of how different sectors of an oil economy interact, but naturally it
comes with many limitations. As mentioned before, the model remains very sensitive
to the labor market. In reality, the oil sector is capital intensive. Additionally,
the labor force is very specialized, and the degree of substitutability remain low.
Furthermore, the model abstracts from the exchange rate and trade. Indeed, in oil
economies the major export remains oil, and the revenue is accrued to the government
and a sovereign wealth fund or a development fund. The negative spillover effect from
the oil to the non-oil sector can be exacerbated by modeling a small open economy
and introducing a real exchange rate. Moreover, by choosing credit-constrained firms
and introducing collaterals, the banking system becomes part of the propagation
mechanism, and the financial accelerator must function. Finally, the central banks of
many oil-exporting countries have the implicit mandate of exchange rate stabilization.
The model dynamic can be improved by choosing exchange rate stabilization as one
of the objectives of the central bank. For this purpose, we have to introduce an
intervention rule as well.
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5 Distributional and Welfare Effects of Tax Reforms
Abstract
This paper assesses the macroeconomic and welfare effects of fundamental tax reforms in
an emerging/developing economy. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with
structural and institutional characteristics of non-oil emerging and developing economies
and apply the model to Morocco. The model’s simulations suggest that tax reforms imply
complex trade-off between growth, government revenue, and equity. A comprehensive
approach associated with better targeted social programs, broadens the tax base, removes
tax distorsions, better distributes the tax burden, and mitigates adverse distributional
effects (that is improves welfare) by making the tax system more progressive and reducing
inequalities. For Morocco, a comprehensive tax reform package would involve i) reducing
tax exemptions, ii) a broader-based property tax, iii) a lower corporate tax rate, iv) aligning
the VAT rate on exempted goods and services to the standard rates, and v) a better targeted
social safety net. The paper indicates that such a reform package is growth-friendly, broad-
based, progressive and has implications for existing gender biases.
JEL classification:E62, H20, F41 .
Keywords : Tax reform, Macro-structural policies, Distributional effects, Dynamic
general equilibrium, Welfare.
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5.1 Introduction
This paper quantifies the potential effects of fundamental tax reforms on growth,
government revenue, welfare, and inclusiveness. It aims to contribute to the design
of tax reform strategies in emerging and developing economies using Morocco 1 as
a case study. It builds a reliable model for policy makers to assess tax reforms
and their distributional 2/welfare effects by using a number of yardsticks. This
includes: i) enhancing tax revenues which helps create fiscal space for investment
and social spending; ii) boosting growth through tax incentives to entrepreneurship
and investment; and iii) increasing fairness and welfare, by making the tax system
progressive. The dynamic general equilibrium model is adapted to emerging and
developing market economies’ specifications and could capture all key dimensions
mentioned above in the short, medium 3 and long run, as well as potential changes to
social spending.
Our keys conclusions from the model simulation and welfare analysis are: first, tax
reforms should be part of a comprehensive and well explained approach. Such an
approach should consider the combined impact of various tax measures in several
dimensions, including growth, revenue, and fairness, as well as parallel efforts to
improve the targeting and impact of public social spending. In the absence of
comprehensive strategy, the risks are that isolated reforms are not sequenced properly,
that they either introduce inconsistencies or distortions, or that they be perceived
as unfair, and in the end counter-productive from the perspective of improving the
quality, efficiency, fairness, and acceptance of the tax system. Second, a comprehensive
tax reform package for Morocco could include: removing tax exemptions on large
agricultural firms, simplifying the value-added tax (VAT) regime and corporate
taxation, better enforcing tax payments from self-employed and liberal professions,
1. Following the National Tax Conference in 2013. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/
2014/cr1465.pdf
2. For more studies on distributional effects of tax reform please see Aaron and Gale (2010) and
Golladay and Haveman (2013).
3. Consistent with the medium term revenue strategy (MTRS) proposed by the IMF. See IMF
et al. (2016).
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applying property taxes and strengthening social safety net plans. This reform
package helps broaden the tax base, remove tax distortions, and better distributes
the tax burden 4. The long-run multiplier for this reform is 0.55.
Our research is related to various papers that assess the macroeconomic and
distributional effects of fundamental tax reforms e.g. Altig et al. (2001) and the
impacts of major reforms in low-income developing economies e.g. Fabrizio et al.
(2017) and Furceri et al. (2016). Our paper contributes to the literature by adding
new features, specifically the real estate and rental market, property tax, the ability
of assessing a mixed tax reform package, evaluating the impact of informality and the
possibility of tracing different social aid plans. Our model draws from the neoclassical
approach and is augmented by capital and housing frictions. The sectors which
form the economy are households, firms and government. The household sector
is heterogeneous by four agents: i) rural workers who work on land and produce
food; ii) informal workers who produce services and rent houses; iii) formal workers
who own a portion of housing market and produce goods and services using capital,
and iv) entrepreneurs who rent houses to informal workers, manage the production
of food, goods and services in firms where rural and formal workers are employed.
The government collects taxes and carries out a re-distributive role through public
spending and lump-sum transfers to households. It could finance its deficit by issuing
interest-bearing bonds.
The application of the model to Morocco shows that a comprehensive tax reform
implementation could help the government to achieve medium-term objectives such
as lower public debt (below 60% of GDP) and higher and more inclusive growth.
Implementing a comprehensive tax reform could yield about 1-2 percent of additional
public revenues over the medium term, creating more fiscal space to support pro-
4. Tax burdens could also be alleviated by strengthening the social safety net and reducing
corporate tax rate. This combination would minimize two major concerns surrounding high tax
rates by: first, reorienting incentive toward value-added activities which would address the effects
from high taxes rates on economic decisions and distortions; second, addressing income distribution
effects of high tax rates by protecting the poor and most vulnerable tranches of the population from
tax burdens.
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growth and pro-poor spending. Moreover, the reform simplifies the tax system,
improves fairness, and better targets transfers. It has a positive effect on output as
investors direct resources to high-yield investments, as opposed to lower yield sector
such as real estate. The paper simulates the behavior of key macroeconomic variables
after applying simple or mix reforms in short and long-run. The short-run effect is
mostly neglected in the literature, but in the context of developing economies, it might
be as important as the long-term impacts 5.
The relationship between taxation and economic growth is mixed and differs across
countries; in advanced economies, a tax rate increase may dampen growth, while
in developing economies, the empirical relationship remains inconclusive. As to
how taxation can help reduce inequality, the findings are also conflicting 6; reducing
inequality supports sustainable economic growth but redistributions through tax
policy could significantly increase tax burdens. For developing economies, where
the body of empirical evidence is smaller, the relationship between tax and growth
seems inconclusive. These findings have in part been attributed to the role of other
factors, such as weaker tax administration and enforcement (Acosta Ormaechea and
Yoo, 2012). Our paper establishes that strengthening social safety nets is a key to
mitigate the effects of tax reform on welfare and inequality. Alongside Emran and
Stiglitz (2005), our paper shows that raising government revenue by increasing VATs
without further reforms in social safety net plans results in welfare loss. Our paper
features generalized and targeted transfers and suggests that designing a tax policy
needs a balance between growth and redistribution objectives 7.
Our paper indicates that the tax mix has implications for existing gender biases and
5. Long-run effects tend to impact the steady equilibrium of the economy, while short-term effects
only affect the cyclical components of macroeconomic variables. Effects that are positive over the
long-run may have negative repercussions in the short-term. It could be difficult for a developing
country (that may not have a stable political situation) to manage such a temporary slowdown for
example in GDP or employment.
6. See October 2017 Fiscal Monitor for additional analysis on the relation between growth and
inequality: the report takes the view that there is no systematic adverse trade-off between increasing
growth and decreasing inequality.
7. For the poorest countries, a shift towards re-distributive tax policies happens only once a
sufficient income per capita has been reached. See Ravallion (2010), Bird et al. (2014) and Lustig
et al. (2013).
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for the efficiency of tax administration. Income and consumption taxes can be gender-
biased because of differences between men and women in employment and expenditure
(Grown and Valodia, 2010). The aforementioned tax reform reduces unfair cost
advantages enjoyed by the informal sector. This makes tax administration simpler
and stronger (Fjeldstad, 2014), but has a gender dimension as men and women in the
labor force are not equally employed across sectors. More women may participate in
the agricultural and informal sectors for example.
We base our conceptualization of informal markets 8 on the standard informality
literature. Ahmed et al. (2012) and Ahmed et al. (2013) develop and estimate a
closed economy, using Pakistan data, in which informal sector uses labor to produce
services. We include this structure in our model. The results indicate that the impact
of decreasing the level of informality (by motivating informal sector to declare incomes)
on growth and fiscal stance, considering related costs and difficulties, is not significant.
Due to a big share of informal sector, tax on informal sector is sub-optimal for the
economy and has a negligible distributional effects on wages.
Tax reform could address economic distortions thereby unlock additional growth.
For Morocco, Karim and Mansouri (2015) shows that tax reform could decrease
distortions in agriculture through an efficient allocation of investments. Verme and
El-Massnaoui (2015) evaluates the 2014 subsidy reforms in Morocco by simulating
the impact of reforms on household welfare, poverty, and the government budget.
Our paper confirms the literature and shows appealing exemptions boost output by
decreasing distortions and making the economy efficient 9.
Finally, the housing market and its impact on welfare in developing countries are
mostly neglected in the literature (McBride, 2012 and Acosta Ormaechea and Yoo,
2012). However, for instance in Morocco, over 40% of the urban population lives
in rental housing (2007 household survey, IMF.). This shows the significance of the
housing market for both home owners and renters. To fill this gap, our paper evaluates
8. Informality has different definitions and sides. For more information, please see Perry et al.
(2007).
9. Fiscal policy shocks affect output through wealth effects, intertemporal substitution, and
distortions. See Ndela Ntsama et al. (2016).
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the impact of taxes on the rental and property markets. This paper suggests that in
the current situation 10 of Morocco, property taxes not only proceed the progressivity,
but also boost output by making the tax system broad-based and growth-friendly.
The paper will rely on a few complementary analytical approaches, and is structured
as follows: Section 2 presents key stylized features of Morocco’s economy and tax
system, including a cross-country perspective; section 3 develops a macrostructural
dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates developing countries’ specific
features. Section 4 calibrates the model based on Moroccan data. In section 5, results
of permanent changes in various tax codes and different scenarios alongside policy
issues are examined. Section 6 analyses the welfare effect of all analyzed scenarios
and section 7 summarizes the keys conclusions.
10. Property taxes are an important revenue stream, particularly at the local and regional levels,
but are still controversial in developing economies. See Slack and Bird (2014) and Bahl and Wallace
(2008).
174
5 Distributional and Welfare Effects of Tax Reforms
5.2 Stylized facts: Key features of morocco’s tax
system
5.2.1 Tax revenue and tax base
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Figure 5.1 – Tax analysis, Morocco vs EMs, MENA and AEs regions
Morocco’s tax to GDP ratio is on average at about 22% of GDP. It has declined
in recent years from almost 24% in 2012 to 21.5% in 2016, but remains above the
average for lower middle and upper middle income economies. Figure 5.1 compares
the tax revenue in Morocco with the other EMs (Emerging Markets), AE (Advanced
Economies), and the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region.
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Figure 5.2 – Composition of tax revenues, 2012-16. Source: IMF FAD tax revenue
Indicators Database.
Figure 5.2 depicts the share of each category in total tax revenue. Morocco’s tax base
is relatively narrow and skewed. There is an important gap between the potential
tax base and actual tax collection. Significant contributors to this gap include tax
exemptions, tax evasion and avoidance by certain sources of income. Moreover, the
tax base is skewed towards (corporate and personal) income and goods and services
taxes, with these two components accounting for about 80% of tax revenues. The VAT
does not apply to all purchases of goods and services, since several items (e.g. some
foods items, medicine) are exempted. Notably, the share of VAT in total taxes has
risen over the past 10 years, while trade taxes have decreased as tariffs were reduced.
Property taxes now supersede trade taxes as a revenue source, going from around 3%
of total taxes in 2005 to almost 7% in 2016.
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Figure 5.3 – Distribution of corporate tax burden in Morocco by firm size. Sources: IMF
Fiscal Affairs Tax Revenue Indicators database.
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Figure 5.3 shows that the corporate tax base is skewed towards a small number of large
firms (5% of firms produce more than 80% of corporate tax). A significant number
of firms (about 64% of total) do not pay corporate taxes as they tend to report
losses. Tax bases for classes of taxes vary across the board. The VAT is a relatively
broad-based tax as it levies a substantial share of its potential tax base. The income
tax base is relatively narrow because many liberal and independent professions could
manage to shelter their income from tax and only a few number of firms are subject
to corporate tax. At current tax rate, a broad-based income tax could raise more
revenue since more potential tax base would be levied.
5.2.2 Tax rate and tax burden
An analysis of the tax burden, drawing on cross country comparisons, shows that
tax rates and income taxes in Morocco are relatively high compare to peers. Recent
income tax reforms have focused on corporate tax, while personal income tax remained
unchanged. Corporate tax brackets were introduced in the 2016 budget, departing
from a unique 30 percent corporate income tax rate. The VAT regime has remained
unchanged since 2012, with a standard rate of 20%, but a number of items have
been subject to reduced rates 11, which has been at the sources of VAT refund issues.
Personal income tax has been in place since January 2010, and its rate ranges between
0 to 38 percent across income brackets. Overall, the tax burden is not proportionally
distributed in Morocco, and consumption tax, in particular, appears regressive.
11. Specifically: medicine and utilities (7%), essential food items (10%), and some processing food
items and transportation equipment (14%).
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Figure 5.4 – Comparison of Tax Rates (Average by country group) . Morocco, EMD,
MENA region and advanced countries. Sources: IMF Fiscal Affairs Tax Revenue Indicators
database.
Rates applied to VAT and income tax are above regional average. Cross country
experience in Figure 5.4 highlights some specific features of Morocco’s tax system:
i) average VAT statutory tax rates are very close among developing and advanced
economies (14.7% versus 16.2%), ii) income tax rates can vary significantly across-
country, iii) corporate tax rates are converging, and iv) multiple tax rates could
introduce economic distortions, complicated administrative procedures, unfair revenue
distribution, and revenue loss.
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Figure 5.5 – Household Tax burden, transfer and expenditure. Sources: 2007 Morocco
Household survey.
Within country analysis of tax burden suggests that it is not proportionally distributed
and that consumption tax appear regressive. Figure 5.5 presents a micro distribution
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and structural analysis using Morocco 2007 household survey data to determine
whether (consumption and income) taxes are mostly regressive or progressive 12. Tax
burdens calculated as a percentage of both disposable income and pre-tax expenditure
by household types show high proportion of tax levy on wage as opposed to profit.
5.2.3 Tax expenditures
While total tax expenditure in percentage of GDP is relatively low, exemptions
are numerous and introduce distortions. Figure 5.6 presents revenue losses due to
exemptions in Morocco. The number of identified exemptions went from 399 in 2015
to 407 in 2016, of which 30.7% of the total related to consumption tax, 45.5% to
income tax, and the remaining to rights registration and stamp. For 2016, total tax
expenditure was about 3.2% of the GDP (15.2% of tax revenue), compared to 3.1%
in 2014. The largest fraction of tax expenditure is related to VAT (1.5% of GDP
with 102 exemption measures), then administrative fee and corporate income tax,
respectively 0.6 and 0.5 percent of the GDP.
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Figure 5.6 – Revenue losses due to exemptions (% GDP). Sources: IMF Fiscal Affairs
Tax Revenue Indicators database.
While the objective of the exemptions was to provide incentives to certain economic
12. The computation uses a lifetime income approach – with expenditure as a proxy for lifetime
income. It also estimates lifetime income using household panel income data (see Metcalf (1994)) to
further assess household VAT burdens as a percentage of lifetime income.
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activities, in many cases they are distorting 13.
5.2.4 Public transfers and social safety nets
The reform of public transfers system was motivated by the finding that public
transfers were in general regressive (Figure 5.7, left). Public transfers system have
been expanded in recent years but they are poorly targeted. Figure 5.7 (right)
shows that the share of households receiving public transfers more than doubled
between 2001 and 2014, going from 10.8 to 22.9 percent. However, the bulk of the
increase was in urban areas while most of the poor reside in rural areas. In 2014,
only 8.9% of households in the bottom quantile received public transfer as opposed
to 40.2% in the top quintile. Moreover, 43.8% of the total amount transferred by
public administrations during that same year benefited the top quantile households,
which reflects significant disparities in public transfer. The average annual amount
transferred to the poorest households in 2014 was about 6 times less than the top
quantile household. Regressive transfers amplify inequality in the benefits between
the poorest and upper quantile households.
13. Exemptions tend to differ widely, including in their duration (temporary, limited, or
permanent), scope (limited versus full). While some exemptions are discretionary, many are
stipulated (e.g. some sectors have total exclusion). Their implementation takes different forms,
including reductions in rate, deductions, allowances, lump sum taxation, and liquidity facilities. In
2016, agriculture and fishing benefited from 65.4% of exemptions measures, while the real estate
sector received about 23.6% of tax expenditures (about 0.7% of the GDP). Households are prime
beneficiaries of income tax exemptions. Tax expenditures related to import duties amounted to
0.9% of the GDP and are mainly for capital goods from major investment projects and economic
and commercial vehicles. Our analysis (see Section 6) suggests that the exemptions on food, for
example, have affected allocated of resources and contributed to lower output growth.
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5.2.5 Informality
A large segment of the economy is informal, which hinders equal application of tax
collection. Self-employed individuals may be unlikely to report their earnings, as well
as small informal businesses.
The informal sector is estimated, by National Statistics, , to about 15% of total
economic activity. These estimations suffer from lack of data as informal activities
are not surveyed and firms tend to underreport earnings. The estimations shows
that about 22% of total employment (Figure 5.8)is the labor forces employed in the
informal sector .
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Figure 5.8 – Morocco Workforce, 2007. Sources: Haut Commissariat au Plan; ILO; and
IMF staff estimates.
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Taxing the informal sector in Morocco could offer ways to expand the tax base, if tax
administration could achieve high efficiency collection at lower administrative costs.
The primary disadvantages to taxing the informal sector are costs of administration
and enforcement, and horizontal and vertical inequity. More progressive taxes need
to be introduced in order to achieve vertical equity. This would improve the image of
the tax system which would help lure informal workers into the formal sector.
5.3 Model
In this section, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to capture the main
features of Moroccan tax system and economic structure (including the agrarian
base) and to simulate the various impact of fundamental tax reforms. The model
is a closed-economy 14 with four types of households: informal sector workers, formal
manufacturing and service workers, rural workers, and entrepreneurs. The economy
produces three goods: foods, manufacturing products, and informal services. The
manufacturing sector includes structured service industries that require capital for
production (e.g. communication, tourism, finance, tourism industries etc). The large
number of households and products allows the model to capture the structure of
Morocco tax system, specifically, multiple tax rates for VAT, income, and corportate
tax. In addition, there is active housing market in urban areas to assess the benefits
and impacts of a broad-based property taxation. The government collects taxes and
receives bonds in order to cover its expenditure and lump-sum transfer to each agent.
Informal services and food are non-tradable, while manufacturing goods are tradable,
and also the numeraire.
14. Since most of the tax base rests on domestically produced goods, this rationalizes the choice
of a closed economy. For Morocco, tax revenues from trade are less than 2% of GDP, as opposed to
income taxes or VAT that are each about 10% of GDP.
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5.3.1 Households
Households have utility for consumption, housing, and leisure. The consumption
basket has three main goods: food cf , manufacturing products(including formal
services) cm, and informal services cs. Subscripts and superscripts f,m and s stand
for food, manufacturing products and informal services, respectively. In addition,
households profit from housing h, and leisure time (1 − l). The population is
normalized to unit, and we assume households live infinitely. The households utility
function is given by
uit = ϕ
i
f ln c
if
t + ϕ
i
s ln c
is
t + ϕ
i
m ln c
im
t + ϕ
i
h lnh
i
t + ϕ
i
l ln(1− lit) i = I,M,R,E (5.3.1)
superscripts I,M,R,E stand for Informal service workers, formal Manufacturing
workers (including formal service workers), Rural workers and Entrepreneurs,
respectively. The share of each category of households in the population is given
by µi, i = I,M,R,E, (of one unit). The utility function is additively separable in
consumption goods, housing, and leisure. The coefficients ϕj, j = f,m, s, h, l reflect
the relative importance of consumption goods, housing and leisure in the utility
function.
Furthermore, the problem of each agent is to maximize its utility function over time,
max Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−ti u
i
t i = I,M,R,E (5.3.2)
where β is the specific discount factor for each agent.
Informal workers
Informal workers are self-employed who produce services in competitive markets.
They live in urban areas where they rent houses owned by entrepreneurs. The budget
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constraint for a representative informal household is given by,
(1 + τf )p
f
t c
If
t + (1 + τm)p
m
t c
Im
t + (1 + τs)p
s
tc
Is
t + p
r
th
I
t = (1− ξτ Iw)wIt lIt + ΓIt (5.3.3)
where cSi and pi, i = f,m, s are consumption and price for food, manufacturing goods
and services, respectively. hS is houses rent by informal workers and pr is the rental
price, determined in a competitive house renting market. At the equilibrium, the
supply of rental houses by entrepreneurs equals the demand from informal workers.
The production of services in the informal sector is labor intensive. wIt = p
s
tz
I is the
labor unit cost in the sector, and it depends on a constant productivity zIand the
service market price ps. Production decisions in the informal sector are essentially on
worked hours lI to devote in the activity. So the total service (production function of
the informal sector) is:
Y st = µSl
I
t z
I (5.3.4)
ΓS is a government lump-sum transfer to informal sector households.
Informal sector workers face the following tax regimes: i) VAT when they purchase
goods and services; VAT rates are established by the tax code and are respectively τf ,
τm, τs and for food, manufacturing goods, and informal services that they consume; ii)
personal income taxation to the extent that the tax administration is able to capture
some of their activities. We assume that the tax administration has a collection
efficiency rate ξ ∈ [0, 1] for the informal sector, which reflects the fraction of the
(informal sector) potential tax base wIt l
I
t authorities could levy. High values of ξ
implies a large actual tax base for the informal sector. We also assume that informal
sector activities do not generate much income (as they typically operate on a lower
scale, part to reduce likelihood of being taxed) and therefore are in the lower range
personal income tax rate τ Iw. We assess the effects of enforcing income tax (raising
ξ) in the model simulation, where we compare the findings against those from the
baseline model, where we assume ξ = 0, which implies that informal sector workers
do not pay income tax. Since informal workers do not own houses, they are exempted
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from property taxes. Finally, we assume that the informal sector workers spend all
their income in consumption and housing, and have no savings to invest in government
bonds 15.
The representative informal sector household maximizes his utility 5.3.2 subject to
the budget constraint 5.3.3. The optimum conditions for consumption, housing and
leisure are as follows:
prt =
ϕIh
λIth
I
t
(5.3.5)
ϕIl
1− lIt
= λIt (1− ξτ Iw)wIt (5.3.6)
where λI is the Lagrangian multiplier of the service worker’s budget constraint 16. The
optimal allocations of consumption and labor by informal sector workers depend on
the tax rates. Specifically, the marginal rate of substitution between labor and leisure
in the informal sector will be shaped by the tax adminitration’s ability to enforce tax
collection, as reflected by the tax collection rate ξ. VAT rates also affect consumption
at the equilibrium.
Formal manufacturing and service workers
Manufacturing and service sector households supply labor to productive units
managed by entrepreneurs. They live in urban areas, buy and sell houses, and pay
taxes, including VAT on the purchase of goods and services, personal income tax, and
property tax at a rate τh. The representative household’s budget constraint is given
15. According to HCP (2009), more than 78% of informal production and about 73% of informal
labor force in Morocco, are concentrated in service sector. Industrial sector has only a small part of
informal production unit. See Alami (2006). Hence, following literature, the assumption of including
all informal workers in service sector simplifies the model and does not change the results. Informal
service workers are urban and hand-to-mouth household. We have another hand-to-mouth agent
who lives in rural area which will be explained later. They only consume what they earn and do not
have access to bonds or savings mechanisms. According to HCP (2009) the share of bank loans in
informal activities and products is barely 1%.
16. The full list of equations and optimum conditions are listed in the online Appendix.
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(1− τMw )wMt lMt + ΓMt + ACMt (5.3.7)
where cMi, i = f,m, s are consumption of manufacturing workers for food,
manufacturing goods and service, respectively. hM is housing for manufacturing
workers and ph is the housing price, lM is worked hours and ΓM a lump-sum transfer
received from the government. Manufacturing and service workers supply labor on
competitive market at a wage wM , subject to a personal income tax rate τMw ,
which applies to their income backet. There are some adjustment costs attached to
homeownership since acquiring a house could be a costly process due to administration
fees and searching time. The adjustment costs add some frictions to the housing
market and are defined by the quadratic function, ACMt = (ψh/2)p
h
t (
hMt −hMt−1
h
M )
2.
The representative household maximizes his utility 5.3.2 subject to the budget
constraint 5.3.7. His optimum conditions for consumption, housing and leisure are
given by:
pht =
ϕMh
λMt h
M
t
+ βMEt
λMt+1
λMt
pht+1(1− τh) (5.3.8)
ϕMl
1− lMt
= λMt (1− τMw )wMt (5.3.9)
where λM is the Lagrangian multiplier for manufacturing and service sector worker’s
budget constraint.
Rural worker
Rural workers live in rural areas and work on lands which belong to entrepreneurs.
Rural workers receive wages for working on lands and producing foods. We assume
that frictions limit population movements across urban and rural areas, which
eliminates migrations from wage differential, and renders the share of rural and
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urban population relatively stable. Rural households are composed by individuals
who spend all their income on consumption. Due to the high poverty in rural area,
the government implements a generalized subsidy scheme to lower the price of food
items and to help low-income households satisfy their food needs. We further assume
that rural workers own their own houses; these are typically small dwellings of low
value than urban houses, and for that reason they are exempted from property tax.
Moreover, the housing market remains very shallow in rural areas, therefore the model
assumes homeowners keep their houses infinitely.
The budget constraint for a representative rural worker is given by:
(1 + τf − σR)pft cRft + (1 + τm)pmt cRmt + (1 + τs)pstcRst = (1− τRw )wRt lRt + ΓRt (5.3.10)
where cRi, i = f,m, s for food, manufacturing goods and services respectively. wR is
the wage paid in rural labor market, ΓR is the government lump sum transfer to rural
households, τRw is the personal income tax rate for rural workers and is the lowest rate
comparing with other payroll taxes. Parameter σR is the government subsidy (and
policy parameter) to lower food price 17 in rural areas.
The representative rural household maximizes his utility 5.3.2 subject to the budget
constraint 5.3.10. The optimal allocations of consumption and labor for rural workers
are affected by tax rates. An increase in VAT rate for a consumption good or
service would make certain items relatively more expensive than others, lowering its
consumption and switching the structure of consumption basket. For example, the
government could influence food consumption by adjusting food subsidies, changing
effective food prices.
17. This subsidy presents indirect transfers to low-level income households, i.e., it is a generalized
transfer in form of vouchers etc to aid low-income household and secure their essential needs, e.g
foods . It facilitates food consumption for poor households and can be seen as a policy parameter.
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Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs manage productive units of the economy. There are two type of firms:
agricultural firms in rural areas and manufacturing and (formal) service firms in urban
areas. The agricultural firms combine land and labor (by rural workers) to produce
foods. The manufacturing and (formal) service firms use capital and the labor (by
urban households) to produce goods. The technologies of production are given by a
Cobb-Douglas functions in both sectors.
Food output Y ft uses the technology
Y ft = µEz
FLαF (nFt )
1−αF (5.3.11)
where zF is a productivity factor, L is land used in food production, nF is rural
workers labor, αF and 1 − αF denote the share of land and labor in food output
respectively. Entrepreneurs decide on the optimum surface for food production. We
assume that the use of land for agricultural activities involves residual costs that
support entrepreneurs.
The output from manufacturing goods and services is given by the technology
Y mt = µEz
EkαEt−1(n
E
t )
1−αE (5.3.12)
where zE is the technology factor, nE is labor hired by entrepreneurs from
manufacturing workers, k the capital effectively utilized by the manufacturing and
services firm, αE and 1−αE represent the share of capital and labor in manufacturing
and services output respectively. The capital stock k evolves according to the law of
motion
ikt = kt − (1− δk)kt−1 (5.3.13)
where δk is the depreciation rate of the capital and i
k is the economy gross investment.
188
5 Distributional and Welfare Effects of Tax Reforms
Entrepreneurs own all productive units in this economy. They finance investment for
manufacturing and service firms and place their extra savings in government bonds.
Their income includes corporate profits (from agricultural firms piFt = p
f
t Y
f
t − wRt nFt
and manufacturing and services firms piEt = p
m
t Y
m
t − wMt nEt .), rent payment by
informal sector workers, and interest payment from government bonds. Entrepreneurs
are subject to various taxes at the firm and individual levels. At the firm level,
entrepreneurs pay corporate tax on profits. The corporate tax rate for agricultural
firms τFw , is below that of manufacturing and service firms τ
E
w . This difference in
corporate taxation reflects preferential treatment for agriculture as illustrated by
multiple tax exemptions granted to that sector. At the individual level, entrepreneurs
pay income tax on their earnings from housing renting and interest payment on bonds,
VAT on their purchase of goods and services, and property tax on their houses.
The budget constraint of the representative entrepreneur is given by
(1 + τf )p
f
t c
Ef
t + (1 + τm)p
m
t c
Em
t + (1 + τs)p
s
tc
Es
t + p
h
t (h
E
t − (1− τh)hEt−1)
+ pht (h
r
t − (1− τh)hrt−1) + pkt ikt + bt+1 + δLLt =
(1− τFw )piFt + (1− τEw )piEt + (1− τr)prthrt + (1 + rt−1(1− τb))bt + ΓEt + ACEt
(5.3.14)
where cEi, i = f,m, s are consumption for food, manufacturing goods and services,
respectively. They can buy and sell residential housing hE and rental housing hr, and
receive the rent pr, of rental houses from informal service workers. Regarding the data,
we assume the total supply of land is fixed. The entrepreneur representative agent
has a fixed land asset. So, the decision of the entrepreneur is to choose the arable
area L, based on the cost of cultivating that area δLL. b is government bonds bearing
interest rate, r subject to a tax rate τb. Γ
E a lump sump transfer from the government.
Entrepreneurs face internal adjustment costs when changing their housing and capital
stock, ACEt = (ψh/2)p
h
t (
hEt −hEt−1
h
E )
2 + (ψh/2)p
h
t (
hrt−hrt−1
h
r )2 + (ψk/2)p
k
t (
kt−kt−1
k
)2.
The representative entrepreneur household maximizes its utility 5.3.2 subject to a
budget constraint 5.3.14. The optimum condition for residential housing, rental
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housing and bonds are
pht =
ϕEh
λEt h
E
t
+ βEEt
λEt+1
λEt
pht+1(1− τh) (5.3.15)
pht = βEEt
λEt+1
λEt
pht+1(1− τh) + (1− τr)prt (5.3.16)
1 = βEEt
λEt+1
λEt
(1 + rt−1(1− τb)) (5.3.17)
and with respect to capital, land and labor,
1 = βEEt
λMt+1
λMt
(1− δk + (1− τEw )pmt+1zEαE(
nEt+1
kt
)(1−αE)) (5.3.18)
δL = (1− τFw )(1 + σf )pft zFαF (
nFt
Lt
)1−αF (5.3.19)
(1− αE)pmt zE(
kt−1
nEt
)αE = wMt (5.3.20)
(1− αF )pft zF (
L
nFt
)αF = wRt (5.3.21)
The optimal allocations by entrepreneurs are affected by tax rates, which could switch
production and saving incentives.
5.3.2 Government
The government collects tax revenue and has a redistributive role through lump sum
transfers to households and public spending. The government budget constraint is
given by:
Tt +Bt+1 +Gr = gt + (1 + rt−1)Bt + Γt + At (5.3.22)
T is total tax revenue, B is total government bond, g is government expenditure, Γ is
total lump sump transfer to households and A is food subsidies to rural workers. Gr is
fixed and represents other revenue received by the government, including grants and
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voluntary contributions. We assume that government expenditure follows the path
gt = ρggt−1 + (1− ρg)g (5.3.23)
where g is the steady state of the government expenditure and ρg is a positive constant
smaller than one. Γit i = S,M,R,E are lump sump transfers to each agent and total
transfer is Γ,
Γit = γiYt, i = S,M,R,E (5.3.24)
Γt = µSΓ
I
t + µMΓ
M
t + µRΓ
R
t + µEΓ
E
t (5.3.25)
At = σRµRp
f
t c
Rf (5.3.26)
where Y is total output (GDP) and Y f is total food production. Government
tax revenue includes VAT, property tax, income taxes on wage, profit and interest
payment. The total tax revenue collected in this economy is given by:
Tt = τfp
f
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f
t + τmp
m
t C
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s
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s
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where
Ci = µSc
Si
t + µMc
Mi
t + µRc
Ri
t + µEc
Ei
t , i = f,m, s (5.3.28)
Ht = µSh
I
t + µMh
M
t + µEh
E
t (5.3.29)
W it = µil
i
tw
i
t, i = I,M,R (5.3.30)
ΠFt = µEpi
F
t (5.3.31)
ΠEt = µEpi
E
t (5.3.32)
Bt = µEbt (5.3.33)
Ci, i = f,m, s is the aggregate consumption of food, manufacturing goods and
service, respectively. H is the number of houses and is normalized to one, W i, i =
I,M,R is the wage income for informal, manufacturing, and rural sector respectively;
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B is the stock of government’s bonds. ΠF and ΠE are the aggregate profits from
agricultural and manufacturing firms respectively.
5.3.3 Market Clearing
Non-housing good market clearing condition equates each type of output to total
consumption of that type,
Y ft = µEz
FLαF (nFt )
1−αF = Cft (5.3.34)
Y st = µSl
I
t z
I = Cst (5.3.35)
Y mt = µEz
EkαEt−1(n
E
t )
1−αE = Cmt + µEit + gt (5.3.36)
manufacturing goods are numeraire (i.e. pm = 1) so it is equal to total manufacturing
good consumption, capital investment and government expenditure. GDP is the sum
of all production, respecting their prices
Yt = p
f
t Y
f
t + p
m
t Y
m
t + p
s
tY
s
t (5.3.37)
The labor market clearing in agriculture and manufacturing are
µEn
F
t = µRl
R
t (5.3.38)
µEn
E
t = µM l
M
t (5.3.39)
The market clearing in the rental market, capital and total housing supply are
µEh
r
t = µSh
I
t (5.3.40)
Kt = µEkt (5.3.41)
H = 1 (5.3.42)
An equilibrium is a set of prices (pf , pm, ps, ph, pr, pk, r) and allocations of all
consumption for each agents and each type, housing and leisure time so that maximize
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the household utility functions subject to all constraints, market factors and market
clearings.
5.4 Calibration
Table 5.1 – Calibrated parameters
Parameters Symbol Value
VAT on food,manufacturing,service τf , τm, τs 0.10, 0.20, 0
Income tax on workers τ Iw, τ
M
w , τ
R
w 0.10, 0.20, 0.10
Income tax on Entr. τFw , τ
E
w 0.10, 0.30
Tax on return, rent, property τb, τr, τh 0.15, 0.13, 0.05
Share of each agent µS , µM , µR, µE 0.28, 0.32, 0.39, 0.01
Targeted transfer σR 0
Informality index ξ 0
Discount factors βI , βM , βR, βE 0.95, 0.96, 0.94, 0.97
Direct transfer γI , γM , γR, γE 0.028, 0.039, 0.010, 0.0007
Coef. in utility, Service ϕSf , ϕ
S
m, ϕ
S
s , ϕ
S
h , ϕ
S
l 1.1, 1, 0.82, 0.16, 7.5
Coef. in utility, Manufac. ϕMf , ϕ
M
m , ϕ
M
s , ϕ
M
h , ϕ
M
l 0.90, 1, 0.61, 0.15, 8.3
Coef. in utility, Rural ϕRf , ϕ
R
m, ϕ
R
s , ϕ
R
h , ϕ
R
l 1, 1, 0.50, 0, 8.6
Coef. in utility, Entre. ϕEf , ϕ
E
m, ϕ
E
s , ϕ
E
h , ϕ
E
l 0.95, 1, 0.80, 0.10, 0
Capital depreciation rate δk 0.1
Land preparation rate δL 0.001
Elasticity of capital αE 0.35
Elasticity of land αF 0.70
Factor productivity zS , zF , zE 1, 1.5, 0.96
Adj. cost coeff. ψk, ψh 2.4, 2
AR parameter of Gov. ρg 0.95
Table 5.1 presents the value of the parameters which are consistent with macro data
evidence in Moroccan economy from the national accounts, IMF and World Bank
databases (see the steady state values in Table 5.2). Tax rates for VAT, income tax,
property, and capital gains are from the Morocco’s official tax codes. The share of each
sector in total output and household consumption are derived from the input-output
tables published in the EORA MRIO database. The distribution of households by
type in the economy, the household wages and consumption of goods and services,
and the transfers received from government are calculated from the 2007 Household
Survey; and when the data were available from the 2014 Household survey.
The discount rate for entrepreneur is 0.97, which is consistent with a 3.6% average
annual interest rate on 5-year Morocco treasury bonds 2007-8. The discount rate for
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other agents reflects a relative preference for the present as opposed to entrepreneurs’
preferences. For the benchmark model, targeted transfers of food for poor people is set
to 0, and we assume the full informality in informal sector i.e. ξ = 0. The coefficient
of manufacturing consumption in the utility functions is normalized to 1 and all other
coefficients are set relative to this coefficient. The coefficient of leisure in the utility
function is consistent with time allocation of 25%, 27% and 31% working hours per
day for rural, informal and manufacturing workers based on household survey 2007.
Coefficients of service consumption in the utility functions and productivity of service
production target a 15% informality rate in all economy i.e. the value of all informal
activity (in this paper it is psY s) per GDP is about 15% based on HCP (2009).
Factor productivity of food production and the coefficients of food consumption
in the utility functions are calibrated in order to target the share of agriculture
production (pfY f ) per GDP equal to 20% according to Karim and Mansouri (2015).
Elasticity of capital and land , and factor productivity of manufacturing production
are conventional parameters and resulted from 65% share of manufacturing products
(pmY m) per GDP. Coefficients of housing in the utility function reflects the housing
market’s structure of 40% rental housed, 53% worker homeowners and the remainder
for entrepreneurs’ houses. This setting correctly results in 2.1% property tax
revenue per GDP, in line with rates from the General Tax Administration. Capital
depreciation rate is set to 0.10 to target capital per GDP equal to 1.2 annually based
on Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2015). According to the World Bank, urban residential
areas in Morocco are about 2.7% of all land areas and agricultural farms are about
68%. This shows agricultural areas occupy about 25 times the land of residential areas.
In this paper all residential areas are normalized to one, hence the land preparation
rate δL is calibrated to have total agriculture area equal to 25 times of total residential
area in the benchmark. We conduct a sensitivity analysis to calibrate the parameters
to the adjustment cost functions and retain the values consistent with the short run
volatility of the economy.
194
5 Distributional and Welfare Effects of Tax Reforms
Table 5.2 – Steady state of the benchmark model per GDP.
Variable/GDP symbol/Y Steady State/Y
Consumption C 0.54
Tax T 0.25
Bond B 0.67
Transfers Γ 0.024
Capital K 1.22
Grants Gr 0.03
Wages WS ,WM ,WR 0.15, 0.42, 0.06
Government Exp. g 0.24
Housing market phH 0.43
Food market pfY f 0.20
Manufacturing and service market pmY m 0.65
Informal sector psY s 0.15
Investments µEi
k 0.14
Housing/H∗ hS , hM , hE 0.40, 0.53, 0.07
* This row shows the share of agent’s houses over all houses and not GDP.
5.5 Scenarios and analysis
In this section, we study the impact of tax reforms by analyzing the macroeconomic
and welfare effects on households. The changes (1% for each parameter) are as follows;
increasing VAT and property tax rates, decreasing food exemptions (for entrepreneurs)
and corporate tax rate, enforcing personal income tax rate in the informal sector, and
strengthening the social safety net (Generalized and targeted transfers 18). We assume
that economic agents anticipate the tax reform and fully internalize its implications
to their economic decisions. In each of these simulations, our initial steady state is the
same, calibrated to Morocco’s economy as described in the calibration section, and we
assess the transition to the new steady state after implementing the new tax policy.
Table 5.3 summarizes the main long-run effects on output, tax revenues, consumption,
and prices. In addition, tax multipliers, ∆ = ∆Y
∆T
, for each scenario are presented in
the last column.
18. Generalized transfers reduce the cost of consumption for certain products. Targeted transfers
are transfers to certain agents in the economy.
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Table 5.3 – % change in the steady state for a 1% change in the policy parameters
Increasing the VAT rates Y T Cf Cm Cs ph ∆
Food −0.03 0.91 −0.37 0.37 0.01 0.40 −0.033
Manufacture 0.14 0.88 0.28 −0.44 0.01 0.34 0.15
Reducing exemptions & CIP
Decreasing exemption 0.12 0.76 −0.54 0.33 0.009 0.30 0.15
Decreasing Co. tax 0.58 −0.46 0.18 0.28 −0.01 0.33 −1.26
Both 0.71 0.30 −0.35 0.61 −0.004 0.63 2.3
Increasing the property tax
property tax 0.20 0.93 0.13 0.17 0 −10.2 0.21
Social Safety net
Generalized transfer 0.03 −0.18 0.43 −0.43 −0.02 −0.46 −0.16
VAT on food & Generalized transfer 0.008 0.72 0.09 −0.09 −0.004 −0.10 0.01
VAT on food & Targeted transfer −0.06 0.61 −1.88 0.38 0.009 −0.11 0.09
Taxing the informal sector
Income tax 0.003 0.65 −0.002 −0.002 −0.03 −0.2 0.004
VAT on Service −0.11 0.70 0.06 0.08 −0.02 −0.15 −0.15
Both −0.10 1.35 0.06 0.08 −0.06 −0.38 −0.07
Suggested Mix Policy
Comprehensive tax strategy 1.0 1.8 −1.4 0.3 0 −9.8 0.55
5.5.1 Increase VAT rates
Increased VAT rates would boost government revenue, but the impact on output
depends on which types of goods are subjected to the increased rates. A marginal
increase in the VAT rate (1%) on food (respectively manufacturing goods) would raise
government revenue by 0.9% (respectively 0.8%). However, GDP increases by 0.14%
following an increase in VAT on manufacturing good but declines by 0.03% after the
increase in VAT rate on food.
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Figure 5.9 – (%) change from the baseline steady state, perfect foresight path, aggregate
of key variables, 1% increase in VAT of food and manufacturing products.
Figure 5.9 shows the economy transition under the new VAT regime (food and
manufacturing items); in the short run, output variations reflect changes in the
work effort associated with marginal tax rates, while in the long run, higher
(manufacturing good) prices induce greater capital accumulation. Increasing VATs
benefits entrepreneurs the most as their profits increase, while workers would generally
be worse off. Given Morocco’s high VAT rates, and considering the growth effects of
increased VAT on food, the appropriate approach to tax reform would seem to consists
in aligning the reduced VAT rate on manufacturing goods to the standard VAT rate,
to take advantage of both the growth and revenue enhancing impacts.
The short-run drop in the capital-labor ratio, followed by the increase on the VAT
rate on manufacturing goods, produces a relative increase in after-tax return on
housing. This leads entrepreneurs to invest more on real estate. The more demand for
housing, the higher the housing price. This makes it more difficult for manufacturing
households to buy houses. As a result, the manufacturing household demand for
housing drops. From equation 5.3.16, the rent price in the steady state is a liner
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function of the housing price,
pr =
1− βE(1− τh)
1− τr p
h (5.5.1)
so the rent price percentage change is the same as the housing price, ceteris paribus.
However, due to dynamic equation 5.3.16, they pass in different paths. The rent
price increases due to equation 5.5.1 and the fact that with a higher VAT food,
the supply side of the rental houses declines. Increasing the manufacturing VAT
has a positive effect on entrepreneurs’ profits. The manufacturing product price is
set to one as numerior, so alternatively, the food relative price increases and makes
entrepreneurs better off in term of profits. This makes space for entrepreneurs to
increase consumption and housing.
5.5.2 Reduce Exemptions and Corporate tax rate
A combination of lower exemptions and corporate tax rate would boost government
revenues and output 19. Formally, broadening the tax base is specified by corporate
profits as a combination of agricultural and manufacturing firm profits and by applying
relevant corporate tax rates. Reducing tax exemptions (e.g. to agricultural firm)
would be equivalent to increasing corporate taxation for those firms. A combination
of lower exemptions and lower corporate tax rates boosts government revenue and
output. This combination expands the tax base and reduces tax avoidance.
19. We analyze the impact of reducing the income tax exemption on food producer, from 10% to
11%, decreasing corporate tax on manufacturing production from 30% to 29% and at the end, the
impact of applying these two changes at the same time on the aggregate of key variables is assessed.
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Figure 5.10 – (%) change from the baseline steady state, perfect foresight path, aggregate
of key variables,targeted transfer to rural workers and 1% exemption reduction on food
producers.
Following these changes, output increases. The lower corporate tax rate increases the
rate of investments. The lower exemptions and corporate taxes induces substitution
effects that encourage lower food consumption, but higher manufacturing goods
consumption. These impacts are reinforced by the positive wealth effect among
entrepreneurs who hold capital. These two factors also generate a substantial long-run
jump in government revenues, because the lower exemptions compensate the revenue
loss from the lower corporate tax rate.
By paying more tax, entrepreneurs decrease food production and move toward
manufacturing. This increases manufacturing consumption and decreases food
consumption in all agents. On the other hand, the mentioned policies increase the food
price which offsets the impact of reducing food production. Hence, the entrepreneurs’
profit increases (in this case about 0.12%) and entrepreneurs consequently consume
more. Figure 5.12 show the dynamic effects of scenarios.
The reduction in corporate taxes has a positive influence on both food and
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manufacturing consumption. It happens because after the reduction, entrepreneurs
have more space, but due to the high productivity in agriculture industries, they prefer
to partially move to manufacturing industries. Increasing investment in the capital
stock leads to less consumption and saving for entrepreneurs and consequently less
housing demands. As a result, the rental market and the housing prices decline. In
this situation manufacturing workers have more opportunity to increase their housing
demands.
5.5.3 Increasing property tax
A broad-based property tax associated induces beneficial substitution effects in asset
accumulation. It encourages lower real estate, but higher capital accumulation, and
thus increases manufacturing production. It generates an increase of 0.2% in long-run
output, and of 0.9% in government revenues. House prices are a key channel for these
effects, as they affect incentives to home ownership versus renting (see Equ. 5.5.1).
Figure 5.11 – (%) change from the baseline steady state, perfect foresight path, aggregate
of key variables, 1% increase in property tax.
Being housing owners, manufacturing workers and entrepreneurs are affected directly
200
5 Distributional and Welfare Effects of Tax Reforms
by changing property tax. Manufacturing workers reduce their demand due to the
higher marginal cost. On the other hand, informal workers are exposed to this change
indirectly through rental market. Due to the fixed total housing supply and the
lower price, entrepreneurs increase their demand of housing. As a result, according
to equation 5.5.1, the rent price has a positive correlation with property tax and the
housing price. The housing price drops about 10% while property tax is increased
only 1%.The conventional result is about 0.8% increase in the rent price. The higher
the rent price, the lower rental demands which drops the supply side of rental market.
This results in an increase in the rent price.
5.5.4 Social safety net
In this section, we analyze the impact of generalized and targeted transfers as well
as mixed scenarios. In generalized transfer, government issues vouchers entitling the
holder to a discount for a particular product or cards with credits. We assume that
such a program exempts poor people of paying VAT on food, i.e. σR = τf . The other
aid scenario is targeted transfers to poor people and let them choose their consumption
i.e γR form 0.01 to 0.02.
Generalized transfer increases GDP through an increase in food consumption. This
increases the food price and the benefit of food producers. As a result, entrepreneurs
decrease their consumption and savings to profit from more food production by
increasing land and labor. This reduces entrepreneurs housing demands which results
in a drop in the housing price. Manufacturing households use this situation to buy
more houses. Entrepreneurs hire more rural labor. This has a positive distributional
effect on rural wage. The higher the food price, the lower the food consumption of
those agents who do not benefit from this kind of transfer. Rural workers are around
36% of all the population, so exempting them from paying tax has a negative effect on
total tax revenue. By Having more profit, entrepreneurs decrease all consumption and
saving to profit from more food production by increasing the usage of land to guaranty
the maximum profit. This reduces entrepreneurs housing demands which results in a
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drop in the housing price. Manufacturing households use this situation to buy more
houses. The drop in entrepreneurs consumption has a negative distributional effect
on the informal and manufacturing wages due to lower demand, but it has a positive
distributional effect on the rural wage due to the increase in labor. Mixing generalized
transfers and increasing food VAT does not change GDP and has positive effect on
total tax revenue. VAT of food lowers the food price (as it is discussed in VAT
section) but it is offset by the effect of the higher demand from rural workers due to
the generalized transfers. On the other hand, the same plan with targeted transfers,
inversely, has a negative impact on GDP with a lower tax revenue. This result is very
important. Whiles generalized transfers increase rural wages, targeted transfers have
negative impacts on wages. Targeted transfers motivate rural households to consume
more but it does not target one type of consumption. More consumption positively
affects all prices. With higher prices the consumption of other agents declines. This
reduces the entrepreneur’s profit and consequently, decreases investment and output.
Figure 5.12 – (%) change from the baseline steady state, perfect foresight path, aggregate
of key variables,targeted and generalized transfer to rural workers.
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5.5.5 Taxing the informal sector
A fully informal service sector is assumed in the baseline model. We assume that
government motivates 20 informal workers to declare their incomes, so 10% of informal
workers are taxed 21. We also assess the impact of 1% increase in the VAT of informal
services form zero to one percent.
Figure 5.13 shows the perfect foresight path between two steady state. Decreasing
informality has an insignificant negative effect on GDP right after the shock but in
the long term it makes a raise in GDP that mostly comes from the increase in capital
investment.
However, the decrease in informality has a positive effect on GDP and economy, it
is not significantly important relative to costs and difficulties that the government
should pay 22. Nonetheless, the behavior of the rent price is the same as
housing price in the case of the change in the VAT of food and manufacturing,
it behaves differently in case of the VAT of informal services. Informal
workers are renters and their demands for rental housings affect rental market.
20. Dougherty and Escobar (2013) empirically urges ”that to reduce labour informality it is
necessary to promote economic development, education, FDI openness, as well as the prevalence
of corruption and the share of microenterprises.”
21. We chose 10% just to magnitude the impact because the effect of 1% is relatively small. ξ is
the parameter which captures informality. It moves from zero in the baseline model to 10%.
22. See Oviedo et al. (2009) to find about costs of decreasing informality.
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Figure 5.13 – (%) change from the baseline steady state, perfect foresight path, aggregate
of key variables, 1% decrease in informality.
Applying a tax reduces the supply side of the informal market. By paying tax on their
income, informal workers decrease their rental demands to smoothen consumption.
This results in a drop in the rent price. This motivates entrepreneurs to move more
toward buying residential houses than rental ones. The higher demand, the higher
price, which forces manufacturing household to reduce their house demands in short-
run.
5.5.6 Suggested policy: Comprehensive package
The simulations above show the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables
to different fiscal policies. These simulations allow us to identify several
recommendations that could be part of an optimal reform package. This
comprehensive tax reform strategy should enhance tax revenues, boost growth, and
improve fairness simultaneously. This 3-dimension target is the reason of launching
the fiscal reform. Noting the results of each policy, it is clear that each policy is
a trade-off. Macroeconomic policy questions involve trade-offs between competing
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forces in the economy. The problem is how to assess the strength of those forces for
the particular policy question at hand. Each policy improves a dimension of the target
and decreases another one. For instance, decreasing corporate taxes boosts output
but decreases tax revenues. To optimize our 3-dimension target, we simply combines
several reform components from the list of reforms above. Note, there is not only one
optimal policy for the whole economy. The optimal package depends on the needs of
government and other economic considerations. The goal here is to do a pedagogic
exercise and show that a mixed tax reform is a better policy for the economy than
an individual reform. While a single tax reform has positive and negative impacts on
the economy, a mixed tax policy offers better results by offsetting the adverse impact
of a single reform and improving the positive effects. Hence, the size of changes
(here, 1% change from the baseline) is only chosen to keep the simulation simple,
standard and understandable. One can change the size of reforms based on the results
of the simulation, government’s plan and other political economic and technological
considerations.
Figure 5.14 – (%) change from the baseline steady state, perfect foresight path, aggregate
of key variables1% Lower exemptions and corporate tax, 1% increase in targeted social safety
net, VAT increase in manufacturing goods, and property tax increase.
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Figure 5.15 – Long-Run Effects of Tax Reform Scenarios on Macroeconomic Aggregates
Compared
(Comprehensive Reform’s Scenario = 1, better outcomes are greater than 1)
The suggested policy which satisfies our 3-dimension target is composed of a 1%
decrease in exemptions and corporate tax, and a 1% increase in: generalized social
safety net, the VAT of manufacturing goods and property tax. Figure 5.14 presents
the impulse responses to the mixed policy. Table 5.3 shows that this reform approach
could bring about significant benefits in terms of growth, revenue mobilization, and
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welfare improvements. A comprehensive tax reform boosts growth by 1% in the long-
run by encouraging business and sharpening incentives to production. In addition,
it enhances government’s revenue by 1.8% from initial steady state, which helps to
reduce the fiscal deficit and create a fiscal space for investment and social spending.
Finally, it improves fairness by addressing some lingering inequality and making the
tax system progressive in its effects. The mixed package actives all mechanisms
and channels already explained in previous sections. Some of these mechanisms are
synergistic and some offset the impact of other mechanisms. More broadly, figure 5.15
shows that a comprehensive package yields better outcomes (represented by the grey
area in the figure) than partial reforms.
5.6 Welfare effects
In order to calculate welfare effects, we apply the standard welfare measure used in the
literature e.g. see Domeij and Heathcote (2004). In an economy with idiosyncratic
shocks, the welfare is measured by expected future variables. On the other hand
in the no-risk economy, the welfare change is a function of initial position. In this
framework, welfare is measured in terms of annual consumption equivalents that is
equal to Λi, i = S,M,R,E. The welfare measure Λi obtained
23 from
∞∑
t=0
βtiU((1 + Λi)C
i
0, h
i
0, l
i
0) =
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t=0
βtiU(C
i
t , h
i
t, l
i
t), i = S,M,R,E (5.6.2)
and the weighted average welfare measure is defined as ΛA = µSΛS+µMΛM +µRΛR+
µEΛE.
Table 5.4 summaries the welfare impacts of the scenarios developed in this paper. The
23. There are three different type of consumption in the utility function, but due to the Natural
Logarithm characteristics, it is possible to express all consumption in one term and analyze the effect
of changes in term of annual consumption equivalents. The rearranged utility function is
uit(C
i
t , h
i
t, l
i
t) = ln[(c
if
t )
ϕif (cist )
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Cit
] + ϕih lnh
i
t + ϕ
i
l ln(1− lit) i = I,M,R,E (5.6.1)
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Table 5.4 – welfare effects for related change
Change in ΛS(%) ΛM (%) ΛR(%) ΛE(%) ΛA(%)
Food VAT 0.06 −0.93 −2.02 6.79 −1
Manufacture VAT −0.03 −1.19 −0.15 5.51 −0.39
Property tax 0.36 −0.87 0.32 3.97 −0.012
Decreasing exemption −0.05 −1.02 −0.20 4.71 −0.37
Decreasing Co. tax −0.03 1.32 0.07 −5.85 0.38
Both −0.09 0.28 −0.12 −1.29 0.003
Generalized transfer −1.008 0.18 10.8 −8.41 3.93
VAT on food & Generalized transfer −1.03 −0.73 9.70 −2.70 3.23
VAT on food & Targeted transfer −1.80 −2.07 26.7 −8.89 9.18
Informality −2.30 −0.03 −0.03 5.21 −0.62
Service VAT −2.23 −0.09 −0.01 6.15 −0.59
Both −4.48 −0.13 −0.04 11.5 −1.20
Comprehensive package −1.6 −2.8 28 −7.4 9.8
welfare analysis also serves as a yardstick to gauge the impact of different tax reform
on inequality across households types. The percentages in the figure present what
percent of the first period consumption of agent is required to make agents indifferent
between applying the change and having the benchmark value. Figure 5.16 shows
that in the view point of average welfare, except for the scenarios including transfers
and reducing taxes, the economy is worst off and faces the welfare loss in average
for all agents. Figure 5.17 further shows the superiority of a comprehensive reform
package relatively to partial reforms.
 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Increasing VAT on food
Increasing VAT on manufacturing goods
Decreasing exemptions
Property tax
Lowering exemptions and corporate tax
Decreasing corporate income tax
VAT on food & generalized transfer
Generalized transfer
VAT on food & targeted transfer
Comprehensive package
Figure 5.16 – Average household Welfare gained by tax reform scenarios (%).
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Figure 5.17 – Long-Run Effects of Tax Reform Scenarios on Household Welfare Compared
(Comprehensive Reform’s Scenario = 1, better outcomes are greater than 1)
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5.7 Conclusion
A tax reform package implies complex trade-off between growth, government revenue,
and equity. A comprehensive approach associated with better targeted social
programs, broadens the tax base, removes tax distortions, better distributes the
tax burden, and mitigates adverse distributional effects (that is improves welfare)
by making the tax system more progressive and reducing inequalities. In emerging
and developing economies, a comprehensive and pedagogical approach could help
support fiscal reforms going forward. For Morocco, while achievements have been
made, there is a need for greater clarity and communication on the overall reform
strategy. There is agreement that the priority is to broaden the tax base and make
the system more efficient and equitable. However, faster implementation of the agreed
consensus reached in 2013 requires a more strategic and pedagogic approach, including
the coordination, sequence, and timeframe of reforms, which could yield about 1.5-2
percent of additional public revenues over the medium term. This analysis proposed
tax reform package for Morocco would involve i) aligning the reduced VAT rate
on manufacturing goods and service to the standard VAT rate, ii) reducing tax
exemptions, iii) a broader-based property tax rate, iv) lower corporate tax rate, and
v) strengthened safety net. The proposed comprehensive tax reform package offers a
tax mix that would allow Morocco to perform well along the key yardsticks used to
assess tax system. It would enhances government’s revenue from initial steady state,
which help to reduce the fiscal deficit and to create a fiscal space for investment and
social spending. It would boost growth by reducing government taxation on corporate
to encourage business and sharpen incentives to production. Finally, it would improve
fairness by addressing the lingering inequality and making the tax system progressive
in its effects.
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5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 Long-run impacts of each household
Long-run impacts on each household for all analyzed scenarios
Table 5.5 – % change in the steady state of total wage, consumption of each good and
housing for each agent, 1% increase in VAT.
VAT on Food W Cf Cm Cs h
Informal worker 0.47 -0.30 0.44 -0.006 0.04
Manu. worker 0 -0.75 0 -0.45 -0.40
Rural worker -0.52 -1.24 -0.48 -0.93 0
Entre. −0.20∗ 2.12 2.89 2.43 2.48
VAT on Manu.
Informal worker 0.44 0.32 -0.39 -0.003 0.08
Manu. worker -0.004 -0.11 -0.82 -0.43 -0.34
Rural worker 0.39 0.26 -0.44 -0.05 0
Entre. 0.15∗ 2.15 1.42 1.82 1.91
* This is total profit of entrepreneurs in the form of (Πf + ΠE).
Table 5.6 – % change in the steady state of total wage, consumption of each good and
housing for each agent, 1% increase in property tax.
Property tax W Cf Cm Cs h
Informal worker 0.21 0.16 0.21 0 -0.61
Manu. worker 0.20 -0.11 -0.06 -0.27 0.41
Rural worker 0.18 0.13 0.18 -0.02 0
Entre. 0.19∗ 1.27 1.33 1.11 0.49
* This is total profit of entrepreneurs in the form of (Πf + ΠE).
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Table 5.7 – % change in the steady state of total wage, consumption of each good and
housing for each agent, targeted transfer to rural workers and 1% decreasing exemption to
food producers.
Decreasing exemption W Cf Cm Cs h
Informal worker 0.38 -0.51 0.37 -0.003 0.07
Manu. worker -0.003 -0.88 0.001 -0.37 -0.29
Rural worker 0.34 -0.55 0.32 -0.04 0
Entre. 0.12∗ 1.05 1.95 1.57 1.65
Decreasing Cor. tax
Informal worker 0.20 0.13 0.22 0.004 -0.10
Manu. worker 0.77 0.68 0.76 0.54 0.43
Rural worker 0.20 0.29 0.07 1.09 0
Entre. 0.57∗ -2.14 -2.06 -2.27 -2.38
Both
Informal worker 0.59 -0.37 0.60 0.001 -0.03
Manu. worker 0.76 -0.20 0.76 0.16 0.13
Rural worker 0.61 -0.35 0.62 0.02 0
Entre. 0.70∗ -1.06 -0.10 -0.69 -0.72
* This is total profit of entrepreneurs in the form of (Πf + ΠE).
Table 5.8 – % change in the steady state of total wage, consumption of each good and
housing for each agent, targeted transfer to rural workers and 1% decreasing exemption to
food producers.
Generalized Transfer W Cf Cm Cs h
Informal worker -0.54 -0.68 -0.51 0.007 -0.05
Manu. worker -0.001 -0.16 0 0.52 0.46
Rural worker 0.60 10.4 0.56 1.09 0
Entre. 0.23∗ -3.49 -3.33 -2.82 -2.88
VAT on food & Generalized transfer
Informal worker -0.12 -1.05 -0.11 0.001 -0.01
Manu. worker 0 -0.93 0 0.11 0.10
Rural worker 0.13 10 0.12 0.23 0
Entre. 0.05∗ -1.66 -0.73 -0.61 -0.63
VAT on food & Targeted transfer
Informal worker 0.18 -2.13 0.17 -0.003 0.29
Manu. worker 0.001 -2.30 0 -0.17 0.11
Rural worker -0.47 4 6.46 6.27 0
Entre. −0.18∗ -4.71 -2.45 -2.63 -2.34
* This is total profit of entrepreneurs in the form of (Πf + ΠE).
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Table 5.9 – % change in the steady state of total wage, consumption of each good and
housing for each agent, 10% decrease in informality.
Decreasing Informality W Cf Cm Cs h
Informal worker 0.02 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.7
Manu. worker 0 0 0 -0.06 0.23
Rural worker -0.001 -0.002 -0.06 -0.006 0
Entre. −0.001∗ 1.88 1.88 1.82 2.1
VAT on Service
Informal worker -0.85 -0.84 -0.82 -0.98 -0.67
Manu. worker 0.003 -0.02 0 -0.16 0.15
Rural worker 0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.08 0
Entre. 0.03∗ 2.39 2.42 2.25 2.57
Both
Informal worker -0.82 -1.75 -1.73 -1.95 -1.36
Manu. worker 0.003 -0.02 0 -0.22 0.38
Rural worker 0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.15 0
Entre. 0.03∗ 4.27 4.29 4.05 4.69
* This is total profit of entrepreneurs in the form of (Πf + ΠE).
Table 5.10 – % change in the steady state of total wage, consumption of each good and
housing for each agent, 1% Lower exemptions and corporate tax, 1% increase in targeted
social safety net, VAT increase in manufacturing goods, and property tax increase.
Combined 1 W Cf Cm Cs h
Informal worker 0.9 -1.6 0.1 0 -0.3
Manu. worker 0.9 -1.9 -0.1 -0.2 0.7
Rural worker 1.2 5.2 7.2 7.1 0
Entre. 1.0∗ -4.4 -2.6 -2.7 -3.1
Combined 2 W Cf Cm Cs h
Informal worker 0.5 -1.9 -0.2 0 0.4
Manu. worker 0 -2.5 -0.8 -0.5 -0.1
Rural worker 0.7 4.9 6.7 7 0
Entre. 0.3∗ -3.5 -1.9 -1.6 -1.2
* This is total profit of entrepreneurs in the form of (Πf + ΠE).
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6 Re´sume´ des travaux de the`se
6.1 Conse´quences macroe´conomiques
de la re´allocation des actifs bancaires apre`s
de´faillance de preˆts hypothe´caires
Cet article propose un mode`le DSGE qui utilise des estimations baye´siennes pour
e´valuer une e´conomie qui fait face aux de´fauts des emprunteurs vis-a`-vis de leur
preˆt bancaire. Cette situation peut eˆtre compare´ a` la re´cession de 2008. La fac¸on
d’appre´hender le mechanism des de´fauts est e´tudie´ dans cet article de la meˆme manier
que Iacoviello (2015). Le mode`le de cet article ajoute un marche´ des obligations du
Tre´sor a` la litte´rature et montre que ce marche´ joue un roˆle important dans cette
e´conomie. En effet, le de´faut augmente l’e´cart entre le taux hypothe´caires et celui
de de´poˆts. Dans cette situation, les banques pre´fe`rent compenser leurs pertes en
re´alisant des be´ne´fices sur le marche´ hypothe´caire et ainsi, en diminuant leurs avoirs
en obligations du Tre´sor. Ces changements propagent le choc a` l’e´conomie re´elle a`
travers le marche´ de l’immobilier , celui du cre´dit, et aussi par l’effet sur les de´poˆts et
les preˆts gouvernementaux.
Les simulations reproduisent le comportement de variables e´conomiques cle´s avant la
grande re´cession; en particulier les prix de l’immobilier, les hypothe`ques, les de´poˆts
et les avoirs en obligations du tre´sor par les banques. Ce mode`le montre un effet de
spirale descendante sur le prix de l’immobilier qui perdure apre`s la crise.
En outre, les re´sultats montrent que les politiques macroprudentielles contribuent a`
atte´nuer les risques financiers. Cependant, les simulations montrent que les politiques
de sortie de crise peuvent eˆtre inade´quates pour la restauration de l’e´conomie apre`s
la crise.
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6.2 Shadow banking, marche´s de l’immobilier et
du cre´dit: re´cit d’une re´cession
Cet article reprend le mode`le de Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) et l’augmente de
plusieurs e´le´ments. Il propose un mode`le DSGE avec des retraits bancaires afin
d’e´valuer l’impact du marche´ de l’immobilier et de celui du cre´dit sur l’instabilite´
financie`re et sur les activite´s de shadow banking. Cet article montre que les canaux
macro-financiers et macro-immobiliers amplifient le choc sur la productivite´ totale des
facteurs de production a` travers le bilan des me´nages, le bilan des banques et via des
canaux de liquidite´.
Si le choc rend le secteur bancaire paralle`le (shadow bank) insolvable, deux e´quilibres
coexistent : un e´quilibre avec les retraits bancaires provoquant des faillites bancaires
et un e´quilibre sans ceux-ci. De ce point de vue, le retrait bancaire est un e´chec
de coordination. A` l’e´quilibre avec faillite Si les me´nages cessent de transfe´rer leurs
de´poˆts au secteur financier, les banques ne sont pas en mesure de financer leurs pertes
par de nouveaux de´poˆts. Alors elles sont oblige´es de liquider leurs actifs a` un prix de
liquidation endoge`ne.
Les simulations de l’e´quilibre avec faillite reproduisent le double creux du prix
des logements, la spirale descendante de la production et la longue pe´riode de
convalescence apre`s la crise. En outre, des outils de politiques macroprudentiels,
tels que des exigences d’ade´quation des fonds et des ratios preˆt-valeur, peuvent eˆtre
utiles pour e´liminer l’e´quilibre avec les faillite. Ces politiques prote`gent l’e´conomie
contre les crises extreˆmes et aident a` atte´nuer les risques syste´miques en isolant les
prix des actifs.
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6.3 Fiscalite´ de l’immobilier et interme´diation
financie`re
en collaboration avec Jean-Franc¸ois Rouillard, Professeur adjoint a` l’Universite´ de
Sherbrooke, Canada
Cet article reprend le mode`le de Alpanda and Zubairy (2016) en y ajoutant un secteur
bancaire. En suite, ous l’angle d’un mode`le d’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral dynamique multi-
agents, nous examinons les effets de quatre modifications d’imposition permanentes
sur les agre´gats macroe´conomiques et le bien-eˆtre. Les modifications fiscales que
nous examinons sont (i) la de´duction des paiements d’inte´reˆts hypothe´caires pour les
me´nages impatients, (ii) la de´duction des loyers impute´s, (iii) la taxe foncie`re, et (iv)
la de´duction pour amortissement. Nous constatons que ces changements ont de tre`s
faibles effets sur l’activite´ e´conomique a` court terme. Les multiplicateurs d’impoˆt, a`
court terme, que nous trouvons sur un horizon de 20 trimestres vont de -0,02 a` -0,13,
tandis que les multiplicateurs d’impoˆt a` long terme constate´s vont de -1,43 a` -0,81.
La mise en place des contraintes d’emprunt vis-a`-vis des banques atte´nue les
conse´quences ne´gatives de la fiscalite´ de l’immobilier sur la production, en particulier
a` court terme. La re´duction de la de´duction des paiements d’inte´reˆts hypothe´caires
offre le plus faible multiplicateur a` long terme.
Nous mettons e´galement en œuvre des re´formes fiscales sans incidence sur les revenus
et constatons que l’abrogation de la de´ductibilite´ des preˆts hypothe´caires est la seule
politique ge´ne´rant des gains de production.
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6.4 Cycle e´conomique avec interme´diation
bancaire dans les e´conomies pe´trolie`res
en collaboration avec Hamid Reza Tabaraei et Asghar Shahmoradi, senior Economists au
Fonds Mone´taire International (FMI), E´tats-Unis
Le mode`le structurel pre´sente´ dans cet article propose un cadre fonde´ sur des
fondements microe´comiques qui inte`gre un secteur bancaire actif et un secteur
de production pe´trolie`re. L’ajout d’un secteur bancaire a pour objectif principal
d’examiner le roˆle d’un marche´ interbancaire en cas de choc, de mettre en place un
fonds de de´veloppement national et d’e´tudier son lien avec le secteur bancaire et le
gouvernement.
Le gouvernement et le fonds national de de´veloppement jouent directement un roˆle cle´
dans la propagation du choc pe´trolier. En revanche, le secteur bancaire et le marche´
du travail, par une substitution parfaite entre les secteurs pe´trolier et non pe´trolier,
ont des impacts indirects majeurs sur la propagation des chocs.
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6.5 Effets distributifs des re´formes fiscales dans les
pays en de´veloppement: une e´tude de cas du
Maroc
en collaboration avec Jean Frederic Noah Ndela Ntsama, e´conomiste principale au Fonds
Mone´taire International (FMI) et Gregory Auclair, assistante de recherche au Fonds
Mone´taire International (FMI), E´tats-Unis.
Cet article e´value les effets macroe´conomiques des re´formes fiscales fondamentales
dans les e´conomies e´mergentes/en de´veloppement. Nous de´veloppons un
mode`le d’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral dynamique avec les caracte´ristiques structurelles et
institutionnelles des e´conomies e´mergentes et en de´veloppement non pe´trolie`res. Nous
appliquons ce mode`le au Maroc.
Les simulations du mode`le sugge`rent que les re´formes fiscales impliquent des
compromis complexes entre croissance, recettes publiques et e´quite´. Une approche
globale associe´e a` des programmes sociaux mieux cible´s, e´largit l’assiette fiscale,
supprime les distorsions fiscales, permet de mieux re´partir la charge fiscale et atte´nue
les effets ne´gatifs sur la re´partition (ame´liorant le bien-eˆtre) en rendant le syste`me
fiscal plus progressif et en re´duisant les ine´galite´s.
Pour le Maroc, une re´forme fiscale globale impliquerait i) une re´duction des
exone´rations fiscales, ii) un impoˆt sur les biens a` l’assiette plus large, iii) un taux
d’imposition des socie´te´s plus bas, iv) l’alignement des taux de TVA existants sur un
unique taux standard, et v) un filet de se´curite´ sociale mieux cible´. De plus, l’article
indique qu’un tel train de re´formes est favorable a` la croissance et a des implications
sur ine´galite´.
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Summary
The modern economy, which is a result of intricate human society, compels economists
and policy makers to build complex economic models. In addition to this complexity,
each country requires its own economic policies. This thesis addresses these intricacies
of modern economies. In the first three chapters of this thesis, I improve the current
literature to assess the role of financial intermediary agents, housing and credit markets
in the economy, using Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. Data
from three periods in the US economy, including the economic climate before the Great
Rescission, the systemic collapse in 2008, and post-crisis fiscal policies, are imputed into
the models. Simple DSGE models have been criticized for not placing more emphasis on
financial frictions. Here, I have included financial frictions on different sides of economy to
resolve the failures of previous models. The results of simulations indicate that introducing
these features to the economy reveals new channels and mechanisms which are neglected
in simple models. As a result, my model gives a more accurate means to forecast economic
movements. In addition, this thesis documents the significance of macroprudential policy
regulations in financial stability, sustainability and welfare. Lastly, in the final two chapters
of my thesis, I move away from the study of advanced markets and focus on developing
economies. These chapters build new models and address a variety of economic questions
pertaining to financial, public and labor economics in developing countries, through the
lens of multi-agent dynamic general equilibrium models. I examine the impacts of real,
monetary, fiscal and oil price shocks on the economic environment of developing countries.
I then propose appropriate policy recommendations.
Re´sume´
L’e´conomie moderne, qui re´sulte d’une socie´te´ humaine he´te´roge`ne, oblige les e´conomistes
et les de´cideurs a` e´laborer des mode`les e´conomiques complexes. Outre cette complexite´,
les politiques e´conomiques varient d’un pays a` l’autre. Cette the`se aborde ces complexite´s
des e´conomies modernes. Dans les trois premiers chapitres de ma the`se, j’ame´liore
les the´ories existantes pour e´valuer le roˆle des agents interme´diaires financiers, des
marche´s de l’immobilier et du cre´dit dans l’e´conomie, en utilisant des mode`les d’E´quilibre
Ge´ne´ral Dynamique et Stochastique (EGDS). Les donne´es de trois pe´riodes de l’e´conomie
ame´ricaine, couvrant le climat e´conomique avant la Grande Re´cession, l’effondrement
syste´mique de 2008 et les politiques budge´taires apre`s la crise, sont utilise´es. Les mode`les
EGDS ont souvent e´te´ critique´s pour leur trop grande simplification des marche´s financiers.
J’ai inclus les frictions financie`res des diffe´rents coˆte´s de l’e´conomie, ainsi que d’un
secteur immobilier. Cette combinaison des marche´ financier et immobilier est encore peu
de´veloppe´ dans la litte´rature. Les re´sultats des simulations indiquent que l’introduction de
ces nouvelles caracte´ristiques dans l’e´conomie re´ve`le de nouveaux canaux et me´canismes
qui sont ne´glige´s dans les mode`les simples. Par conse´quent, les mode`le de cette the`se
donne un moyen plus pre´cis d’analyser les mouvements e´conomiques. En outre, cette
the`se souligne l’importance des re´glementations des politiques macroprudentielles pour la
stabilite´ financie`re, la durabilite´ et le bien-eˆtre. Enfin, dans les deux derniers chapitres
de ma the`se, je quitte l’e´tude des marche´s avance´s et je me concentre sur les e´conomies
en de´veloppement. Ces chapitres construisent de nouveaux mode`les et abordent diverses
questions e´conomiques relatives a` l’e´conomie financie`re, publique et du travail dans les
pays en de´veloppement, a` travers le prisme des mode`les EGD a` agents he´te´roge`nes.
J’examine les impacts des chocs re´els, mone´taires, fiscaux et pe´troliers sur l’environnement
e´conomique des pays en de´veloppement. Je propose ensuite des recommandations de
politique e´conomique.
